Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Social Movement Studies

ISSN: 1474-2837 (Print) 1474-2829 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csms20

Imaginary enemy, real wounds: counter-movements, 'gender theory', and the French Catholic church

Romain Carnac

To cite this article: Romain Carnac (2020) Imaginary enemy, real wounds: counter-movements, 'gender theory', and the French Catholic church, Social Movement Studies, 19:1, 63-81, DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2019.1708307

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2019.1708307

SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES
2020, VOL. 19, NO. 1, 63–81
https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2019.1708307

Imaginary enemy, real wounds: counter-movements, 'gender theory', and the French Catholic church

Romain Carnac

CRAPUL-IEPHI, Université de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

ABSTRACT

In France, political opposition to the inclusion of so-called 'gender theory' in school curricula reached a peak during the debate over gay marriage in 2012–2013, where many observers were surprised by the strength of the opposition to government reforms promoting gender equality. The Catholic church played a leading role in this 'anti-gender' protest movement, seeing an opportunity to integrate conservative sexual morality into the movement's broader ideological framework. Here, I discuss this movement in order to draw out the shortcomings of the 'classical' movement-countermovement theoretical perspective, which often views conservative religious movements as monolithic actors, locked into a binary relationship with progressive forces. I argue however that the key outcomes of the 'anti-gender' movement are its effects not on its political opponents, but on the Catholic community itself. Indeed, the shaping of 'gender' as an *imaginary enemy* has powerful performative effects, including on the very group that invented it, including the reinforcement of Catholic identity 'we feeling' processes. Its effects include access to a wider audience, appealing to atheists in a global context of panic over the stability of sexual identities, and alliance with other religious groups, on the basis of shared moral values. Nevertheless, this strategy also has its drawbacks: it has revived old conflicts within the Church, and accelerated the internal division of the Catholic community.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 27 April 2016
Accepted 19 December 2019

KEYWORDS
France; Religion; Catholic Church; Gender; Same-sex marriage; Controversy

> 'It is easy to see, replied Don Quixote, that thou art not used to this business of adventures; those are giants; and if thou art afraid, away with thee out of this and betake thyself to prayer while I engage them in fierce and unequal combat.'
>
> Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, I-8

Throughout its history, the French Catholic Church has always been a plural community. Until the middle of the 20th century, this plurality of beliefs, practices, and political views remained under strict hierarchical control; however, from the 1960s onwards, the French ecclesiastical space started to splinter. This progressive disintegration has been accompanied by a dynamic of retreat; secularization has caused the Church to lose not only its faithful, but its cultural imprint (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). Catholics became, during the 20th century, a religious minority among others in France; for many

CONTACT Romain Carnac romain.carnac@gmail.com CRAPUL – IEPHI, UNIL Mouline, Lausanne 1015

Catholics, the perception of this reality has magnified a sense of threat, and fostered a defensive attitude towards the rest of society.

It is an understatement to say that in such a context, the return of conservative Catholics to the French public sphere in the 2011–2014 mobilizations against non-gendered education and same-sex marriage were unexpected, although they were not unprecedented: the focus on gender is rooted in global and national Catholic history, specifically in the 1970–1980 theological developments on 'complementarity' (Carnac, 2017a). In addition, the Catholic street protests of 1998–1999 against civil partnerships demonstrated the development of a 'moral struggle', serving as a rallying call for French intransigent Catholics but leaving them with a bitter legacy of defeat. How might social movements studies deal with such a phenomenon? European and American scholars often regard Christian movements against feminist/LGBTQ claims and equality-oriented government reforms as 'countermovements' – the dissident voices within the Church falling, in this perspective, into the 'counter-countermovements' category (Zald & Useem, 1987, p. 249). However, it is not in these terms that I intend to consider mobilizations in the context of the French 'gender controversy'. The shortcomings of this approach have already been widely pointed out, especially in studies of abortion or gay rights in the United States, which prefer the concept of 'opposing movements'.

Kuhar and Paternotte (2017) have also investigated the transnational dynamics of 'anti-gender campaigns' across Europe. Specifically, focus on Italy has showed remarkable commonalities with France (Avanza, 2015; Garbagnoli & Prearo, 2017), even if the contexts differ, particularly regarding the place of Catholicism in the national culture (Prearo, 2017) and the mobilization of the symbols of republicanism (Robcis, 2015). Importantly, this comparative perspective focuses on the strong internal networks of these movements, whose actions and decisions can be explained more successfully by the influence of counterpart movements abroad, hierarchical authorities (it should not be forgotten that the Catholic Church is a model of transnational pyramidal organisation), or the rise of the activist base, than by the moves of their opponents. Such analysis casts doubt on the relevance of the 'countermovement' perspective in the analysis of Catholic 'anti-gender' movements, as this approach tends to obscure the fact that these groups do not only 'react' to a 'progressive' movement, but also take their initiatives and pursue their own objectives (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017).

Here, I outline this theoretical discussion before showing, from the case study of the anti-gender movement in France, that an 'opposing movements' perspective can be useful in highlighting the mechanisms through which the Catholic 'anti-gender' movements and its broader environment are affected by the social movements in which Catholics are involved. Specifically, I argue that the creation of an enemy by the movement has a strong and complex impact on it, and that these dynamics can be analysed from an 'opposing movements' perspective.

The limits of the movement-countermovement approach

The most general and fundamental finding of the study of 'movements fighting against each other' (Fetner, 2008: xvi) is that *they influence each other*. Their ability to mobilize is directly related to the mobilization of their opponents, their strategies, their actions, and the actual or perceived effectiveness of the latter (Zald & Useem, 1987). Yet the

traditional movement-countermovement approach tends to focus on the issue of the origins of the movements, losing sight of their continuous interactions. In order to address this deficiency, some scholars suggest that the attention to political opportunities (Tarrow, 1996) could help refocus attention on the interplay of opposing movements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996, 2008), especially when understanding the concept of opportunity as relationally produced (Fillieule, 2005). In the case of activism against school desegregation in Mississippi, for example, Andrews remarks that the creation of numerous white-only private academies in the late 1960s must be considered in conjunction with the intensification of the threat posed by the state public policies of desegregation, but also with the empowerment of black activists in newly desegregated schools and the emergence of new claims from them (2002). Similar dynamics are at play, among others, in the abortion debate (Staggenborg, 1991; Munson, 2008) and in the gay rights debate (Fetner, 2001, 2008; Stone, 2016): the rise of the Religious Right opposition in the late 1970s not only negatively affected the pro-choice and LGBTQ movements, but also increased their ability to mobilize. As Meyer and Staggenborg argue in a milestone paper, 'movements ebb and flow in response not only to policy, but also to each other' (1996, p. 1644). This finding should not lead us to minimise the role of the State, insofar as it is a full-fledged actor in the interaction between opposing movements which can amplify or mitigate the interference between them (McAdam, 1982); the logical consequence of this perspective is rather that only by taking into account all the opposing movements involved can sociologists understand the developments at work within each of them (Jasper, 2004).

