

Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Environmental taxes are often underexploited. This paper analyses the effectiveness of a garbage tax, assessing its effects on multiple outcomes as well as its acceptability. We study how a Supreme Court decision, mandating the Swiss Canton of Vaud to implement a tax on garbage, affects garbage production and beliefs about the tax. We adopt a difference-in-differences approach exploiting that parts of Vaud already implemented a garbage tax before the mandate. Pricing garbage by the bag (PGB) is highly effective, reducing unsorted garbage by 40%, increasing recycling of aluminium and organic waste, without causing negative spillovers on adjacent regions. The effects of PGB seem very persistent over time. Our assessment of PGB looks very favourable. It may surprise that PGB is not implemented more often. Hence, we look at people's perceptions. We find that people are very concerned with PGB *ex ante*. Public opposition seems to be the main obstacle to PGB. However, implementing PGB reduces concerns with effectiveness and fairness substantially. After implementing PGB, people accept 70% higher garbage taxes compared to before PGB. We argue that environmental taxes could be much more diffused, if people had the chance to experience their functioning and correct their beliefs.

1. Introduction

Many countries aim to increase the fraction of garbage that is sorted and recycled, and thus reduce the quantity sent to incineration or landfills. In some cases, ambitious recycling targets have been set. The European Union, for instance, would like its households to recycle 65% or more of their garbage, on average a 15% increase compared to current levels (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2016). Similarly, in Switzerland household waste recycling targets at the Cantonal level can be at 60% or more. One may expect these targets to translate into a wide use of economic instruments to foster recycling. However, the use of theoretically ambitious economic instruments may not always be aligned with the definition of ambitious policy goals.

From an economic perspective, waste management may not represent a pure public good. We stress in particular the rivalry in waste management, since any additional bag of garbage or container generates additional costs to the community. Furthermore, it is possible to

attribute the costs of waste collection to the single household causing them, for instance with the use of special bags (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996). Pricing garbage by the bag allows attributing to households their share of waste management costs, following the polluter pays principle, well-known since Pigou (1920). Pricing garbage by the bag may in principle also account for the external costs related with waste disposal or incineration (cf. e.g. Muller et al., 2011).

In theory, the logic of pricing garbage by the bag (PGB) is compelling. However, the real world seems either not to understand it or not to accept it. PGB and other measures of waste taxation are not often used in developed countries (see Halvorsen, 2012). In practice, there are several reasons for the limited use of waste taxation. First, taxation may not work for household waste. Consumers can find other ways to dispose of their bags, leaking them to areas that do not have pay-per-bag policies, or consumers may not want to reduce waste production. Taxation may also have a short-lived effect on behaviour, with no long-lasting impact on recycling. Second, people may think unit pricing is

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ineffective, or unfair, for instance due to its potentially regressive nature (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996; Husaini et al., 2007).

We analyse the political economy of unit pricing and study both effectiveness and acceptance of pricing garbage by the bag. On July 4, 2011, the Supreme Court of Switzerland mandated all municipalities in the Canton of Vaud, in Western Switzerland, to apply the polluter pays principle to household waste by January 1, 2013. This ruling created a quasi-experimental situation. Some municipalities had, already before the mandate, implemented PGB and were unaffected; these are the control municipalities. Other municipalities were forced to adopt PGB to comply with the mandate; these are the treated municipalities. We compare the evolution of outcomes in treated municipalities to control municipalities, before and after 2013, to learn about the effects of PGB.

Our approach couples four sources of information. First, we conducted short telephone interviews with people living in treated and control municipalities. To the same households, in both groups, we asked twice the same questions, in fall 2012 and in spring 2013. We asked questions related to the policy's effectiveness: waste production and recycling behaviour. We also integrated a module designed to assess people's attitudes and beliefs about the policy. We were interested in perceptions concerning the effectiveness of the tax and its fairness. The interviews provide a more complete description of behavioural change at the microeconomic level and consumer sentiment. Second, we collected administrative data on incinerated garbage, at the municipality level, from 2008 to 2015, to compare our survey-based estimates of the effects of PGB to administrative estimates. We also assess whether the evolution of incinerated garbage is comparable across treated and control communities, the key requirement for a difference-in-differences analysis, and analyse the persistence of the observed effects. Third, municipalities adopting PGB often facilitated waste disposal to their citizens. We conducted a telephone survey with municipality representatives and collected data on additional measures undertaken by municipalities to assess to what extent PGB is a pure price effect as opposed to e.g. ease of access to waste management facilities. Fourth, we collected media data for the region, and citation data for the largest city in the canton, and analyse the evidence available on illicit, or undesirable, behaviour.

Multiple outcomes need to be examined to determine the success, or failure, of a policy such as PGB. Each of these outcomes follows from hypotheses derived from the literature. We address the question of the effectiveness of PGB from different angles and, in a single treatment, provide the following empirical findings. First, our results indicate that PGB strongly reduces the volume of incinerated waste. Both survey data and administrative data indicate that the tax reduces the quantity of incinerated garbage by about 40%. This result is consistent across specifications regardless of how garbage is measured, i.e. in terms of weight or volume. This is a finding *per se*, as it shows limited stomping. Second, we show that PGB increases recycling of aluminium and organic waste. About 20% new households start sorting aluminium. Similar results apply for organic waste. Third, we show that the effect of PGB is persistent over time. The 40% drop in garbage takes place within a year from implementation, and lasts over the following years. Hence, PGB seems to be effective beyond the very short run. Fourth, we study leakage by comparing Vaud municipalities, with PGB, to their neighbours in Geneva, without PGB. A key concern with PGB is leakage, people leaving their waste elsewhere to save on the garbage tax. We find no evidence of leakage. Fifth, we investigate the emergence of other undesirable behaviours. We find that a fraction of people keep using the standard garbage bags, now outlawed. This fraction is, however, very small and, with time, the incidence of this phenomenon declines very rapidly. Citation data provide a similar figure. After a few years, the level of undesirable behaviour is very similar to when there was no PGB.

Our findings suggest that PGB is highly effective in reducing incinerated waste. Its effects are neither driven by stomping, or leakage, nor by short-lived increases in awareness of waste use and policies. To

find a potential explanation for why PGB is rarely implemented, we need to look at the political aspect of implementing PGB, and analyse what inhabitants of the affected communities believe regarding the PGB's effectiveness, fairness, and political acceptability. Our approach provides the answer. Before PGB's implementation, inhabitants of treated municipalities are concerned that PGB will not work, and believe the tax is unfair. Hence, we identify political opposition as the main barrier to PGB. However, implementing PGB reverses the situation: inhabitants in treated villages believe PGB is more effective and fairer, eventually converging to the beliefs in non-treated municipalities, who had PGB throughout. To assess whether an improved perception of PGB matters for policy, we asked people about the maximum price they would accept in a vote. This maximum price, the garbage tax, is 70% higher after implementing PGB.

Our original approach contributes to two strands of literature. First, our study complements the literature assessing the effectiveness of unit pricing. Several types of garbage taxation exist, such as pricing garbage by the bag (or by tags, stickers), weight pricing, and subscription programs. Subscription programs tend to under-perform the other two schemes, as the marginal cost of additional garbage may be zero if households remain stuck with a given number of containers for which they subscribed (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000). Ideally, unit pricing should incentivise households to sort more, and to look for less voluminous wrapping while shopping (Jenkins et al., 2003).

Since the price of incinerating garbage, or disposing in landfills, is usually defined in terms of weight, municipalities should in principle price households in the same unit. When garbage is priced based on its volume, and not weight, households may be tempted to compress waste to reduce volume (the so-called Seattle Stomp). However, operating weight programs is generally much more costly than operating volume programs. It is hence an empirical question whether PGB can be effective both when measuring garbage in litres, and in kilograms. According to the review of Kinnaman (2006), PGB and weight programs may perform in a very similar way, in common units. Overall, the estimates for price elasticities that he reports range approximately from -0.08 to -0.39 , pointing to incinerated garbage as a relatively, but not completely, inelastic good. This reconciles unit-pricing schemes with other types of environmental taxes.

Second, our analysis contributes to the study of the acceptability of environmental taxes. On the question of public acceptability, the literature is much less developed. Distributional issues are evaluated by Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), which estimate the income elasticity of incinerated garbage between 0.05 and 0.57 (thus making unit pricing regressive). Environmental taxes may be in general perceived as a constraining instrument, for instance as opposed to subsidies (Steg et al., 2006). A recent strand of literature on the acceptability of carbon taxes emphasises how the incentive effect of environmental taxes may be misunderstood by the public and this may make Pigouvian taxes be felt as 'Ramsey' taxes unless revenues are earmarked (see e.g. Thalmann, 2004; Dresner et al., 2006; Kallbekken, 2011; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017). Yet, the cross-country comparison of Husaini et al. (2007) suggests that, where implemented, unit pricing enjoys a relative popularity among the general public. This may be a signal that acceptability *ex ante* and *ex post* differ.

Differences in acceptability are likely to occur if people tend to be overly cautious *ex ante*, overweighting cons and underweighting pros, of a policy change. There is one instance in particular, relevant to this paper, in which acceptability has been examined over time, and has been shown to increase shortly after implementation. In 2006 and 2013, respectively, the Swedish cities of Stockholm and Gothenburg implemented a congestion charge for a trial period, followed by a referendum. In the city of Stockholm, voters decided to extend the policy beyond the trial period. Resistance did not disappear with the trial run, but was significantly reduced (Schuitema et al., 2010). Hence, the trial run contributed to permanentise the policy (Börjesson et al., 2012). In Gothenburg, in 2014, 57% of voters rejected the congestion charge in a

consultative, non-binding, referendum. Nevertheless, survey data show that acceptability would have been 5% lower had voters expressed their opinion before the trial (Hansla et al., 2017). Both commuters and non-commuters were less skeptical towards the policy once in place (Andersson and Näsén, 2016).¹

Our study contributes to the existing literature on the effectiveness of PGB and the political economy of environmental taxes in at least three ways. First, we study effectiveness, and beliefs, in a setting that forces municipalities to adopt PGB. This is a unique setting, allowing us to document both what PGB does, and how it affects people's perceptions. Earlier research is based on jurisdictions that voluntarily adopt unit pricing (e.g. Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004). The decision to implement PGB can be strongly correlated with the outcome variable, garbage per capita. Nonetheless, we are aware of only a few studies dealing with endogeneity in garbage taxation.