The tactical (Taylor, Rupp, & Gamson, 2004) and organizational (Clemens, 1993) repertoires of social movements are classically considered to be constrained by organisational structures (Freeman, 1979). But these structures are always partly produced by the actions of the movements, and therefore by their ideologies, resources, and strategies: particularly, movements tend to engage in arenas (Gusfield, 1963) in which they are most likely to succeed, depending on their perception of the availability of institutional venues (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Opposing movements always co-shape these structures, since they adapt their tactics to those of others: in the United States, the pro-choice movement decided to act in the electoral politics arena because of the threat posed by pro-life politicians in the Republican Party (Staggenborg, 1991). By entering an arena, a movement can force the opposite movement to follow it. On the other hand, the effects of the structures on movements can be reinforced in the presence of opposing movements: for example, when they engage in the same arenas, they tend to develop similar organisational forms in order to compete with each other more efficiently.

This also applies to framing strategies. Movements engaging in public debates have to frame their discourses in such a way as to address their activists, their institutional interlocutors, and public opinion (Lipsky, 1968). This causes strong internal tensions: Bourdieu's statement that 'the definition of the terms of struggle is always a central stake of the struggle' (1980, p. 258) also applies here. The presence of an opposing movement is likely to provoke or intensify 'frame disputes' (Benford, 1993) within a movement, since it introduces an additional framing constraint.

Indeed, movements have to take into account their opponents' frames to respond to them: thus in her work on the abortion debate in the United States, Rohlinger shows how a pro-choice organization, the National Organization for Women, and a pro-life

organisation, Concerned Women for America, built the frames of their media discourses in response to each other (2002). When a movement raises a subject, the other must also do so; if it has a pre-existing narrative on this point, it is likely that it will have to evolve it. Conversely, the discourse of a movement on a theme is likely to remain unchanged as long as the opposite movement remains silent (Fetner, 2001).

This constraint can go so far as to impose themes and demands: while it was almost absent from their initial concerns, the claim for same-sex marriage was imposed on LGBTQ movements by their conservative opponents' campaign against this right (Fetner, 2008), causing deep divisions amongst activists (Bernstein & Taylor, 2013). Conversely, adverse speech can also lead to the disappearance of a theme: this is the case, for example, when the LGBTQ rights rhetoric of recognizing 'reciprocal beneficiary relationships' was recycled by Vermont Conservatives to reject same-sex marriage claims, in a process of discursive 'co-optation' which seeks to 'adopt aspects of the *content* of a movement's discourse, while subverting its *intent*' (Burke & Bernstein, 2014, p. 831).

Dugan identifies another process during a debate on gay rights in Ohio, that could be described as a *frame reversal*: while LGBTQ activists framed gay and lesbian requests for non-discrimination as a fight for equal rights, their conservative opponents framed it as an unjustified demand for special treatment; this ultimately victorious developed a radically different approach to the issue in order to make the discourse of LGBTQ activists inaudible (2004). In both cases, the framing strategies of opposing movements are decisively influenced by the other's framing choices.

While the traditional movement-countermovement approach tends to view the movements as monolithic and unitary blocs (this is, as Munson (2008) remarks, especially true for 'countermovements'), an *opposing movements* perspective is better able to study the internal fragmentation of movements and to investigate the causes and consequences of these movements in the actions of opponents and/or the State. The splitting effects of these dynamics on LGBTQ movements, in particular, have been studied in depth: through the performative effect of conservative discourse hostile to LGBTQ rights, the gay activist community has been effectively divided into: 'good gays' and 'bad gays' (Stein, 2001a), those who endorse an identity based on the 'celebration' of difference and those who seek to 'suppress' it (Bernstein, 1997), those who belong to the 'marrying kind' and the others (Bernstein & Taylor, 2013), or those who put forward the 'similarities' between gay and lesbian identities and heteronormative identities and those who highlight the 'differences' (Ghaziani, 2011)). However, movements do not only passively suffer from external influences that affect their cohesion: they can use their commonalities as 'cultural anchors' in order to support their differences and give a sound basis to the movement (Ghaziani & Baldassari, 2011).

In the field of gender and sexual rights, most studies showing how an opponent's moves impact on the mobilization, cohesion, discursive production, and tactics of social movements are devoted to *progressive*, change-oriented movements. This can be seen as an effect of another bias in the traditional movement-countermovement approach, which considers the conservative countermovement as the 'opponent', emerging (chronologically or symbolically) after the progressive 'initiator', and whose opposition produces effects on the initiating movement. Researchers seem inclined not only to take a closer look at the movements with which they feel ideologically closest (Avanza & Della Sudda, 2017; Munson, 2008), but also to describe as 'countermovement' those movements to

which they feel personally opposed (Avanza, 2018; Poulson, Casewell, & Gray, 2014), reinforcing the first trend. Indeed, where the classification of countermovement does not indicate simple chronology, it is often based on the 'conservative' character attributed to it; which, as Zald and Useem (1983) underline, is a highly problematic criterion, especially given the relationship of the countermovement to political authority (1983). Hence the urgency of 'getting beyond an analysis in terms of movement-countermovement' (Avanza, 2018, p. 113).

To do this I focus on the creation by the French Catholic movement of an 'imaginary' enemy in the shape of 'gender theory', drawing on fieldwork carried out between 2011 and 2014 in Paris, Rennes, and Lyon (including observations in three groups of Catholic activists, informal interviews, participation in meetings, workshops and training sessions, observations in the streets during the 2012–2013 protests against the same-sex marriage law). I argue that the confection of this imaginary enemy enabled the French Catholic movement to mobilise and reinvigorate its core identity and base. But this also had consequences for the definition of the movement itself, as it produced a series of discursive and strategic obstacles to be negotiated. Rather therefore than a movement-countermovement dynamic (where each side attempts to respond tactically to the other), the French Catholic movement effectively forced itself into responding to its own discursive construction as it evolved through three phases of action. After setting out these phases, I then discuss these effects on the movement.

The key phases of the 'gender controversy'

The French Catholic mobilisation of the early 2010s can be traced through three separate – but chronologically very close, and sometimes overlapping – phases. The phases shared a common issue that the French media referred to as '*la controverse du genre*'; and for each of them, the trigger was a government project aiming to combat stereotypes, prejudice, and legal discrimination based on gender or sexuality.

The first phase, studied in depth by Béraud (2013), began in September 2010, after the national Ministry of Education announced that it planned to include a new unit entitled 'Masculin/Féminin' in the secondary school biology curriculum, dealing with notions of biological sex, sexual identity, and sex roles, in order to develop reflection on the concept of gender. In spring 2011, several lay Catholic personalities, supported by some Church representatives, denounced this project and asked the Minister to remove the updated textbooks. In this, they were not successful; but the controversy raised awareness amongst French Catholics of the issue of 'gender', and the idea that the government was promoting a sexual project in drastic opposition to the teachings of the Church started to gain traction.

When socialist François Hollande was elected president in May 2012, opponents and supporters alike expected him to implement his campaign promise to 'open marriage and adoption to homosexual couples' (a project that had already been championed for over a decade by his party), known as *Mariage pour tous*. But in mid-summer 2012, the Catholic Church pre-empted the government's forthcoming announcement: reviving the forgotten tradition of the 'Prière pour la France', the President of the French Bishops' Conference and Archbishop of Paris André Vingt-Trois urged followers to pray 'for children and teenagers' in order to prevent them from being involved in adults' 'desires

and conflicts', and to allow each of them 'to receive the love of a father and a mother' (Vingt-Trois, 2012). Widely publicised by the media, this 'whistleblower-like' strategy worked perfectly.

In this second phase, and just as had happened in the United States (Dorf & Tarrow, 2014), religious conservatives were able to define the terrain of their opponents. On 11 September, four weeks after the Archbishop of Paris's prayer for France, Minister of Justice Christiane Taubira chose Catholic broadsheet newspaper *La Croix* to formally announce the Mariage pour tous project; but far from easing minds, it heightened tension over the issue. From early Autumn, French bishops and lay activists started organizing the massive and copiously mediatised *La Manif Pour Tous* (LMPT): a series of street protests thorough winter 2012–13. These protests (featuring demonstrations, petitions, press releases, legal actions, and intense lobbying) again remained fruitless, save for implicitly announced measures governing medically assisted reproduction. After an uncommonly long and heated debate in Parliament, the Taubira Act was passed into law on 23 April 2013.

The controversy did not stop here, however: newly mobilized Catholic networks remained active and visible in the media, especially on the internet. In the third phase, a further government move reopened the discussion on school curriculums: the new Minister for Women's Rights (and future Minister of Education), Socialist Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, launched the 'ABCD de l'égalité' (ABCD of equality) experimental programme to combat gender-based stereotypes, violence, and inequality amongst young pupils. Whilst the institutional Church lagged behind lay organizations and the leader of the mainstream conservative-Catholic LMPT collective downplayed the controversy, some of the most radical networks active during the previous phases (Civitas, Printemps Français) strongly committed themselves to a new battle in order to protect children from 'gay lobbies' siding with the government to 'promote homosexuality' at school. These diehard Catholics sealed unexpectedly tight alliances with non-Catholic groups – in particular lower-class suburban Muslims. Catholic anti-gender collectives joined the 'Journée de Retrait de l'École' initiative launched by former anti-racist activist Fadela Amara. This third mobilisation was more successful: the 'ABCD de l'égalité' programme was eventually dropped in June 2015. After this episode, Catholic activists maintained a discrete activity around the topics of medically assisted reproduction and surrogacy, but no longer made the headlines of the French media.

Defining the imaginary enemy

The discursive strategy of the 2010–2014 period was based on the *strawman fallacy*: in 'la théorie du genre', threat was embodied by a clearly identified, yet imaginary enemy (Carnac, 2014). The career of this phrase can be retraced from the Vatican delegation at the United Nations Conferences of 1994–95 to the banners in LMPT street protests, via Rome and various episcopal committees (Fillod, 2014; Garbagnoli & Prearo, 2017). A key moment appears to be the creation of a working group on 'Structuring Differences in Social Life' by the French Bishops' Conference in 2005, in the wake of a pivotal text by future Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger.[1] The following year, a note published by lay psychoanalyst Jacques Arènes in the official episcopate journal defined the main lines of the French Catholic Church strategy, namely that *la théorie du genre* 'is the ideological

corpus that is used by gay lobbies to defend their ideas in the legislative arena' and 'aims to get rid of difference as an incentive to call for otherness, through self-production of meaning systems' (Arènes, 2014 p. 3, p. 16). In the following years, these key ideas were developed in an impressive amount of books, official communiqués, symposiums, conferences, debates and 'watch' websites. The 'théorie du *gender*' (the original version of the word often being preferred in order to insist on the impossibility of transferring into French culture this weird and decadent American concept; see Fassin, 2009, pp. 52–61) gradually emerged as both the cause and consequence of contemporary moral decay, operating as a 'symbolic glue' (Kováts & Pető, 2017). Priest and psychoanalyst Tony Anatrella described it as a 'Trojan Horse' of forthcoming deep social transformations, coinciding with what was hidden behind government policies. A slogan seen on banners during the January 2013 protests sums up this perspective: 'Mariage pour tous = Théorie du *gender* pour tous' (Fieldnotes, 2013). The enemy is embodied as a very tangible threat: texts circulated within the movement define *la théorie du genre* as 'a new terrorism' (Verlinde, 2012, p. 8) that is 'sneaking into schools'[2] in order to 'assault our children'.[3] Above all, this 'ideology' is described as if it had its own will: widely spread discourses explain that gender aims at 'creating a world where there would no longer be either man or woman' (Levet, 2014, p. 106), 'destroying the biological family and setting new rules' (VigiGender, 2014, p. 15) and finally 'giving rise to the subjective desire of the king and sovereign individual' (Boyancé, 2012, p. 36) to create 'a world of anarchy of desires' (ibid., p.38).

Meanwhile, several scholars tried to explain in the media that gender is a useful category for understanding the organisation of society, and that there is nothing like a unique and ideological theory in gender studies, but without succeeding in changing protesters' minds: for the latter, these efforts were (in the words of one Catholic activist) 'just a smokescreen. They're trying to get us to drop our guard. But it won't work' (informal interview with a demonstrator, Paris, 21 April 2013). In the discursive productions of the Catholic movement, *'le gender'* remained a well-identified entity against which the faithful must rise and fight. The enemy was thus shaped by the very discourse about it, simplifying reality and reducing the conflict to an opposition between 'gender ideologists' and the defenders of family, children's rights, social harmony, and nature.

How imaginary enemies affect movements and their environment

The particularity of the French controversy over 'gender theory' was therefore that the opposing movement – that is, the movement in defence of 'gender theory' – was largely constructed by the discourse of the 'anti-gender' movement. In vain could one seek a symmetrical 'pro-gender' movement: if it is true that the state's policy in favour of sexual rights and non-discrimination was supported by numerous groups and personalities, and if it is true that a large part of the public was in favour of it, such support was much less identifiably formalised. In other words, the French conservative Catholics were opposed to a movement that, so far, lacked any consistency; and so they had to draw its outlines in order to enable their own mobilization, within and outside the Church. Gradually, the imaginary enemy created by the Catholic movement began to empower the Catholic movement itself.

Thus *the construction of the opponent by the movement, not only enabled movement mobilisation, but also produced rebound effects on the movement itself, just as opposing movements do*. These rebound effects can be intended or unintended, positive or negative. Here, the rebound effects fall into three categories: positively, (i) strengthening mobilisation and creating (ii) a powerful convening effect; but also, negatively, (iii) bringing about divisions within the movement and the Catholic community, which may compromise its ability to mobilize in the future. Below, I address each of these effects in turn.

Strengthening internal cohesion

Rémond has shown how, at the end of the 19th century, identifying 'main enemies' like 'modernism' or 'Americanism' helped pull conservative Catholicism together around consistent orientations (1989, p. 100). This binary vision of French society is galvanizing, and constitutes a dormant force available for reactivation.

A century later, Catholics considered themselves challengers, engaged in what Gusfield (1963) defines as 'status struggle'; their activism, both at individual and collective levels, constitutes a 'reparative act' (Stein, 2001b). Response to this experience of marginalisation appears one of the most important driving forces of the 'anti-gender' Catholic mobilization. Conservative 'moral entrepreneurs' emphasize the sense of being a disregarded, even scapegoated minority: for example, for the Archbishop of Lyon Philippe Barbarin, the Church 'had got used to be treated like a doormat'.[4] The Church's position on family and sexuality is derided, they say, and even censored. For Anatrella (2011, pp. 18–19),

> Criticizing *la théorie du genre*, the Queer movement or sex non-differentiation is not permitted in the current political and media context. On the contrary, a serious censorship does exist in order to present political-correctness as the absolute truth.