Second, our assessment is based on a transparent and plausible empirical design. Our methodology consists in following the same set of households, and municipalities, both before and after adoption of PGB, allowing us to document our findings in a difference-in-differences setting. Our original data sources allow us to provide in a single treatment a full assessment of PGB's effectiveness, comparing evidence from our household panel with administrative data covering a relatively long period. We are able to identify the margin of response in terms of frequency of recycling, the extent of stomping, the persistence of the decrease in garbage per capita and the effect on surrounding municipalities. Thanks to the survey to municipalities we are also able to provide a more complete description of administrative changes around the implementation, and test (and rule out) whether the observed effect of PGB is driven by confounding policies. Thanks to the length of our panel of municipal waste data, we can also test (and rule out) whether the observed effect of PGB is driven by short-lived increases in awareness.

Third, and most importantly, our extensive information on people's perceptions of the effectiveness and political acceptability of the tax enable us to assess how these beliefs change when the tax is implemented. Doing so turns out to be important as perceptions change dramatically when the tax is implemented. While the recent literature on the acceptability of environmental taxes has used several methodologies to understand why more often than not economic prescriptions are not followed by local and national authorities, we are aware of only another instance, namely the implementation of congestion charges in Sweden, in which perceptions of the same households are examined before and after the implementation of an environmental tax. Our results on acceptability provide considerable implications. First, we document that the main reason for not implementing PGB is people thinking it is ineffective, or unfair, and not PGB being ineffective, or unfair. Second, people update, and correct, their beliefs once the policy is in place, suggesting that PGB, and potentially other environmental policies, could be much more diffused had people the chance to observe them in action. By studying a situation in which vested interest play little role, we can isolate the effect of experiencing environmental policy on acceptability and inform the literature analysing more complex policies, such as carbon taxes, in which popular opposition interacts with lobbying from potential losers.

The next section provides information on waste collection in Switzerland and a literature review. Section 3 provides background on

the data sources, and a first descriptive overview. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy, difference-in-differences, and discusses the identifying assumptions. Section 5 provides our evaluation of the effectiveness of PGB. Section 6 shows how introducing PGB changes people's perceptions. Section 7 concludes.

2. Waste Management in Switzerland and the Canton of Vaud

In Switzerland, municipalities manage waste disposal either directly or by joining forces in regional companies that manage the full process for several shareholder municipalities. Regional companies collect and weigh garbage, which is then incinerated in local plants, also funded by public capital from municipalities or the Canton. Regional companies re-inject recycled materials in the production cycle.

Households are charged for this service by the municipality in which they reside. Absent any pricing, all waste management costs are raised independently of the quantity of garbage that the household produces. Most commonly, waste management costs are covered by lump-sum taxes calculated based on the number of household members in adult age. Municipalities (as well as cantons and the federal government) can raise income taxes, but these are generally not used to pay for waste management.

Households are free to recycle or not, based on the incentives that they face. Drop-off centres are available in all densely populated areas as well as in rural municipalities. Most of them allow the disposal of the following materials: polyethylene terephthalate (PET), carton, paper, clothes, glass, cans, organic waste, batteries, and aluminium. In many apartment buildings, paper and carton are collected within the building's premises.

In Switzerland, municipalities can set their own rules for garbage collection, as long as they respect federal and cantonal law. Unit pricing has existed for two decades in Switzerland, but in a very heterogeneous fashion. Unit pricing is frequent in the Swiss-German, Eastern, parts of Switzerland. In the Western parts of the country, it has been limited, until very recently, to the Cantons of Fribourg and Neuchâtel (unit pricing introduced in 2012) and to some municipalities of the Cantons of Jura, Vaud and Valais. The cantons Jura and Geneva, are known to have been historically averse to such policy.

Heterogeneity is the result of the principle of subsidiarity, according to which municipalities have the right to decide their own way to deal with waste management unless cantonal or federal laws prescribe otherwise. A limit to the principle of subsidiarity comes however from a 1997 federal environmental protection legislation imposing the polluter pays principle in waste collection management, thus forcing the implementation of unit pricing at the municipal level.

In the Canton of Vaud, this legislation was nevertheless not enforced until a 2011 lawsuit led to a Federal Supreme Court's ruling. The Federal Supreme Court mandated all municipalities in the Canton of Vaud to implement unit-pricing schemes to finance waste collection. Lump-sum taxes are only allowed as a complementary source of revenue. Since regulations for waste collection management are defined at the municipal level, this decision started a legislative process at the municipal level that generated a large wave of unit pricing implementations in the canton, driven by municipalities taking action to comply with the Federal Supreme Court's ruling.

Our analysis focuses on municipalities that switched to a system of pricing by the bag. Pricing for garbage is identical all across the canton and proportional to volume, e.g. the price for 17-litre bag is 1 CHF or about 1 USD, for a 35-litre bag it is 2 CHF, etc. When switching to PGB, municipalities decreased the lump-sum taxes used to fund waste management costs, as prescribed by the federal institutions overseeing regulated prices in the country.

3. Data

In this section, we first discuss how we defined treated and control

¹ Note that, since the studies mentioned in this paragraph do not include a control group, 'the context in which the trial took place should be taken into account when interpreting the results' (Schuitema et al., 2010, p. 108). Given that, in all studies, the survey waves took place only a few months apart, there are good reasons to believe that the role of confounders in driving these findings is limited. The role of confounders may be more important in Murray and Rivers (2015), another interesting study that uses multiple cross-sections, from opinion polls, to analyse the popularity of the British Columbia carbon tax. The popularity of the carbon tax increases persistently after 2011 in both British Columbia and the rest of Canada. Sampling effects aside, some of this result may be due to an improvement in the Canadian economy after the economic crisis.

municipalities, how we collected the household survey data, and provide a first descriptive overview of the main variables.

3.1. Treatment and Control Municipalities

Before 2013, 86 municipalities had already introduced some form of unit pricing, out of which 58 had implemented PGB. By November 2013, 162 municipalities had modified their laws in order to introduce unit pricing by January 2013, out of which 158 adopted a PGB scheme. A total of 121 municipalities had not reached a decision on introducing PGB by January 2013.²

Our analysis focuses on municipalities that introduced PGB by January 1, 2013. We separate these municipalities in two groups. The 58 municipalities that introduced PGB before January 1, 2013, are ‘control’ municipalities, as they did not change PGB status. The 158 municipalities that introduced PGB on January 1, 2013, are ‘treated’ municipalities.

We collected data on control and treated municipalities from three sources: a household survey, municipality level data on waste, and municipality survey on waste management policies, introduced along with PGB.

We designed the household survey study as follows. We randomly selected 48 municipalities from the set of control municipalities, and 22 municipalities from the treated municipalities. We then contacted a professional survey company, which provided us with a random sample of at most 30 addresses of people within each municipality in our sample. Overall, we had 1380 addresses for the control group, and 599 for the treatment group.³

A team of interviewers then administered two rounds of telephone interviews to households in our sample. The first round of interviews took place between November and December 2012. Due to the limited amount of time available, we contacted only 70% of the households before January 1, 2013, the date of the policy change. Since each interviewer contacted a random mix of treated and control households, households we did not contact are similar to households we contacted. We collected data from 228 households in the control group, and for 124 households in the treatment group. The response rate in this first round of interviews is about 20% for both groups.

The second round of interviews took place between April and June 2013, once the policy was in place. Out of the 352 households that participated in the first round, 193 households participated also to the second round. We will use data on the 193 households participating in both interview rounds in our difference-in-differences analyses. The response rate is higher for treated households. We discuss below potential selection issues and how we pacify any related concern.

Interview data provide rich information on households, but do not cover all individuals living in treated and control municipalities. To address this, we also collected administrative data on incinerated waste, available for all municipalities. These data provide information on the quantity of solid waste produced per capita in a municipality. It

² Among them, a few municipalities introduced PGB later during 2013, and are excluded from the econometric analysis. We further consider the possible implications of this specific situation. Note that due to on-going merging processes, the number of municipalities slightly differs between 2012 and 2013. Note also that a few municipalities implemented PGB in 2012, i.e. after the Supreme Court's ruling but before the formal date of forced implementation. Excluding these municipalities from the control group would not affect our results.

³ The sampling rates are not the same across treated and control municipalities since not all municipalities that were supposed to introduce PGB on January 1, 2013, did it. Latecomers had not announced the implementation of the tax in November 2012, when we designed the survey, but we could not rule out that some of these municipalities would manage to introduce PGB on time. We exclude latecomers from our analysis as none introduced PGB by January 2013. As shown by Table A.1, the municipalities implementing PGB at a later stage are no different from those implementing it on January 1, 2013, in terms of population size, greenness (measured in terms of votes cast for a green party at the last federal elections) and income tax coefficients, a standard proxy for wealth. Data for 2014 confirm this observation; the effect of PGB is not different on latecomers. Section 5 tests whether heterogeneous treatment effects may exist across municipalities.

is available from 2008 to 2015. The data cover the entire Canton of Vaud, allowing comparing survey data from our sample of households with aggregate data for all municipalities in each group.