The recently-coined word 'cathophobie' is often used to highlight this oppressed group identity.[5] The deeper social transformations linked to secularization, laicization and individualization reinforce this trend. Faith has tended to become an individual choice, no longer determined by social structures or family legacy (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). An increasing part of the faithful tend to become what Weber called 'virtuosi' (the faithful who show a particularly developed religious sensitivity and tend to distance themselves from the institution or even challenge it); the attachment to faith and its demonstration takes on a preponderant identitary dimension.

As the 'gender controversy' progressed, the Catholic movement toughened. At the beginning of the mobilisation period, Catholic leaders attempted to influence government policy by participating in public discussion, demanding: 'don't deprive us of a debate';[6] in late September 2012, the episcopate released a text advocating this approach.[7] Nevertheless, repeated disappointments quickly made Catholic leaders reconsider their strategy: from mid-Autumn, they abandoned dialogue with the government and moved from an open attitude to radical confrontation. Within a few weeks, the Catholic movement deepened its segmentation from the centres of political power, and more broadly, from the rest of society.

In this phase, the Catholic movement appeared to external observers as a unified block, a block which included the Catholic Church as a whole. There were no audible dissenting voices, and all levels of the Church were called to duty: parishes extended

episcopate discourses and lay associations played a key role in organizing mobilizations. Several existing Catholic structures and associations were revitalized by the controversy, benefitting from considerable media coverage, enabling them to remobilize former members, recruit new ones, and create new entities, like the LMPT federation of associations, in September 2012.

From the first street protest, on 17 November 2012, to passing of the Taubira Act in April 2013, LMPT organized demonstrations at a rhythm of approximately one per month, in Paris and other main cities. The largest demonstration, on 13 January 2013, mobilised 340,000 participants (according to police estimates; one million, according to organizers). Mass demonstrations are unusual in the context of a Catholic repertoire, though there are precedents in contemporary French history (Fillieule, 1997; Tartakowsky, 2014). Alongside street protests the movement organised a series of happenings, broadly inspired by non-violent civil rights movements and anti-globalization actions: sits-in with songs and prayers in front of symbolic centres of political power with the 'Veilleurs' group, performances of people standing silently in public places for hours with the 'Sentinelles', or street debates with the 'Mères Veilleuses' (Avanza & Della Sudda, 2017). A civic petition gathered 700,000 signatures.

This broad range of collective actions drew directly on the repertoires of movements opposed to authoritarianism, war, imperialism, or capitalism. The actions also demonstrated careful choreography and concern with controlling media coverage: names of the collectives and events, banners, clothes, age of the front-row protesters and dominant colours were selected in order to create ready-made visuals highlighting the properties the organizers wanted to put forward: good mood, humour, youth, peaceful and positive attitude, open-mindedness (Brustier, 2014). They also relied on their own communication tools to make the faithful aware of the 'gender ideology' danger and refute its 'arguments', organizing hundreds of meetings and conferences, distributing tracts and being very active on the internet. The success of the mobilization owed much to the high level of 'catnet' (White, 1992) of the conservative Catholic groups, but can be above all explained by the care taken in the construction and communication of the discourse against the opponent it was itself shaping.

Convening alliances with other religious and non-religious actors

As the controversy developed, the Catholic opposing movement met with other actors, allies and partners, to create a broader and stronger movement against their common enemy. The most logical alliance was undoubtedly with the conservative spheres of other religious communities, and started from the beginning of the same-sex marriage debate (Béraud, 2014).[8] Other Christian groups, from Orthodox institutions to the main French Protestant organizations, moved toward the conservative Catholics; this convergence was not at all obvious since, in the early 1990s, important Protestant groups had clearly distanced themselves from Catholics on questions of gender and sexuality. French Judaism spokespersons also stood side by side with Catholic 'anti-gender' campaigners: Chief Rabbi Bernheim released a text that reiterated their arguments against '*la théorie du genre*' and same-sex marriage (Bernheim, 2012). Muslims were probably the most important (symbolically, if not quantitatively), and also the least expected, allies; the public positions of the two main Islamic organisations in France against same-sex marriage

were relayed, like those of other religious representative groups, on Catholic institutional and associational websites. The Muslim presence in LMPT demonstrations has been highlighted – and even overstated – by Catholic organizers, not without causing the irritation of some of the protesters seeing Islam as a threat for the 'Catholic identity' of France and Europe (Carnac, 2017b). Giving maximum visibility to this religious diversity within the countermovement appeared a priority of the Catholic leadership's strategy, in order to avoid the image of 'faith particularism' ('*particularisme confessionnel*'),[9] and to show that Catholics 'are not the only ones who disagree'[10] with their opponents.

Nevertheless, this 'sacred union' of diverse religious actors soon appeared to be too narrow to Catholic leaders: there was a risk of polarization between religious people and the rest of the society, and even worse, between faith and 'reason' (or 'science', or 'democracy'). Thus, they felt the need to develop a broader focus than the 'coalition of all the faithful'. When representatives of the different religious communities met at the end of September 2012, they decided to abandon the project of a common front of religions, in order to argue that their positions were not determined by specific traditions and beliefs but defined by the general interest and universal humanism. When Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim spokespersons published a joint declaration in *Le Monde*, they signed alongside politicians, entrepreneurs, lawyers, philosophers, and psychoanalysts.[11] On its website, the LMPT collective emphasized that it was a 'civil, free, non-partisan, non-religious, plural and diversified movement'. As was the case, on a smaller scale, in the 1990s civil partnership debate (Buisson-Fenêt, 2004), they chose to downplay the religious specificity of the movement.

The goal of this extended movement was to reach a wider audience and to speak not only to religious people, but to so-called 'people of goodwill', by convincing them that 'it is not a religious debate but an anthropologic debate, that is to say a debate which touches upon everybody's life'.[12] This entails 'deconfessionalizing' the discourse by abandoning theological references and accepting the rhetorical rules of a public sphere founded on rational debate (Habermas, 1991). The arguments put forward were acceptable to everyone, faithful or not: the anthropological need for stable benchmarks and limits; 'human ecology' and the 'precautionary principle' as applied to the '*théorie du genre*' replaced references to the Bible or to the Church Tradition. The master framing (Benford & Snow, 1992) of the controversy amplified values like 'common sense', 'care for the weak' and 'respect for nature', a strategy that the basis of the Catholic 'anti-gender' movement mostly engaged in. This frame tended to bridge with a left anti-capitalist view, taking advantage of increasing public discontent with the liberal turn of the French socialist government (Brustier, 2014). Slogans like 'We want jobs, not gay marriage' or 'brotherhood for growth' clearly show this intention; 'Gender' is identified with ultra-individualism, unlimited liberalism, the tyranny of desires for domination and appropriation.

This public discourse coexisted alongside a more discrete discourse, addressed to the core group of conservative faithful, and was far from the socialist or counter-globalist inspirations of the former: calling upon tradition and service of God, this discourse was structured around Good and Evil. As is often the case, not all the actors mobilized within the movement therefore shared the same mobilizing frames (Hull, 2001). This duality of discourse was coupled with a duality of identity strategy. Alongside efforts to hide the Catholic origin and leadership of the movement, some of its members emphasized the

Catholics' prominent role in the success of the mobilization. Archbishop Vingt-Trois insisted on his pioneering role ('until I made strong public declarations [...] no one raised any objections [...] I awoke people, I opened their eyes and ears, I set up the movement'),[13] recalling that 'Catholics accounted for an important proportion of the protesters'.[14] LMPT spokesperson Frigide Barjot took every opportunity to put forward her 'catho' pride, and more radical organizations like the Institut Civitas gave even greater importance to the mobilisation's denominational identity. This complex strategy of alternative identity claiming and hiding underlines a contradiction between ends and means: the Catholic movement sought to become the spearhead of all the 'anti-gender' forces, but achieving this also implied sacrificing Catholic identity, thus making the objective effectively unachievable.

Creating internal division in the French Catholic community

The opposition to 'gender theory' not only reinforced and extended the Catholic movement: it also produced internal tensions and splits within the Catholic Church. As previously noted, Catholicism was already divided prior to this period. Nevertheless, the 2011–2014 mobilizations increased and accelerated this division process by reactivating pre-existing antagonisms and creating new ones (Brustier, 2014; Raison Du Cleuziou, 2014). The mobilizations split the faithful of the Catholic community – but also the ecclesial institution, and even the movement itself.

The main divide among Catholics opposed followers and detractors of the movement leadership's declaration of war on 'gender'. Opinion polls showed that around half of self-declared Catholics disagreed with the hierarchy's position about same-sex marriage. This proportion even increased during the mobilization.[15] This disapproval was expressed in different ways: in the correspondence columns of Catholic newspapers, and on blogs and social networking sites. These Catholics sometimes evoked difficult personal and material situations. They often voiced feeling uncomfortable with their officials' positions, and even feel ashamed of being part of a Church they call 'reactionary', 'obscurantist', or 'exclusionary'. They also deplored the hierarchy's failure to listen to the faithful, and the denial of Catholic plurality on these issues, pointing out that the debate Catholics leaders claimed in public space was censored within the Church itself.

Their campaign to make a different Catholic voice heard resulted in the development of activist networks around figures of left-wing Catholicism, like theologian Anne Soupa, journalists Christine Pedotti and Philippe Clanché (author of a book *Mariage pour tous, divorce chez les cathos*), or lawyer and politician Jean-Pierre Mignard, and change-oriented Christian magazines such as *Témoignage Chrétien, Évangile et Liberté* and *Golias*.

This activism principally took the form of petitions and press releases, and occasionally relied on pre-existing structures: Réseaux des Parvis, a federation of associations created in 1999, addressed a petition called 'Enough is enough' to the episcopate;[16] in November 2012, Catholic feminist association *Femmes et Hommes, Égalité, Droits, et Libertés dans L'Église et dans la Société* released a text stressing openness to different sexual identities (Jobbé-Duval, 2012); and in January 2013, the anti-misogynist Comité de la Jupe (or Skirt Committee, established in 2008 following comments by Archbishop Vingt-Trois about the intelligence of women) published an editorial 'We, Catholics, refuse to condemn gender' (de la Haye, 2013), and homosexual Christian movement

David et Jonathan released a communiqué.[17] Christian ecumenical associations, too, played an important role, interfaith solidarity with Protestants allowing some Catholics to voice their dissent with the institution more strongly; for example, the social Christianity movement launched a petition to emphasise diversity of opinion within the Catholic and Protestant communities.[18] New bodies also emerged, including *Jeunes, Cathos et pour l'Égalité*, created in January 2013 and which circulated a petition 'This is not our Church',[19] calling progressive Catholics to demonstrate in favour of the Taubira bill.

These multiple points of resistance came together, organizing a joint press conference in January 2013, and creating a platform that challenged institutional authority and the Church's claims to representativeness.[20] Not only did they support the 'enemy', but they insisted on doing so 'as Catholics', preventing opposing movement leaders speaking on their behalf. This internal split had a deep impact on the traditionally monolithic structure and operation of the ecclesial organization.

Moreover, the Church itself was not spared internal conflict. Clerics remain divided over the substantive position to take, and above all, over how to address the diversity of opinion within the Church. Some felt uncomfortable with the imposed position, as evidenced by the contrasting reception among priests of Archbishop Vingt-Trois' warlike 'Prayer for France', a few going so far as to publicly criticize it, whilst others replaced or transformed it. Even within the episcopate, declarations of unanimity eventually broke down. Some bishops called the faithful to demonstrate and take part in the demonstrations (with different levels of insistence, admittedly, some playing on the ambiguity of words 'manifester' (to march in the streets) and 'se manifester' (to express oneself)); others expressed discreet but resolute reservations, warning against the trap of political exploitation and negative repercussions for the Church's image.

After the Taubira Act was passed, president of the national 'Famille et Société' council and Bishop of Le Havre Jean-Luc Brunin released two texts in which he questioned the 'radicalization' process and its harmful effects on the cohesion of the Church (Brunin, 2013a, 2013b). But it was not until the following year that these divisions became widely publicised, as in January 2014, ahead of a planned new demonstration, Barbarin and the Archbishop of Clermont, Hippolyte Simon, confronted each other in the columns of *La Croix* over whether or not they should take to the streets (Barbarin, 2014; Simon, 2014). The plenary meeting of the French Bishops' Conference in April 2014, under the aegis of a new president, Georges Pontier (who was amongst those who voiced concerns at the height of the controversy), was the scene of a public playing out of these dissensions. Ultimately, Church officials fostered a process of conciliation, and focused on other priorities; of course, this did not please everyone.

Indeed, whilst moderates in the Catholic 'anti-gender' movement accepted this cease-fire, this was not the case for the most radical activists, the latest embodiment of an evolving 'intransigent Catholicism'. This radical wing was very present from the start of the first mobilization phase: Institut Civitas, a fundamentalist grouping linked to traditionalist schismatic group Fraternité Sacerdotale Saint Pie X, had been ahead of the mainstream movement and was the first to call a demonstration, on 18 November 2012; LMPT responded to this announcement, calling for a different demonstration on the day

before the Civitas protest, arguing 'ethical divergences' and their desire to open the demonstration to everyone, 'gay or straight, left or right, catho or not'.[21]

Quickly, this openness strategy came under criticism and a significant number of activists quit LMPT at the beginning of 2013 to follow its former leader Béatrice Bourges, who is close to traditionalist institute Ichtus, into a new group, called Printemps Français (by analogy with the 'Arab Spring'). This movement, which claims to lead 'possibly illegal' actions,[22] aimed at bringing together all those disappointed by the perceived lack of fighting spirit and the lukewarmness of LMPT, as is suggested by its motto: '*On ne lâche rien*' ('Never give up, no compromises').