Many municipalities introduced measures that made it easier for their citizens to dispose of their waste when they shifted to pricing garbage by the bag. These measures have often been neglected in previous research, although they may confound the main estimates. We collected detailed information on these measures. We contacted the member of the municipality councils in charge of waste management for all municipalities covered by the survey panel data. We administered a supplementary questionnaire capturing changes in the number of kerbside programs, of collection centres, of skips, in the opening hours of existing collection centres and in the frequency of raising-awareness initiatives taking place between the two periods. Of the 82 municipalities for which we observe at least one household, we obtained answers for 34 municipalities. We pay attention to possible selectivity of this sub-sample of 34 municipalities in our estimates below. Assessing the effects of PGB only on the municipalities for which we know that no additional measures were introduced between 2012 and 2013 would provide the same results as in the main estimations.

Furthermore, implementing PGB may increase household awareness on the importance of recycling. Short-lived awareness may lead to large estimates of PGB, which may disappear in the medium to long run. Some households may also over- (or under-) react in the short run, and realise that they may (not) be better off paying the fee than recycling a given material. We use administrative data for 2014 and 2015 to shed light on the persistence of PGB's effect. This aspect has been generally overlooked in the literature, and we exploit our relatively long panel and the other properties of our context to fill this gap.

Finally, implementing PGB may lead to undesirable effects such as the use of non-compliant bags. The largest municipality in the canton, the city of Lausanne, keeps a record of the tons of improperly-disposed garbage that it collects, as well as of the citations that it issues for illegal behaviour. We use these data to have a sense of how important this issue is in this context and how it evolves over time. We use media data from the global database Factiva to check whether the trend, as well as the incidence, observed for Lausanne may be a good proxy for the situation at the cantonal level.

3.2. Main Variables

The survey is structured in three parts. In the first part, we ask households about their behaviour regarding solid waste and recycling of the following 9 materials: PET, carton, paper, textiles, glass, cans, organic waste, batteries, and aluminium. The second part of the questionnaire concerns unit pricing's perception and acceptability. The final questions provide us with the standard socioeconomic variables (cf. Table A.2).

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables concerning unit pricing's effectiveness: solid garbage per household and per capita, recycling of the 9 materials and attention to voluminous wrapping while shopping. Descriptive statistics are given for the treatment and control groups for 2012 and 2013. Solid waste is measured in litres per week. This value is obtained by multiplying the number of bags used per week with their volume (17 and 35 l are the most common sizes). Total observations for solid waste are 371. Recycling variables take value 1 if the household sorts a given material and 0 otherwise.⁴

⁴ We do not measure the intensity of recycling but rather the probability of doing it. Arguably we can assume that households stating that they recycle a given material do it in most cases, even though probably not in all. Viscusi et al. (2011) describe recycling as a dichotomous choice with corner solutions, i.e. people recycle or do not recycle at all. This is the result of the following proposition: if for a given household it is desirable to recycle n units of material, then it is likely to be desirable to recycle $n+1$ units. The choice of frequency over intensity of recycling clearly simplifies the task to interviewees, which are not asked to estimate the share of a given material that is recycled. This estimation may indeed be cognitively demanding and possibly lead to a substantial difference between stated and reported behaviour (Sterner and Bartelings, 1999). We use a binary measure also for voluminous wrapping: we ask to households whether they pay attention to wrapping or not.

Table 1
Household survey: solid waste, recycling and voluminous wrapping, mean comparison between 2012 and 2013.

| Variable | 2012 | | 2013 | |
|-----------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| | Treatment | Control | Treatment | Control |
| Per capita | 27.385 | 16.187 | 13.875 | 13.153 |
| Per household | 65.906 | 39.728 | 33.647 | 35.061 |
| | <i>N</i> = 85 | <i>N</i> = 103 | <i>N</i> = 85 | <i>N</i> = 98 |
| PET | 0.919 | 0.981 | 0.953 | 0.944 |
| Carton | 0.849 | 0.944 | 0.965 | 0.907 |
| Paper | 0.895 | 0.972 | 0.953 | 0.935 |
| Textiles | 0.872 | 0.897 | 0.907 | 0.841 |
| Cans | 0.733 | 0.925 | 0.756 | 0.738 |
| Organic waste | 0.698 | 0.85 | 0.884 | 0.841 |
| Batteries | 0.942 | 0.935 | 0.988 | 0.897 |
| Aluminium | 0.733 | 0.907 | 0.93 | 0.869 |
| | <i>N</i> = 86 | <i>N</i> = 107 | <i>N</i> = 86 | <i>N</i> = 107 |
| Attention to wrapping | 0.471 | 0.551 | 0.571 | 0.608 |
| | <i>N</i> = 85 | <i>N</i> = 107 | <i>N</i> = 84 | <i>N</i> = 102 |

4. Empirical Strategy

In this section, we explain the empirical strategy and discuss the external validity of the household survey data.

4.1. Empirical Framework

Evaluating the introduction of PGB is challenging because adoption of PGB could be related to environmental preferences of voters, i.e. policy endogeneity (cf. Besley and Case, 2000). We describe in this section how we address endogeneity. We assume the level of garbage production absent any treatment to be dependent on time and municipality characteristics and apply a standard difference-in-differences approach. The parameter of interest captures the average effect of introducing PGB in municipalities that adopted PGB in compliance to the Supreme Court mandate. The average effect might vary across municipalities for socio-economic reasons, but not because of differences in the garbage tax, as the tax is linear and homogeneous at the cantonal level.

The key identifying assumption requires that the trend in the treated outcome in municipalities that had PGB before the mandate, or control municipalities, is the same as the trend in the non-treated outcome in municipalities that adopted PGB in compliance with the mandate, or treated municipalities.⁵

We now consider how this approach compares to those used in the literature. In cross-sectional studies, as in Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000), environmental-friendly communities may be relatively more likely than others to introduce unit-pricing systems. Cross-sectional comparisons may thus overestimate the policy's effectiveness, since these communities may generate lower amounts of garbage anyway, i.e. regardless of the policy. On the other hand, communities with very high levels of garbage per capita may consider implementing such policy to converge towards a "standard" level of garbage production. Efficiency reasons may also support this second source of endogeneity (Dijkgraaf

and Gradus, 2009). Cross-sectional comparisons may thus underestimate the policy's effectiveness.⁶

Time-series analyses for the same community, as in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), do not face this issue, but, absent any control group acting as counterfactual, estimates may be biased by trends (i.e. simultaneity). This bias may be very large if garbage is measured at different moments of the year, as seasonal variation may be considerable (cf. Sterner and Bartelings, 1999). Other elements, such as citizen's environmental friendliness, may also change over time. Non-tax policies (as the ones we observe in our context) may also affect the amount of solid garbage produced by households. In Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), the authors collect data for other communities, regarded as similar, in an attempt to correct their estimates.

Our approach addresses both issues. For treated municipalities, waste production changes over time because of the tax but also because of other changes in time. Control municipalities provide information on the time trend. Difference-in-differences isolates the effect of PGB by netting out the time trend.

4.2. External Validity

Given its sample size, our survey may not be fully representative of the Canton as a whole. In what follows, we thus discuss several pieces of evidence to verify that our results are not distorted by selection issues. First, Tables A.2 and A.3, compare our sample to the population in the Canton. This comparison suggests that, if anything, our sample is slightly older and richer than the underlying population, and includes slightly more Swiss nationals. These minor differences may not be related with selection. Recall that we give equal weight to all municipalities, regardless of their size. We thus cover households living both in urban and rural areas. Second, Table A.2 compares individuals who participate in the first round of interviews but not in the second one, to those who participate in both interviews. Results indicate that compliers may be slightly richer and better educated. Statistically speaking, a small difference can be found also for foreign (EU) citizens between the two waves. Third, Table A.2 also compares individuals in the treated group and in the control group. Once again we remark only very slight differences, for e.g. nationality, education, and income. Based on these comparisons, we observe that the extent of non-randomness, if any, is limited in the selection of our panel. We will introduce control variables in our analyses to account for any possible non-random selection.

Furthermore, we recall that we collected extensive official data measured by municipalities. Using these data, we can estimate the effect of introducing PGB using data on everyone in the municipality. To this end, we proceed as follows. We first compare population estimates with survey estimates to learn about the representativity of our survey estimates. We then exploit the full scope of the administrative data to look at all municipalities starting to price garbage by the bag on January 1, 2013, as (extended) treatment group, with all municipalities already pricing garbage by the bag by the end of 2012 as (extended) control group. These tests should indicate whether our survey results are also relevant for the larger population.

5. Effects of PGB on Waste

In this section, we present the main results on the policy

⁵ Our assumption is somewhat different from the standard identifying assumption in difference-in-differences contexts, asking for parallel trends in the outcome without treatment in treated and control municipalities. The control group in our setting is always treated whereas the control group is never treated in the standard setting. We assess this identifying assumption below using several years of data before the policy change. If the underlying assumptions are verified, an OLS estimate of our key empirical specification provides unbiased estimates of the average causal effect of our treatment. In all survey estimates, we allow for clustering of the errors at the municipality level. Household characteristics may vary between municipalities and groups, so we will assess sensitivity of our results to control variables. Note that readers can refer to an earlier version of this paper for a detailed account of how the difference-in-differences approach works and how we apply it in this context (cf. Carattini et al., 2016).

⁶ Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) attempt to identify the direction of (and correct for) this self-selection bias by estimating in a first stage the endogenous likelihood of implementing a unit-pricing system. Their finding suggests that the second source of bias may dominate, i.e. simple cross-sectional analysis would underestimate the policy's effectiveness. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) use the decision to adopt unit pricing as signal of 'environmental activism'. Controlling for 'environmental activism', the authors find with panel data a lower estimate for unit pricing. They, hence, argue that this variable helps correcting for the policy endogeneity. Based on their finding, they suggest that the first source seems to dominate, i.e. simple cross-sectional analysis would overestimate the policy's effectiveness. Allers and Hoebe (2010) use the tax rate of unit pricing in neighbouring municipalities as instrument for the likelihood of implementing unit pricing. This approach does not improve the estimates for unsorted waste, but it does for organic waste.