Following the passing of the Taubira Act, while Catholic officials tried to calm things down, Printemps Français and Civitas gained more power. Their last-ditch attitude galvanized younger activists: they were at the forefront against the 'ABCD de l'égalité' programme and continued to organize protests and events, whereas the ecclesial institution all but abandoned the 'gender' topic, and LMPT lost momentum as it tore itself apart over what political strategy to adopt. The events of March 2014 revealed a new configuration within the Catholic community: the national 'Famille et Société' council was forced to cancel a conference on care with philosopher Fabienne Brugère, an academic specialist of Judith Butler (and who thus, embodied 'gender theory'), after intense protests from radical activists on the internet, mainly on the traditionalist website 'Le Salon Beige'.[23] This telling episode shows how power relationships have been complicated and how the opposition to 'gender' remains decisive. In trying to reconnect with the dissident faithful by extricating itself from the confrontation with an imaginary enemy that it had itself created, the institution succeeded only in angering its radical wing.

Conclusions

This focus on conservative Catholic 'anti-gender' mobilisations in France enables us to enhance and deepen our understanding of the dynamics of social movements. More specifically, it reveals the limitations and shortcomings of 'classical' movement-countermovement theoretical perspectives – and highlights the symmetrical benefits of opposing movement frameworks – in three ways.

So far, 'anti-gender' movements have been mainly studied as countermovements. This categorization is rarely self-evident, and is often the result of a value judgement or an arbitrary decision made by researchers. Further, seeing a social movement as a countermovement focuses attention on *the impact of the countermovement on the movement*. However, no matter how they are viewed, each opposing movement has an impact on the other, and more broadly, all social movements influence and are influenced by their environment. This case study shows how the French Catholic 'anti-gender' movement has been affected by the struggle in which it was engaged: the opposition to '*la théorie du genre*' generated some reinforcement of existing activism and enabled the creation of alliances, but also produced deep internal divisions within the French catholic community, destroying former coalitions within the 'anti-gender' movement and even within its component groups.

The detail of these dynamics of internal fragmentation cannot be captured from a traditional movement-countermovement perspective, which tends to see movements,

and even moreso countermovements, as monolithic blocs. In contrast, an opposing movements frameworks, by focusing on how adversarial configurations impact on all of the movements, enables investigation of the consequences of opposition to 'gender' in terms of the fragmentation of the Catholic community: division between those who adopt this discourse and those who reject it, but also, within the first group, between 'gay-friendly' conservative activists and openly homophobic ones, between those who give in and those who 'never give up', etc. The dual dynamic of, on the one hand, internal pluralisation (through emancipation from institutional control, for both those believing its opposition to the imaginary enemy to be excessive and those deeming it to be insufficient) and, on the other, the forging of new external partnerships, institutionalisations, and identifications, has reduced the authority of the ecclesial institution and led to the emergence of a new Catholic configuration, based on multiple and competing authority centres. On both sides, some actions can be interpreted as an effort to counter the divisive effects of confrontation with an opponent: in the French conservative catholic 'anti-gender' movement's case, bishops and spokespersons of militant collectives have attempted to maintain unity by presenting a cohesive façade in speeches, and by mobilizing common cultural anchors.

Considering a movement as a countermovement also prevents us from studying the influence it exerts, not only on the movement to which it is opposed, but more generally, on its environment. Traditional approaches tend to view countermovements as part of the environment of a movement; but movements modify their environments. The French 'anti-gender' movement shows that this influence can go as far as shaping a virtual opponent, '*la théorie du genre*', produced by a discourse that is part of a strategy. This movement can be seen as a singular case of a 'symbolic crusade' (Gusfield, 1963) pushing the strawman fallacy to its climax; here, the confection of an imaginary enemy compensated for the evanescent aspect of their opponent, which – for various reasons – did not take the form of a consistent and cohesive movement. This artefact impacted the movement which created it, as in any opposing movements situation, causing both expected and unexpected consequences, as the imaginary enemy gained autonomy and gradually escaped the control of its creator as it became more powerful. The performative effect of movement discourse was not only to make an object *exist*, but to make this object produce strong effects on the movement itself, and on its social environment. In addition to the mobilization, alliance and divisional effects mentioned above, the existence of this virtual sparring partner forced the movement to continue, throughout this period, to maintain gender at the centre of its discourse. The movement's dispersed non-imaginary opponents (the state, LGBT rights activists, liberal Catholics) were also forced to produce opposing arguments on this theme, sometimes leading them to defend the relevance of the concept of gender or the validity of gender studies, although this was not their original intention. As in any opposing movement configuration, this framing impacted on both movements. Indeed, this case study shows that opposing movement dynamics can be at play and produce real effects even without the presence of a 'real' opponent.

Notes

1. Letter on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World, 31 July 2004, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html.

2. Esther Pivet, talk at the conference 'Décryptage des ABCD de l'Égalité' organized by the collective VigiGender, Hotel Pulmann Montparnasse, Paris, 12 June 2014.
3. Avenir de la Culture, 'La théorie du genre agresse nos enfants – Appel à la résistance'. Pamphlet, 2018.
4. 'Monseigneur Barbarin: "Il ne faut pas dénaturer le mariage"'. Interview, *Le Figaro*, 13 August 2012.
5. The signs of this 'cathophobia' have been denounced by conservative Catholic political figures (Christine Boutin in December 2012, Laurent Wauquiez in January 2013), and especially on Catholic websites and social networks: see the popular blog Padreblog (http://www.padreblog.fr/hellfest-2011-lacathophobie-se-confirme) or the website of the magazine France Catholique (https://www.france-catholique.fr/Cathophobie-politique.html). The website of the France Jeunesse Civitas movement (http://francejeunessecivitas.hautetfort.com/tag/cathophobie) and the traditional website Le Salon Beige (http://lesalonbeige.blogs.com/my_weblog/cathophobie/) have even made it a separate section.
6. Forum RCF/TLM, 14 September 2012, http://www.rcf.fr/radio/RCF69/emission/139369/428409.
7. Service 'Famille et Société' of the French Bishops' Conference, communiqué 'Élargir le mariage aux personnes de même sexe? Ouvrons le débat', 28 September 2012, https://eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/textes-et-declarations/366187-elargir-le-mariage-aux-personnes-de-meme-sexe-ouvrons-le-debat-note-du-conseil-famille-et-societe/.
8. On 6 February 2007, Archbishop Barbarin and the local leaders of eight other religious communities released a joint statement; http://lyon.catholique.fr/?Le-mariage-c-est-l-union-d-un-homme-et-d-une-femme.
9. André Vingt-Trois, Interview, 'Le grand Jury' LCI-RTL-Le Figaro, 23 December 2012.
10. Philippe Barbarin, Interview, 'Forum RCF/TLM', 14 September 2012.
11. 'Laissons du temps au débat', *Le Monde*, 17 November 2012, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/11/17/laissons-du-temps-au-debat_1792080_3232.html.
12. André Vingt-Trois, Interview, 'Le grand Jury' *LCI-RTL-Le Figaro*, 23 December 2012.
13. *Ibid.*
14. 'Un nouveau statut pour l'école catholique', *Le Figaro*, 19 April 2013.
15. IFOP online survey for *La Lettre de l'Opinion*, August 2012, https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-francais-les-catholiques-et-les-droits-des-couples-homosexuels/; BVA online survey for *Le Parisien Dimanche/Aujourd'hui en France*, February 2014, http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/sondage-l-eglise-et-la-famille-les-catholiques-francais-veulent-du-changement-22-02-2014-3616215.php.
16. Petition '*Trop, c'est trop*', 28 December 2012, http://www.reseaux-parvis.fr/2014/06/08/trop-cest-trop-petition-6525-signatures/.
17. 'Mariage, famille pour toutes et tous, une question d'amour et d'égalité. Communiqué de David et Jonathan à propos du Mariage pour tous', 8 January 2013 http://www.davidetjonathan.com/2013/01/08/communique-a-propos-du-mariage-pour-tous/.
18. Petition 'Sur le mariage, l'Église aussi est diverse', 12 November 2012, http://www.christianismesocial.org/spip.php?article266.
19. Petition '*Ce n'est pas notre Église*', 10 January 2013, http://jeunescathospourlegalite.fr/La-tribune.
20. Officially organised by *Action Catholique Ouvrière, Christianisme Social, Carrefour des Chrétiens Inclusifs, David et Jonathan, Évangile et Liberté and Réseaux des Parvis*, with the support of various religious homosexual rights groups.
21. '"Mariage pour tous": la guerre des manifs aura-t-elle lieu?' *La Vie*, 12 November 2012.
22. 'Interview avec Béatrice Bourges', *Monde et Vie*, 874, April 2013.
23. 'Le Conseil famille et société de la CEF invite une idéologue du genre'. *Salon beige*, 3 March 2014, https://www.lesalonbeige.fr/le-conseil-famille-et-societe-de-la-cef-invite-une-ideologue-du-genre/.

Author Links

https://unil.academia.edu/RomainCarnac

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Olivier Fillieule and Dr. Christophe Broqua for giving me the opportunity to participate in this special issue and for their valuable support. The extensive comments of Dr. Graeme Hayes and the two anonymous reviewers, and Dr. Camille Debras' careful proofreading, have enabled me to improve this text considerably; I would like to thank them for their help.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Romain Carnac is a PhD candidate in Political science at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. He is mainly interested in the political dimension of discourses on gender and sexuality and the contemporary forms of religious expression in the public space. He is also a research fellow at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Western Switzerland (EESP-HES So), where he is involved in a Swiss National Science Foundation-funded research project on philanthropy, taxation and the transformations of the welfare state.

References

Anatrella, T. (2011). Préface: La théorie du genre comme un cheval de Troie. In Conseil Pontifical pour la famille. *Gender, la controverse* (pp. 3–26). Paris: Téqui.

Andrews, K. T. (2002). Movement-countermovement dynamics and the emergence of new institutions: The case of "white flight" schools in Mississippi. *Social Forces*, *80*(3), 911–936.

Arènes, J. (2014), *La problématique du "genre"*. Documents Épiscopat, 2006–2012, Retrieved from http://ec.cef.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/05/de12-2006.pdf

Avanza, M. (2015). Mobilisations anti 'idéologie du gender' et milieux catholiques pro-life en Italie. *Sextant*, *31*, 207–222.

Avanza, M. (2018). Plea for an emic approach towards 'ugly movements': Lessons from the divisions within the Italian pro-life movement. *Politics and Governance*, *6*(3), 112–125.

Avanza, M., & Della Sudda, M. (2017). Ripostes catholiques'. Recherches contemporaines sur les mobilisations conservatrices autour des nouvelles questions sexuelles. *Genre, Sexualité & Société*, *18*. http://journals.openedition.org/gss/4118

Barbarin, P. (2014, January 23). *Moi, Philippe, prêtre, je ne peux pas passer mon chemin*. La Croix. Retrieved from https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Actualite/Mgr-Philippe-Barbarin-archeveque-de-Lyon-Moi-Philippe-pretre-je-ne-peux-pas-passer-mon-chemin-!-2014-01-23-1095341

Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A. Morris & C. M. Mueller (Eds.), *Frontiers of social movement theory* (pp. 135–155). New Heaven: Yale University Press.

Béraud, C. (2013). Les catholiques contre le genre. L'épisode des manuels de SVT. In F. Rochefort & M. E. Sanna (Eds.), *Normes religieuses et genre. Mutations, résistances et reconfigurations. XIX^{e}-XX^{e} siècle* (pp. 109–122). Paris: Armand Colin.

Béraud, C. (2014). Un front commun des religions contre le mariage pour tous? *Contemporary French Civilization*, *39*(3), 335–349.
Bernheim, G. (2012, October 18). *Mariage homosexuel: Ce que l'on oublie souvent de dire*. Retrieved from http://www.crif.org/sites/default/fichiers/images/documents/Homoparentalité%20-%20ce%20que%20l%27on%20oublie%20souvent%20de%20dire.pdf
Bernstein, M. (1997). Celebration and suppression: The strategic uses of identity by the lesbian and gay movement. *American Journal of Sociology*, *103*(3), 531–565.
Bernstein, M., & Taylor, V. (Eds). (2013). *The marrying kind. Debating same-sex marriage within the lesbian and gay movement*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1980). *Questions de sociologie*. Paris: Minuit.
Boyancé, M. (2012) 'Le concept de genre: Quels enjeux pour l'anthropologie fondamentale?'. *Gender, qui es-tu?* Paris: Éditions de l'Emmanuel.
Brunin, J.-L. (2013a, May 14). *Message aux catholiques après la loi sur le mariage et l'adoption*. Retrieved from https://eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/textes-et-declarations/365801-message-aux-catholiques-apres-la-loi-sur-le-mariage-et-ladoption/
Brunin, J.-L. (2013b, June 4). *Poursuivons le dialogue*. Retrieved from https://eglise.catholique.fr/conference-des-eveques-de-france/textes-et-declarations/365765-poursuivons-le-dialogue/
Brustier, G. (2014). *Le Mai 68 conservateur. Que restera-il de la Manif pour tous ?* Paris: Cerf.
Buisson-Fenêt, H. (2004). *Un sexe problématique. L'Église et l'homosexualité en France 1971-2000*. Saint-Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes.
Burke, M. C., & Bernstein, M. (2014). How the right usurped the queer agenda: Frame co-optation in political discourse. *Sociological Forum*, *29*(4), 830–850.
Carnac, R. (2014). L'Église catholique contre 'la théorie du genre'. Construction d'un objet poémique dans le débat public français contemporain. *Synergies Italie*, *10*, 125–143.
Carnac, R. (2017a). Faire autorité. Les religions dans le temps long et face à la modernité. In D. Avon (Ed.), *Aux sources de la lutte catholique contre le 'genre'. La rénovation post-conciliaire du discours du Vatican sur la différence des sexes* (pp. 245–256). Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
Carnac, R. (2017b). Un rapprochement entre 'catholiques d'identité' et 'musulmans d'identité'? Quand l'affirmation de l'appartenance confessionnelle devient facteur de solidarité inter-religieuse. In B. Dumons & F. Gugelot (Eds.), *Catholicisme et identité. Regards croisés sur le catholicisme français contemporain (1980-2017)* (pp. 287–302). Paris: Karthala.
Clemens, E. S. (1993). Organizational repertoires and institutional change. Women's groups and the transformation of U.S. politics, 1890-1920. *American Journal of Sociology*, *98*, 755–798.
de la Haye, A.-M. (2013, January 27). *Nous, catholiques, refusons de condamner le genre*. Retrieved from https://www.comitedelajupe.fr/?q=node/128&page=1
Dorf, M. C., & Tarrow, S. (2014). Strange bedfellows: How an anticipatory countermovement brought same-sex marriage into the public arena. *Law & Social Inquiry*, *39*(2), 449–473.
Dugan, K. B. (2004). Strategy and 'spin': Opposing movement frames in an anti-gay voter initiative. *Sociological Focus*, *37*(3), 213–233.
Fassin, E. (2009). *Le sexe politique. Genre et sexualité au miroir transatlantique*. Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS.
Fetner, T. (2001). Working anita bryant: The impact of christian anti-gay activism on lesbian and gay movement claims. *Social Problems*, *48*(3), 411–428.
Fetner, T. (2008). *How the religious right shaped lesbian and gay activism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fillieule, O. (1997). *Stratégies de la rue. Les manifestations en France*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Fillieule, O. (2005). Requiem pour un concept. Vie et mort de la notion de structure des opportunités politiques. In G. Dorronsoro (Ed.), *La Turquie conteste. Mobilisations sociales et régime sécuritaire* (pp. 201–241). Paris: CNRS Éditions.
Fillod, O. (2014). L'invention de la 'théorie du genre'. Le mariage blanc du Vatican et de la science. *Contemporary French Civilization.*, *39*(3), 321–333.