Fig. 1. Administrative data: parallel trends, and persistence.

effectiveness. We start by studying the evolution of waste over time in treated and control municipalities. We then show effects on waste, and recycling, based on survey data. We then present evidence based on administrative data, verifying the external validity and representativity of our survey sample. Administrative yearly data are available since 2008, normalised by the number of inhabitants (i.e. kilograms per capita). We discuss how to test for leakage, waste wandering into adjacent municipalities that have no PGB. Finally, we test the persistence of PGB's effect, using data for the most recent years, 2014 and 2015.

5.1. Parallel Trends

We first want to understand the trends in incinerated waste, official data, produced by municipalities in the treatment and in the control group. Fig. 1 shows average garbage in treated municipalities and control municipalities who never changed their PGB status between 2008 and 2012. Dotted lines indicate confidence intervals. We now focus on the *ex ante* period. Both groups follow a horizontal path with only a limited amount of variation around the steady line given by their level of incinerated waste in 2008. This variation is marginal compared with the large difference in solid waste production between the two groups, which is narrowed only in 2013 when the treatment group is subject to treatment.⁷ Hence, Fig. 1 provides evidence of convergence between the treatment group and the control group, once the policy is in place. We return to Fig. 1 when analysing the policy persistence.

5.2. Results for Garbage

We start by assessing the treatment effect on the amount of solid waste produced by households in the survey. The top panel of Fig. 2 shows the variation over time in the volume of solid waste per capita per week in the treatment and control groups. The bottom panel zooms on the difference and provides a first approximation of the difference in differences, which is of about -10 l and statistically significant, as indicated by the confidence intervals.

Column (1) in Table 2 translates this effect into numbers.⁸ We introduce control variables in column (2). The treatment effect amounts




Fig. 2. Household survey: treatment effect on solid waste per capita in litres per week.

to about -10.5 l per capita per week. By introducing control variables in column (2), we test whether this effect is robust to possible differences in the groups' socioeconomic composition. Column (2) shows that it is. The coefficient for the treatment is indeed statistically unchanged. However, several control variables are statistically significant and the goodness-of-fit as measured by the within- R^2 substantially improves. We thus point to column (2) as the appropriate specification and discuss the estimates accordingly.

In 2012, the average solid waste volume per capita per week in the treatment group was slightly above 27 l. This implies that the treatment generates a decline in solid waste of about 40%. The effect of Table 2 is close to the estimate of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), a decrease in volume of about 37%. However, the authors find that in terms of weight this estimate is significantly smaller. We test below whether the magnitude of PGB's effect is the same when measuring garbage in kilograms. In computing the price elasticity of demand we follow the strategy outlined by Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and find an arc-elasticity of about -0.3 .⁹

Results on the control variables indicate that a high level of education as measured by possessing a university degree is related to less solid waste per week per capita (about 8 l) compared to having completed only the compulsory education (the reference case). It is indeed common in the literature to have pro-environmental behaviour

⁷ We have tested parallel trends by implementing a placebo introduction of PGB for treated municipalities in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. The placebo effects are all not statistically significant, and smaller than 10 % of the treatment effect, in absolute value.

⁸ OLS is used in all specifications unless otherwise specified. Municipality-specific fixed effects are justified by a $\chi^2(2)$ of 32.08 ($p > \chi^2(2) = 0.0000$) in the Hausman test for column (1) and a $\chi^2(25)$ of 62.53 ($p > \chi^2(25) = 0.0000$) for column (2). Quantitatively equivalent results can be obtained using household-specific fixed effects. We use clustered standard errors (clusters per municipality) in all specifications where it is justified by the standard heteroscedasticity tests such as modified Wald and Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests.

⁹ On average bags are priced at 1.5 francs. Absent any tax, the retail price of a bag was slightly above 0, around 0.17. The arc-elasticity resulting from an increase in price from 0.17 to 1.5 is the same as the point-elasticity at a price of 0.665. We hence obtain $-9.67 \cdot 0.665 / ((27.4 + 13.875) / 2) = -0.32$.

Table 2
Household survey: treatment effect on solid waste per capita in litres per week.

| | (1) | (2) |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| PGB | −10.51*** (1.921) | −9.668*** (2.009) |
| Year 2013 | −2.847** (1.184) | −2.845** (1.360) |
| Gender (M) | | −2.192 (2.079) |
| Age | | −0.0904 (0.0783) |
| EU | | 4.012* (2.319) |
| Rest of the world | | −1.745 (4.424) |
| Adults in households | | −5.644*** (1.453) |
| Children in households | | −1.465 (1.023) |
| Apprenticeship | | −2.626 (2.515) |
| High school | | −2.275 (3.738) |
| University | | −8.055*** (2.496) |
| Jobless | | −1.462 (12.73) |
| Homemaker | | −11.32 (12.36) |
| Employee | | −8.208 (11.23) |
| Self-employed | | −6.783 (10.45) |
| Manager | | −8.632 (12.55) |
| Retiree | | −10.36 (11.60) |
| Green | | −0.159 (3.440) |
| Renter | | −2.110 (1.822) |
| Distance | | 0.268* (0.142) |
| Income category 1 | | −18.40*** (3.487) |
| Income category 2 | | −2.309 (3.972) |
| Income category 3 | | −5.919* (3.282) |
| Income category 4 | | −5.629 (3.868) |
| Income category 5 | | 0.733 (3.956) |
| Income is missing | | −7.642** (3.242) |
| Constant | 21.23*** (0.467) | 56.12*** (12.70) |
| Within-R ² | 0.117 | 0.295 |
| N | 371 | 359 |

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

positively associated with education (cf. e.g. Jenkins et al., 2003 for the case of garbage). Income is available in six categories, with the highest income serving as the reference. Consistent with consumer economics, low-income households produce significantly less garbage as they have lower levels of consumption and lower opportunity costs of recycling.¹⁰

We find a negative effect for the number of adults in the household. The literature points to economies of scale (cf. e.g. Sterner and Bartelings, 1999; Halvorsen, 2012) and especially to a better allocation of recycling tasks within large households, taking into account the differences in opportunity costs. The statistically significant coefficient for distance from a collecting centre shows the importance of installing collection centres close to the final users reducing the households' cost of recycling. We relate this finding to the vast literature on the effectiveness of drop-off centres and kerbside recycling programs (cf. e.g. Jenkins et al., 2003; Kinnaman, 2006; Halvorsen, 2008; Hage et al., 2009).

5.3. Effects on Recycling

We now investigate the effects on recycling. Table 3 reproduces the same approach of Table 2 for all recycling materials plus attention to wrapping. The outcomes that we observe here are binary. We may thus want to also estimate a probability model. Since the number of unknown parameters increases with the number of households for a fixed panel length, such specification would face the incidental parameters problem, which implies that the coefficients for municipality-specific fixed effects would be inconsistent. Applying a random-effect model allowing for a Chamberlain/Mundlak correction introducing the mean of time-varying variables in the main specification would help, but this would not be

possible absent time-varying independent variables. We can however estimate a non-linear model by “brute force” (cf. Greene, 2011), knowing that this technique introduces an upward bias of 100% when $T = 2$ as in this context, and compare it to linear regression. Since estimates from Logit are very similar to those obtained with OLS, taking into account the brute-force bias, and given the lost observations when success or failure are perfectly predicted, we comment the empirical results based on estimates from OLS. Estimations from Logit models are provided in Appendix A. For the same reason, we do not display Logit models with control variables.¹¹

In the top panel, we apply the simplest model without control variables to the frequency of recycling. Treatment effects have the expected sign and are the largest in the case of aluminium and organic waste. In the bottom panel, we introduce our standard set of controls. Only the treatment effects for aluminium and organic waste are robust to the inclusion of control variables. That is, the most conservative estimates from columns (1) and (6) confirm that there is an increase in the frequency of recycling of organic waste (of about 14%) and of aluminium (of about 20%). These effects are not only statistically significant, but also considerably large from an economic perspective. Regarding batteries, cans, carton, glass and paper, the coefficients remain positive, but are no longer large enough to reach significance.

Statistically significant control variables include distance from the collection centre and a few income categories. When significant, the effect of income is in most cases as expected: low-income households have a lower opportunity cost and are thus supposed to be more inclined to sort waste. The effect of distance from the collection centre is negative and statistically significant for all materials except for aluminium and batteries, which may be less difficult to transport than other materials. From Table A.4, we can infer that a decrease in distance of about 10 min would lead to an increase in the frequency of recycling of paper of about 6%.

5.4. Testing for Confounders

Some municipalities facilitated recycling at the time of introducing PGB. Neglecting these policies, we would tend to overstate the effectiveness of unit pricing. We now consider the role of this confound using data from the survey to the municipalities. These data measure whether a municipality increased opening hours, launched a raising-awareness initiative, etc. or not.¹² Table A.6 gives descriptive statistics for the variables considered in this analysis for both the control and the treatment groups. We observe in Table A.6 that non-tax measures increase in both the treatment group and the control group, perhaps due to the salience of the Supreme Court mandate in the entire region.

Estimates from the regressions including potential confounders are presented in Table 4, using survey data. Non-tax variables are not available for the whole sample. Column (1) estimates again the treatment effect as in the respective column of Table 2, but for the subset of households living in municipalities for which we possess data on non-tax measures of waste management. The treatment effect is statistically unchanged with respect to Table 2. Column (2) adds variables that indicate the presence of new measures to facilitate recycling. The coefficient for the treatment effect is somewhat smaller but statistically identical to the baseline effect in column (1). This result suggests that mainly PGB, and only to a much lesser extent the recycling programs, explain the sizeable reduction in garbage in municipalities that introduced PGB.¹³

¹¹ All additional estimations are available by the authors upon request. The statistical significance of the treatment effect on recycling, if any, is robust to the use of false discovery rate q -values for multiple regressions (Anderson, 2008).

¹² We exclude a few measures that affected only a handful of households, i.e. awareness-raising tools such as street stands and specific online websites.

¹³ We have replicated results also with administrative data on incinerated waste (see below). Table A.7 shows results that are virtually identical to those obtained with survey data. We have also explored how non-tax variables affect recycling behaviour. Results are not affected. The coefficient for organic waste, for instance, becomes 0.130, statistically undistinguishable from the 0.144 of Table 2 and remains statistically significant.

¹⁰ Note that socioeconomic variables may be given for the household's representative answering the questionnaire, whereas waste management is rather a household decision.

Table 3
Household survey: treatment effect on recycling and wrapping.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Aluminium | Battery | Cans | Carton | Textiles | Glass | Organic waste | Paper | PET | Wrapping |
| <i>OLS</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| PGB | 0.235*** (0.0718) | 0.0839 (0.0519) | 0.210** (0.0877) | 0.154** (0.0652) | 0.0910 (0.0683) | 0.0885* (0.0443) | 0.195*** (0.0695) | 0.0955* (0.0528) | 0.0723 (0.0475) | 0.0497 (0.0914) |
| Year 2013 | −0.0374 (0.0401) | −0.0374 (0.0403) | −0.187*** (0.054) | −0.0374 (0.0391) | −0.0561 (0.0487) | −0.0187 (0.0295) | −0.00935 (0.0509) | −0.0374 (0.0321) | −0.0374 (0.0291) | 0.0558 (0.0612) |
| Within-R ² | 0.047 | 0.009 | 0.037 | 0.026 | 0.006 | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| N | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 | 386 | 378 |
| <i>OLS (with control variables)</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| PGB | 0.195** (0.0745) | 0.0288 (0.0511) | 0.149 (0.0940) | 0.107 (0.0656) | 0.0335 (0.0766) | 0.0206 (0.0355) | 0.144** (0.0645) | 0.0361 (0.0531) | 0.00896 (0.0412) | 0.0561 (0.0987) |
| Year 2013 | −0.00107 (0.0423) | 0.0192 (0.0373) | −0.135** (0.0587) | 0.00331 (0.0360) | −0.00975 (0.0542) | 0.0281 (0.0180) | 0.0369 (0.0470) | 0.00225 (0.0228) | 0.00447 (0.0183) | 0.0577 (0.0682) |
| Within-R ² | 0.101 | 0.059 | 0.130 | 0.088 | 0.069 | 0.133 | 0.166 | 0.112 | 0.093 | 0.222 |
| N | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 365 |

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4
Household survey: treatment effect on solid waste per capita in litres per week, non-tax waste management policies.

| | (1) | (2) |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| PGB | −12.20*** (3.129) | −11.08*** (3.762) |
| Year 2013 | −1.777 (1.904) | −2.692 (3.299) |
| Additional skips: number of materials covered | | −1.340** (0.606) |
| Collection centres: better opening hours | | 6.104 (4.170) |
| New kerbside program | | −9.383 (6.330) |
| New collection centre | | 6.918** (2.690) |
| Awareness-raising campaign: unaddressed mailshot | | 0.647* (4.462) |
| Constant | 21.71*** (0.765) | 21.68*** (0.748) |
| Within-R ² | 0.105 | 0.115 |
| N | 205 | 205 |

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Most non-tax variables are statistically insignificant and the goodness-of-fit is only slightly affected. The number of materials covered by new skips is negative, and statistically significant.¹⁴ The coefficient for the kerbside program is also negative, but does not reach significance. We also find positive point estimates for better opening hours, new collection centres (statistically significant) and unaddressed mailshots (very small). We suspect this result is driven by reverse causality. PGB may also increase awareness in the short-term, regardless of the other efforts undertaken by municipalities. We analyse with administrative data whether PGB's effects change over time, as if they were driven by short-term increases in awareness eventually vanishing away.

¹⁴ Note that this variable counts the number of materials covered by new skips, which allows to avoid including correlated skip dummies for each material.

5.5. Administrative Data

To estimate the treatment effect with administrative data, we look first at the amount of solid waste sent to incineration in 2012 and 2013, focusing on the sub-sample of municipalities for which we also have survey data. Estimates are provided in Table 5. The first column shows that the implementation of PGB causes a reduction in the amount of per capita solid waste of about 86 kg per year. The goodness-of-fit is much higher than in the survey estimations, probably due to a lower variability in the (average) per capita waste production between municipalities than between households. In percentage, with respect to a previous level without treatment of 244 kg, we find a reduction of about 35%. Hence, the comparison of estimates from Tables 2 (in litres) and 5 (in kilograms) indicates that the two data provide comparable estimates for the effectiveness of PGB.

We obtain a very similar elasticity using weight as unit of measurement (about −0.29 with the estimates from column (1)) as we did based on volume. The slightly smaller elasticity may suggest the presence of some degree of stomping, yet not sufficient to lead to a statistically significant difference in the main effects. As noted by Bel and Gradus (2016), such a difference is likely to exist mainly when volume pricing is represented by containers, as in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), instead of smaller units such as bags, as in this case. Considering for instance the case of The Netherlands, no difference between weight and bag pricing is found in Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2009), while some divergence is documented in Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2015), favourable to weight programs, and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2016), favourable to bag programs.

Administrative data also allow us to test whether the treatment effect found so far applies only to the subset of municipalities covered by the survey data or whether these are representative of the canton as a whole. As a result, we reproduce in column (2) the same approach of column (1) using all municipalities in the canton. Estimates from Table 5 provide further evidence on the external validity of the previous results. Based on 434 observations, 217 municipalities, the treatment effect is estimated in column (2) at about 80 kg per capita per year of reduced solid waste. This figure is quantitatively undistinguishable from the previous estimates and implies a reduction in garbage per capita of about 40%. The treatment in column (2) is still PGB whereas in (3) we take all unit pricing schemes as treatment. Introducing data also on weight programs does not affect the treatment effect in any statistically perceptible way. However, since only a small fraction of

Table 5
Administrative data: treatment effect on solid waste per capita in kilos per year.

| | Survey | Volume | + Weight | Heterogeneous |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| PGB | −86.14*** (12.26) | −79.72*** (4.386) | | −109.37** (31.56) |
| PGB · Green votes | | | | 0.8559* (1.85) |
| Year 2013 | −11.15** (4.346) | −9.084*** (3.182) | −8.461*** (2.748) | −11.15** (4.367) |
| Unit pricing | | | −79.56*** (4.073) | |
| Constant | 173.6*** (2.380) | 186.6*** (1.177) | 181.3*** (1.116) | 172.2*** (1.835) |
| Within-R ² | 0.715 | 0.828 | 0.822 | 0.834 |
| N | 116 | 434 | 470 | 114 |

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

municipalities opts for a weight-based treatment it is difficult to infer from this outcome that effectiveness does not differ across specific pricing schemes.

A central concern with our analysis is the non-random nature of the adoption of PGB. Most of the literature focuses on forerunners. Perhaps treated municipalities, resisting unit based pricing until forced to do so, do not care about the environment and recycling. This might lead to a very large estimate of the effects of PGB on garbage production because of the specific initial conditions. We collect information on the votes cast at the municipal level in favour of green political parties at the national election of 2011. Column (4) of Table 5 adds the green vote share and interacts it with the treatment to assess selectivity of municipalities in our sample. The interaction effect is not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the effect of introducing PGB does not significantly vary with the green vote share. Nonetheless, introducing PGB reduces waste by 109 kg per capita, somewhat stronger than the baseline effect of 80 kg per capita. But note that this main effect refers to municipalities with a zero vote share for green parties. In 2011, the average green vote share in the canton was 15.90%. Hence, the effect of introducing PGB for the entire Canton of Vaud, at the average green vote share, is $-109.37 + 0.8556 \cdot 15.90 = -95.8$. This effect is slightly stronger than the effect in column (2), suggesting that, if anything, our difference-in-differences provides a lower bound for the effects of PGB for the entire region.

Dealing with possible confounders, we extend the specification of column (1) to control for other policies that could potentially drive some of the effect for the treatment, as done with survey data. We do this in Table A.7. Since we possess data on non-tax policies only for some of the municipalities concerned by the household survey, we should compare the treatment effect with or without these controls based on the same sample. Hence, column (2) estimates the same specification as in column (1) on the restricted sample of municipalities whose non-tax policy change is known. Even though the reduction in the observations is non-negligible, the coefficients of interests are statistically unchanged between columns (1) and (2). This additional estimation also points to relatively little heterogeneity in responses to PGB. Similar to survey analyses, non-tax policies reduce the treatment effect, but neither to a statistically significant nor to a quantitatively important extent. One reason for this is that non-tax policies are not only introduced by some treated municipalities, but also by some control municipalities. A statistically equivalent estimate would be obtained if estimating the effect of PGB only on municipalities for which we know that no other change occurred when PGB was implemented.

5.6. Persistence

We look again at Fig. 1, which shows average garbage from administrative data in the treated municipalities and control municipalities covered by our survey from 2008 to 2015. We now want to assess the effectiveness of PGB beyond the very short run. If the main effect of implementing PGB was to increase awareness for garbage use and recycling, we should probably expect part of the effects discussed so far to vanish over time. Fig. 1 provides, however, evidence in favour of PGB's persisting effects. The average quantity of garbage per capita in the treatment group seems to converge towards the average quantity in the control group, and stabilise afterward.

Table A.8 reproduces the estimations of columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 for this longer period. That is, we extend the standard estimations to include data for 2014, and 2015. The estimates are statistically not different across tables (and, again, across specifications). The effectiveness of PGB is the same if measured within the first year after the treatment or within the first three years. If anything, the point estimates are slightly larger after three years.

PGB is effective, and its effectiveness is not related with possible confounders, such as non-price policies. PGB increases recycling of aluminium and organic waste, and its effects are persistent over time. The appraisal is so far very positive. However, at this stage we cannot rule out the possibility of perverse effects, for instance under the form of leakage to neighbouring regions.

5.7. Effect on Surrounding Municipalities

We assess whether there is scope for leakage by observing the changes in solid waste per capita across the border between the Canton of Geneva, where solid waste is not yet priced, and the bordering municipalities of the Canton of Vaud, which implemented unit pricing on January 1, 2013. The policy shock in the Canton of Vaud allows us to exploit a sharp regression discontinuity design, where the threshold between the municipalities in the Canton of Geneva (South) and those in the Canton of Vaud (North) is given by the latitude $46^\circ 17'N$. We thus use the latitude as forcing variable, around the cut-off $^\circ 17$, and an untreated control group. While from a purely theoretical perspective we could be facing some mobility across the border, it is unlikely that households can be tempted to relocate from one side to the other of the border due to unit pricing. We select the optimal bandwidth following Calonico et al. (2014).¹⁵

Our main focus is on the slope of the regression on both sides of the border. If there was leakage, we would expect the amount of solid waste per capita to increase (decrease) in the Canton of Geneva (Vaud) as we approach the border from South (North). Fig. 3 provides the main graphical results. Following the treatment there is a clear jump in solid waste per capita per year, with a difference of slightly more than 100 kg. This result seems to corroborate the effectiveness of pricing garbage by the bag. However, this exercise also allows us to compare the previous estimates of pricing garbage by the bag's effectiveness with a new set of estimates obtained with an untreated control group. In terms of slope, there is no clear pattern.

Tables 6 and 7 provide quantitative evidence for the results suggested by Fig. 3. The jump is estimated at about 107 kg per capita per year, slightly above but statistically unchanged with respect to the

¹⁵ We implement several bandwidth selectors as proposed in the literature and in all cases the choice of the bandwidth has no implication for the findings of this section. Note that Fig. 3 displays bins, and not single observations. Actually, not all available observations are used following the optimal bandwidth, as regression discontinuity design focuses on local effects in the region of the threshold. Estimating a difference-in-differences approach across the border would lead to a treatment effect of about -109 kg of solid waste, statistically indistinguishable from the estimate of the regression discontinuity design. Data for Geneva come from OCSTAT (yearly garbage per capita in kilograms).




Fig. 3. Administrative data: effect on surrounding municipalities, regression discontinuity design.

results in the previous paragraphs. In relative terms, the change is again of about 40%, starting from a level for 2012 of about 273 kg per capita per year. This figure is clearly consistent with the previous discussion. While graphically there seemed to be some very small leakage, in statistical terms this evidence is not confirmed (cf. Table 6). As shown by Table 7 with simple linear local regressions, the coefficient measuring the slope of the regression is positive (negative) on the left (right) of the threshold, but in both cases does not reach statistical significance. Hence, we conclude that there is no evidence of serious leakage (see also the Swedish case of Sterner and Bartelings, 1999 and the Dutch case of Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2004 for comparable findings).

5.8. Environmental Effects

PGB increases the frequency of recycling and decreases the quantity of garbage provided by households. It does not lead to much leakage to adjacent municipalities. Its effects should hence be beneficial to the environment. In principle, there are, however, two channels that may make PGB less environmentally friendly than currently assessed. First, one may be concerned that the decision of disposing versus sorting garbage does not make any difference in terms of environmental impacts. This could be the case if the environmental impact of garbage disposal is limited, sorted materials are not re-injected in the production cycle, or the recycling process is especially polluting. Second, one may be concerned that people may change behaviour in an undesirable way. Rather than sorting, they may dump their garbage in the woods, use public bins, or refuse to use the priced bags. If illicit dumping is an important component of PGB, PGB may do more harm than good to the environment (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995). Hence, we include these channels in our analysis.

In the context under study, unsorted garbage is incinerated. Muller et al. (2011) measure for the United States the external damages from solid waste incineration, which are mainly related with local pollutants, and find that these exceed manifold the sector's added value. Even in Europe, waste incineration is associated with significant emissions, in particular of the following pollutants: PM_{10} , NO_x , SO_2 , volatile organic compounds, CH_4 , CO , as well as CO_2 (Eshet et al., 2006). Most damages are associated to local pollutants, whose effects are experienced by the local population. Only 10% of garbage from the Canton of Vaud is 'exported' to other, adjacent, cantons for incineration, and even in this case some areas of the Canton of Vaud are likely to be affected by the related emissions. All the materials analysed in this study (PET, carton, paper, clothes, glass, cans, organic waste, batteries, and aluminium) are collected and recycled in full. Other materials, such as plastic, are not recycled. According to the authorities of the Canton of Vaud, for these

Table 6

Administrative data: effect on surrounding municipalities, sharp regression discontinuity estimates using local polynomial regression.

| | (1) |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Regression discontinuity estimate | −106.7*** (37.60) |
| Total observations | 11** |
| Observations (left) | 5* |
| Observations (right) | 6 |
| Order local polynomial (p) | 1 |
| Order bias (q) | 2 |
| Available observations | 28 |

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7

Administrative data: effect on surrounding municipalities: linear regression on both sides of the cut-off.

| | Left of the cut-off | Right of the cut-off |
|----------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Latitude | 4.139*** (2.217) | −9.124** (30.48) |
| Constant | −70.55* (36.61) | 50.12 (573.4) |
| R^2 | 0.402 | 0.013 |
| N | 5 | 6 |

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

materials the life-cycle analysis is only slightly favourable to recycling compared to incineration, once energy recovery is considered. Since the Canton only recycles materials for which the life-cycle analysis is clearly favourable, and since their analysis only considers energy consumption and not external damages from pollution, we are confident that, with full compliance, the effect of PGB would be unambiguously beneficial to the environment.

We hence turn to compliance. It is hard to assess the intensity of illicit behaviour. Conversations with local practitioners indicate that the increase in the number of households involved in sorting organic waste is associated with a decrease in the quality of the latter, with a higher presence of "foreign bodies". It is however suggested that these practices are related with a lack of experience rather than an attempt to cheat. A telling example is the use of non-organic bags for organic waste. We, however, also have anecdotal evidence suggesting that other types of behaviour have been undertaken in the treatment group, in particular at the beginning of 2013, with the precise purpose of avoiding the price on garbage.

Some of these behaviours are illicit, such as using unconventional, non-priced bags. Offenders can be fined for such illicit behaviours. Municipalities can search bags for any identifying information about their owners. Fines are set at the municipal level. They usually range from 250 to 500 CHF for the first offense, and can reach 1000 CHF in case of re-offense. Additional administrative costs, including for searching, may exceed 200 CHF. Unfortunately, no database on fines is maintained by the municipalities of the Canton of Vaud, and as such no comprehensive analysis could be realised. One exception is represented by the city of Lausanne, the capital and largest municipality in the canton by population (about 140,000 inhabitants). Lausanne has been tracking, since 2012, the incidence of illicit behaviour related to garbage. Given that PGB implementation in Lausanne occurred on January

1, 2013, these data allow us to compare the situation in the city before and after PGB.

Two measures obtained from the administrative records of the city of Lausanne are used for this analysis. First, a measure indicating the quantity of non-compliant garbage. Second, a measure of sanctioned illegal behaviours such as littering, illicit dumping, and the use of non-compliant bags (once PGB is in place). This second measure reports the number of citations for these behaviours.

Fig. 4 displays the evolution of the first measure. First of all, we observe that even in 2012, before PGB was implemented, the quantity of non-compliant garbage is strictly positive. The city of Lausanne uses a kerbside collection scheme. Garbage abandoned in the wrong location, or day, is collected by the municipality but counted as non-compliant. About 50 tonnes of garbage are non-compliant. In 2012, the city of Lausanne sent to incineration about 40,000 tonnes of garbage. Hence, in 2012 improper disposal was responsible for about 0.1% of this figure. While in absolute terms the value in Fig. 4 looks substantial, in relative terms it seems rather negligible.

Starting from 2013, PGB introduces a new source of non-compliant garbage: the use of non-compliant bags. Fig. 4 shows a clear increase in the quantity of non-compliant garbage. Compared to 2012, this volume more than doubles with PGB. In 2013, when PGB was implemented, the city of Lausanne sent to incineration about 25,000 tons of garbage. In relative terms, non-compliant garbage still accounted for less than 1%. Hence, while the relative increase is substantial, its economic impact is likely to be relatively small. Interestingly, Fig. 4 shows that after four years of PGB, the situation is again relatively similar to 2012, before PGB was implemented. Hence, cheating on bags seems to be a minor issue in this context, even though we do observe a response in behaviour to the incentives provided by PGB.

Fig. 5 displays the evolution of our second measure, citations for illicit behaviour. Illicit behaviour can take different forms. It can relate to littering, dumping, and illicit disposal (before and after PGB's implementation), as well as the use of non-compliant bags (after PGB's implementation). Fig. 5 shows the evolution of this phenomenon. Consistent with Fig. 4, Fig. 5 shows the presence of some fines related with illicit behaviour even prior to PGB's implementation. The number of citations, however, spikes once PGB is implemented in 2013, with more than 300 citations per year in 2013 and 2014. Once again, as time goes by, the situation tends to converge towards the pre-PGB levels. Most people probably abandon their illicit behaviour, given also the escalation in fines with recidivism, while some may become more skilful in avoiding being detected (see below).

Given the limited data available, this analysis is based on a single municipality, although the largest in the canton. In what follows, we test whether a similar pattern can be observed elsewhere. Some




Fig. 4. Evidence from Lausanne, the canton's capital: improper disposal.




Fig. 5. Evidence from Lausanne, the canton's capital: citations.

municipalities in other cantons of Switzerland maintain for instance some statistics on illicit behaviour related to PGB, which are reported by the media. Two interesting stylized facts can be found in the media coverage. First, in the medium to long run only a small proportion of bags are unconventional. Cities such as Zurich, which implemented PGB in the '90s, currently report a share of unconventional bags below 5%. Second, according to Zurich officials, in 10% or less of these bags information about the offender can be found. Hence, in the long run people self-select into either legal or illegal behaviour. Illicit behaviour is perpetrated purposefully by a tiny minority of households, which specialise in this behaviour and invest a certain effort to avoid being caught. Given the importance of fines, the limited cost of priced bags, and the infrequent occurrence of illegal behaviour, which we understand implies a high probability of searching and enforcement, we have two explanations for this equilibrium level of illegal behaviour: offenders either have a very low opportunity cost of time, or are not rational when behaving in an illicit way. Note that virtually all illicit dumping we came across in the media takes place in an urban environment. Dumping garbage in the woods, which could cause very detrimental environmental effects, would imply an additional layer of effort: offenders should not only avoid leaving any trail, but should also make the trip to the woods. At 2 CHF a bag, observing this behaviour would be largely irrational, unless people are willing to store multiple bags at the same time and are able to tackle the nuisance that they would cause.

We hence conclude that, in the long run, compliance is reasonably close to 100%, although not exactly 100%. However, adjustments may be necessary to reach this long-run equilibrium. To analyse whether illicit dumping may be more important in the short term, we rely again on local media coverage. We recognize that the media tend to overweight uncommon behaviours, so our analysis does not pretend to provide anything else than a perception of the problem through the eyes of the media. We proceed by counting newspaper articles from the main local outlets reporting on PGB. Fig. 6 plots the evolution of the number of articles from newspapers in the Canton of Vaud, and surroundings, covering 'PGB', and 'PGB and fines'. Unsurprisingly, we see a spike of articles on PGB in 2012 and 2013, right before and right after the large wave of implementation that we study. Starting from 2015, the local media gradually lose interest in PGB altogether.

Only a fraction of articles on PGB are concerned with fines. The same pattern would be observed when using other keywords related with illicit behaviour. In relative terms, most of the attention that the media give to fines and illicit behaviour takes place in 2013. It seems that the frequency of illicit behaviour is non-negligible right after implementation, with more than 20 articles discussing fines in 2013. The interest in illicit behaviour vanishes thereafter, possibly because most illicit behaviour vanishes. A non-




Fig. 6. Media data: local coverage of PGB and illicit behaviour.

systematic analysis of the content of some of these articles suggests that municipalities have experienced temporary issues of different sorts, including in one instance an increase in the population of foxes, related with the improper sorting of food waste. It seems that in most cases municipalities managed to find the necessary adjustments, for instance by adding video surveillance to collection centres and by resorting to awareness-raising campaigns (pizza boxes should not include slices of pizza). As a result, in many recent articles the overall appraisal of PGB in the media is very positive.¹⁶ For comparison, Winslott-Hiselius et al. (2009) analyses how the media covered the implementation of the Stockholm congestion charge and finds that personal experience also changed the perspective of the media vis-à-vis the policy.

In conclusion, there is little evidence of diffused and persistent illegal or undesirable practices in the context under observation, which reconciles with the Swedish context of Sterner and Bartelings (1999).

If pricing garbage by the bag can be so effective, it may be surprising that we do not observe more municipalities implementing it. A possible explanation might be that people do not know about how the tax works, or find it unfair. We analyse perceptions on effectiveness and fairness in the next section.

6. Effects of PGB on Perceptions

In this section, we discuss the effects of PGB on voter perceptions and voting intentions.

6.1. Results on Perceptions

We address the questions of policy perceptions by applying the same difference-in-differences approach used with respect to the question of effectiveness.

We start our analysis with questions aiming to assess whether respondents understand the tax. The variable *perceived effect on the environment* measures whether respondents consider PGB 'as effective, in the sense that it incentivises the inhabitants of your municipality to recycle more of their garbage and pay more attention to voluminous wrapping' accepting answers 'Yes', 'No', and 'I don't know'. Recall that we ask exactly the same questions to both groups in both periods, before and after PGB is implemented in the treated group. We study the proportion of people

Table 8
Household survey: policy perceptions.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Eff. env. | Eff. env. | Use rev. | Use rev. |
| PGB | 0.165* (0.0899) | 0.203** (0.0968) | 0.421*** (0.0780) | 0.458*** (0.0831) |
| Year 2013 | −0.0251 (0.0602) | −0.0268 (0.0633) | 0.0188 (0.0519) | 0.0155 (0.0566) |
| Socio-economic variables | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Within-R ² | 0.013 | 0.119 | 0.116 | 0.214 |
| N | 385 | 368 | 383 | 365 |
| | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | Unfair taxes | Unfair taxes | Unfair sort | Unfair sort |
| PGB | −0.160* (0.0801) | −0.208** (0.0838) | −0.253*** (0.0910) | −0.312*** (0.0977) |
| Year 2013 | −0.0376 (0.0486) | −0.00346 (0.0530) | 0.0439 (0.0583) | 0.0925 (0.0658) |
| Socio-economic variables | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Within-R ² | 0.028 | 0.181 | 0.026 | 0.142 |
| N | 385 | 368 | 385 | 368 |
| | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| | Unfair ineq. | Unfair ineq. | Leg. cush. | Leg. cush. |
| PGB | −0.0186 (0.0749) | −0.0375 (0.0780) | −0.0671 (0.0896) | −0.00935 (0.0937) |
| Year 2013 | −0.144*** (0.0413) | −0.118*** (0.0440) | 0.273*** (0.0557) | 0.248*** (0.0597) |
| Socio-economic variables | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Within-R ² | 0.057 | 0.114 | 0.070 | 0.181 |
| N | 385 | 368 | 383 | 365 |

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

answering 'Yes' in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8. Socio-economic controls are included in even columns. Since all variables in this paragraph are binary, we compare again estimates from OLS regressions with a fixed-effect Logit model estimated with Greene's (2011) brute force method (cf. Table A.10, even columns include the standard set of control variables). We find that the treatment is associated with more than one household over ten changing its opinion in favour of PGB's effectiveness.

Generally speaking, environmental taxes need in principle to be set so that they internalise external costs. Remaining revenues should ideally be spent on projects with the highest social return, or refunded to the public. Voters, however, often ask for earmarked environmental taxes since they do not see how improvements in environmental quality can be obtained otherwise. We consider some unrelated municipal expenditures and test understanding of environmental taxes using the variable use of revenues for other purposes, which asks respondents 'would you accept a pay-per-bag fee whose revenues would be used to fund some public expenditures other than waste management, such as education, safety?'.¹⁷

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 display a large and clearly significant coefficient for the treatment. Again, no change affects the control group. As a result, we may infer that following the experience of unit pricing, an important proportion of respondents becomes aware of the incentive effect of PGB. Looking at Table A.9, we observe that the *ex post* mean of this variable in the treatment effect attains the level of the control group. The same applies for perceived effectiveness.

In terms of fairness, we asked 'In your opinion, is the pay-per-bag fee unfair because you already pay enough taxes?', an item that captures resentment against introducing a new tax. A second item we study considers responses to the question 'In your opinion, does the pay-per-bag fee make you pay even if you already sort your garbage?'. This item measures resentments against paying a tax on the quantity of garbage that can no longer be sorted. In both cases, we allow for 'Yes', or 'No' answers.

Columns (5) to (8) of Table 8 report the estimates for both

¹⁶ We consider the following newspapers, all tracked via Factiva: *Le Temps*, *24 Heures*, *La Côte*, *Le Matin* and *Le Matin Dimanche*. For 2017, we consider only the first 6 months. In Fig. 6, we consider the keywords 'PGB' (*taxe au sac* in French), 'fines' (*amendes*), and the logical operator 'and'. In other analyses, not included in Fig. 6, we replace 'fines' with 'offenders' (*contravenants*), 'illegal bags' (*sacs illégaux*), and 'illicit dumping' (*dépôts d'ordures sauvages*, *dépôts non conformes*, *déchets sauvages*, *déchetteries sauvages*).

unfairness items. Introducing PGB reduces the feeling of unfairness of having one more tax, and of having to pay a tax on unsorted garbage. Implementing PGB reduces both resentments, as people possibly understand the mechanism behind unit pricing better.

We also explore the feeling of inequity, since PGB opposes two different concepts of justice, the polluter pays principle, advocating for higher fiscal burden for bigger polluters, and a social equity principle, stating that the fiscal burden should depend at least proportionally on one's contributive capacity. Given the regressive nature of PGB, the two concepts conflict. The income elasticity of garbage is 0.4 in our sample, so pricing garbage by the bag has indeed a regressive effect. The first item we study is 'In your opinion, a pay-per-bag fee favours high-income households and is thus inequitable', allowing for 'Yes' and 'No' answers. This variable captures resentments against the regressive nature of the tax. The second variable stated 'The pay-per-bag fee could imply a higher expenditure for low-income households'. Respondents were given a choice between three answers: (1) 'I think this is legitimate', (2) 'I think that the fee is legitimate provided that low-income households are compensated', or (3) 'This fact does not influence your opinion on the pay-per-bag fee'. We analyse the proportion of (2) answers.

Columns (9) and (10) of Table 8 present the estimates for the perception of inequitable treatment, while columns (11) and (12) display the estimates for social justice. Introducing PGB does not affect perception of whether the tax is inequitable or legitimate. The point estimates on the treatment effect are not significantly different from zero. But both treatment and control groups consider PGB less inequitable after January 1, 2013, possibly because this large wave of implementations made individuals much more aware of the regressive impacts that alternative sources of revenues for waste management may have. The public debate also highlighted the measures undertaken by municipalities to offset possible distributional effects.

Experiencing the treatment seems to positively affect PGB's perception, in particular concerning its effectiveness and the related sentiments of unfairness. Seeing the tax work, in one's own household as well as in one's social environment, may change some erroneous beliefs that it is not effective. The stigma of social injustice associated to unit pricing is smoothed in the whole canton, according to the evidence in our sample, perhaps because the large media coverage at the local level contributed to make clear that policy-induced distributional effects are not an inevitable condition of unit pricing.

6.2. Voting Intentions

Individuals become less averse to PGB once they are forced to live with it. In what follows, we assess the implications of this change in perception on the chances of PGB to survive in the political arena. We discuss this using data on voting intentions on the bag's maximum price.

We asked respondents about the maximum bag's price they would vote for in a ballot, if asked to define the tax rate for PGB. Specifically, respondents were asked 'if you were asked to vote on the fee's rate, what is the highest price you would accept to pay for a 35-litre bag?' We accepted responses between 0 and 5 CHF, at increments of 50 cents. Note that this scenario is very realistic as Swiss people regularly vote on local, regional, and national issues.

This survey instrument measures political acceptability of the tax. Note that this is different from willingness to pay. A rich individual, with high willingness to pay to get rid of garbage without time-consuming sorting activities, may well indicate a politically acceptable price of zero in our survey.

Fig. 7 shows the distribution of acceptable prices for 2012 and 2013. For both years and groups the distribution is not normal and clusters at 0 and 2 (the official price for a 35-litre bag). In the treated group, 59 % of individuals indicated an acceptable price of zero, as opposed to 38 % in the control group, before the implementation of PGB. There is a striking difference in the average acceptable price as well. Treated municipalities are willing to vote for a price of 0.89 CHF, whereas control municipalities




Fig. 7. Household survey: voting intentions, histogram.

would vote for 1.49 CHF, or 67 % higher than in the not-yet treated group.

In 2013, after PGB has been introduced in treated municipalities, the distributions of acceptable prices overlap. Interestingly, the modal answer in both groups of municipalities is 2 CHF, the actual price of a garbage bag. Hence, it is plausible that the current price provides a reference for voting behaviour. The average acceptable price in the treatment group is 1.55 CHF, and 1.57 CHF in the control group. That is, people increase by 70% the stated maximum price per garbage bag that they would approve in a ballot. Introducing PGB has removed any differences in the acceptability of the garbage tax.

7. Conclusion

We address the question of unit-pricing programs' effectiveness. We provide causal estimates of pricing garbage by the bag's effect on the amount of solid waste incinerated in the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland. The identification strategy relies on the forced implementation on January 1, 2013, of pricing garbage by the bag in many municipalities of the Canton of Vaud, due to a ruling decision by the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, creating a difference-in-differences situation.

Both survey and administrative data show that pricing garbage by the bag causes a reduction in the amount of incinerated garbage per capita by about 40%, implying a price elasticity of demand of about -0.3 . Lower incinerated garbage is accompanied by a higher frequency of recycling of e.g. organic waste and aluminium. Our estimates are robust to the presence of simultaneous introduction of other measures that make garbage collection easier. The effects of pricing garbage by the bag are also persistent. Pricing garbage by the bag's effectiveness is the same within one year or three years from the implementation. Applying a regression-discontinuity

design, we rule out the potential risk of substantial leakage effects on surrounding municipalities. The incidence of other undesirable behaviours is also relatively small, and decays rapidly over time.

We also analyse people's beliefs concerning pricing garbage by the bag's effectiveness and fairness. Our key result is a sizable gap between *ex ante* beliefs and *ex post* beliefs. People initially believe the tax is unfair and does not work, but implementing it improves the program's perception of effectiveness and fairness. The environmental tax seems to be better understood once in place.

Biased beliefs can be an obstacle to implementing economic policies. People are pessimistic about an environmental tax before they experience it, and become more optimistic once the tax has been implemented. If people hold pessimistic beliefs at the time of democratic decision-making, many environmental policies will not be implemented. Our setting shows a way out of this stalemate. Outside force, e.g. the Supreme Court mandate, can force people to experience a new economic instrument, thereby updating beliefs, as in the context

that we have analysed.

Our context does not allow municipalities to revert the changes forced unto them, but in an ideal world, people could decide on keeping the new policy or returning to the status quo after testing it. Policies forced onto people that remain detested could be abandoned after the trial period. Policies that people embrace after living with them would remain. A mechanism dealing with incorrect beliefs would force people to implement a new environmental tax temporarily but allow them to keep it or abandon it after a trial period. A first example of this mechanism can be found in the referendums held in Sweden, in the cities of Stockholm and Gothenburgh, on the local congestion charges, after the policy had been experienced by local commuters, and citizens had the chance to revise their beliefs accordingly (Schuitema et al., 2010; Börjesson et al., 2012; Andersson and Nässén, 2016; Hansla et al., 2017). Mandatory trial runs may force calculating policy-makers to give a chance also to policies considered as unpopular, and push skeptical members of the general public to try them.

Appendix A. Appendix Tables

Table A.1

Administrative data: comparison between villages implementing PGB on schedule, and 'latecomers'.

| Variable | PGB from January 1, 2013 | | | PGB from later in 2013, 2014 | | |
|--|--------------------------|-----------|-----|------------------------------|-----------|--------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | N | Mean | Std. Dev. | N |
| Population | 2509.27 | 10,564.87 | 161 | 2435.34 | 4659.38 | 70 |
| Income tax coefficient | 69.29 | 8.33 | 161 | 69.38 | 7.71 | 70 |
| Green vote share | 16.46 | 4.00 | 161 | 16.88 | 4.34 | 70 |
| <i>p</i> -Value for two-sided <i>t</i> -test | | | | | | |
| | < 0 | | | ≠ 0 | | > 0 |
| Population | 0.5294 | | | 0.9412 | | 0.4706 |
| Income tax coefficient | 0.4676 | | | 0.9352 | | 0.5324 |
| Green vote share | 0.2454 | | | 0.4907 | | 0.7546 |

Note: No difference is statistically significant at 10%. Population is the resident population in the municipality as of 2012. The income tax coefficient measures the tax paid to the municipality, as a fraction of the tax paid to the canton. Wealthy municipalities tend to have a low income tax coefficient. Green vote share is the proportion of the electorate voting for a green party (either the Green Party of Switzerland or the Green Liberal Party of Switzerland) at the last federal elections.

Table A.2

Household survey: sample's socioeconomic characteristics.

| | Interviewed only in 2012 | | Panel | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|
| | Treatment group | Control group | Treatment group | Control group |
| Gender (M) | 0.41 | 0.331 | 0.43 | 0.327 |
| Age | 54.615 | 58.392 | 56.395 | 56.093 |
| Switzerland | 0.821 | 0.842 | 0.791 | 0.879 |
| European Union | 0.154 | 0.133 | 0.186 | 0.075* |
| Rest of the world | 0.026 | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.047 |
| Adults in households | 2.103 | 2.042 | 1.942* | 2.131 |
| Children in households | 0.974 | 0.587 | 0.674* | 0.71 |
| Households | 38 | 121 | 86 | 107 |
| Total households | | 159 | | 193 |
| Compulsory schooling | 0.135 | 0.153 | 0.070 | 0.190 |
| Apprenticeship | 0.405 | 0.369 | 0.477 | 0.343 |
| High school | 0.135 | 0.234 | 0.104 | 0.143** |
| University | 0.324 | 0.243 | 0.349 | 0.324* |
| Jobless | 0.026 | 0.008 | 0.023 | 0 |
| Student | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Homemaker | 0.079 | 0.084 | 0.058 | 0.066 |
| Employee | 0.447 | 0.303 | 0.384 | 0.34 |
| Self-employed | 0.184 | 0.151 | 0.151 | 0.094* |

| | | | | |
|--|-------|-------|--------|---------|
| International civil servant | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Manager | 0 | 0.042 | 0.047* | 0.075 |
| Retired | 0.237 | 0.403 | 0.337 | 0.387 |
| Income category 1 (< 3000 CHF) | 0.026 | 0.041 | 0.058 | 0.075 |
| Income category 2 (3001–5000 CHF) | 0.051 | 0.165 | 0.093 | 0.168 |
| Income category 3 (5001–7000 CHF) | 0.103 | 0.124 | 0.198* | 0.121 |
| Income category 4 (7001–9000 CHF) | 0.077 | 0.107 | 0.163* | 0.037** |
| Income category 5 (9001–15,000 CHF) | 0.051 | 0.041 | 0.105 | 0.112* |
| Income category 6 (> 15,001 CHF) | 0.051 | 0.033 | 0.081 | 0.065 |
| Distance from collecting centre (in minutes) | 7.836 | 5.784 | 6.368 | 4.918* |
| Green | 0.135 | 0 | 0.093 | 0 |
| Households | 37 | 116 | 85 | 103 |
| Total households | | 153 | | 188 |

Note: *, ** and *** imply statistically-significant differences in the mean for the same group between samples at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. No missing values affect the first block of variables (from gender to children in the household). Income is measured as household monthly gross income in Swiss francs (CHF). We also obtain a measure of distance from the closest collecting centre (in kilometres and in minutes with the appropriate transport mode) from respondents, which is, however, not available in the official statistics. To avoid excessive missing values, we impute distance in time from distance in space whenever needed and use the former as variable. We qualify as “green” the members of environmental organizations. A measure of general trust, as used by the World Values Survey and other large surveys (cf. e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000), is included only in the survey of 2013 and does not allow for