Freeman, J. (1979). Ressource mobilization and strategy: A model for analyzing social movement actions. In M. N. Zald & J. D. McCarthy (Eds.), *The dynamics of social movements* (pp. 167–189). Cambridge: Winthrop.
Garbagnoli, S., & Prearo, M. (2017). *La Croisade anti-genre, du Vatican au Mariage pour Tous*. Paris: Textuel.
Ghaziani, A. (2011). Post-gay identity construction. *Social Problems*, *58*(1), 99–125.
Ghaziani, A., & Baldassari, D. (2011). Cultural anchors and the organization of differences: A multi-method analysis of LGBT marches on Washington. *American Sociological Review*, *76*(2), 179–206.
Gusfield, J. (1963). *Symbolic crusades. Status politics and the American temperance movement*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Habermas, J. (1991). *The structural transformation of the public sphere. An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. (T. Burger, & F. Lawrence, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hervieu-Léger, D. (2003). *Catholicisme, la fin d'un monde*. Paris: Bayard.
Hull, K. E. (2001). The political limits of the rights frame. The case of same-sex marriage in Hawaii. *Sociological Perspectives*, *44*(2), 207–232.
Jasper, J. M. (2004). A strategic approach to collective action: Looking for agency in social-movement choices. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *9*(1), 1–16.
Jobbé-Duval, G. (2012, November 14). *Chrétien-ne-s, manifestons d'abord le respect et l'accueil des personnes homosexuelles*. Retrieved from http://saintmerry.over-blog.com/article-chre-tien-ne-s-manifestons-d-abord-le-respect-et-l-accueil-des-personnes-homosexuelles-112798548.html
Kováts, E., & Pető, A. (2017). Anti-gender discourse in hungary: A discourse without a movement? In R. Kuhar & D. Paternotte (Eds.), *Anti-gender campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against equality* (pp. 117–131). London: Rowman & Littlefield international.
Kuhar, R., & Paternotte, D. (Eds.). (2017). *Anti-gender campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against equality*. London: Rowman & Littlefield international.
Levet, B. (2014). *La théorie du genre ou la vie rêvée des anges*. Paris: Grasset.
Lipsky, M. (1968). Protest as a political ressource. *American Political Science Review*, *62*(4), 1144–1158.
McAdam, D. (1982). *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meyer, D. S., & Staggenborg, S. (2008). Opposing movement strategies in U.S. abortion politics. In P. Coy (Ed.), *Research in social movements, conflict and change, 28* (pp. 207–238). Bingley: JAI Press/Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Meyer, D. S., & Staggenborg, S. (1996). Movements, countermovements, and the structure of political opportunity. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *101*(6), 1628–1660.
Munson, Z. (2008). *The making of pro-life activists. How social movement mobilization works*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Poulson, S. C., Casewell, C. P., & Gray, L. R. (2014). Isomorphism, institutional parochialism, and the study of social movements. *Social Movement Studies*, *13*(2), 222–242.
Prearo, M. (2017). Le cadrage religieux de la mobilisation 'anti-genre': Une étude micro-événementielle du Family Day. *Genre, Sexualité & Société*, *18*. http://journals/openedition.org/gss/4100
Raison Du Cleuziou, Y. (2014). *Qui sont les cathos d'aujourd'hui ?* Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.
Rémond, R. (1989). L'intégrisme catholique: Portrait intellectuel. *Études*, *370*(1), 95–105.
Robcis, C. (2015). Catholics, the 'theroy of gender', and the turn to the human in France: A new dreyfus affair ? *The Journal of Modern History*, *87*(4), 892–923.
Rohlinger, D. A. (2002). Framing the abortion debate: Organizational resources, media strategies, and movement-countermovement dynamics. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *43*(4), 479–507.
Simon, H. (2014, January 30). *Je n'irai pas manifester avec eux*. La Croix Retrieved from https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Actualite/Mgr-Simon-archeveque-de-Clermont-je-n-irai-pas-manifester-avec-eux-2014-01-30-1098826
Staggenborg, S. (1991). *The pro-choice movement: Organization and activism in the abortion conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stein, A. (2001a). *The stranger next door: The story of a small community's battle over sex, faith, and civil rights*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Stein, A. (2001b). Revenge of the shamed: The Christian right's emotional culture war. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 115–131). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stone, A. L. (2016). The impact of anti-gay politics on the LGBTQ movement. *Sociology Compass*, *10*(6), 459–467.
Tarrow, S. (1996). State and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements. In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative perspectives of social movements* (pp. 41–61). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tartakowsky, D. (2014). *Les droites et la rue. Histoire d'une ambivalence, de 1900 à nos jours*. Paris: La Découverte.
Taylor, V., Rupp, L. J., & Gamson, J. (2004). Performing protest: Drag shows as tactical repertoire of the gay and lesbian movement. In D. J. Myers & D. M. Cress (Eds.), *Authority in contention* (pp. 105–137). Bingley: Emerald.
Verlinde, J. M. (2012). *L'idéologie du gender: Identité reçue ou choisie?* Paris: Le Livre Ouvert.
VigiGender. (2014). L'idéologie du genre (Gender) et sa diffusion à l'École. *Pamphlet*.
VingtTrois, A. (2012, August 15). *Intentions de Prière universelle pour la France*. Retrieved from https://site-catholique.fr/index.php?post/Priere-pour-la-France-de-Mgr-Vingt-Trois
White, H. (1992). *Identity and control. A structural theory of social action*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zald, M. N., & Useem, B. (1987). Movement and countermovement interaction: Mobilization, tactics, and state involvement. In M. N. Zald & J. D. McCarthy (Eds.), *Social movements in an organizational society* (pp. 247–271). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Zald, M. N., & Useem, B. (1983). *Movement and countermovement: Loosely coupled conflict*. Version of paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA.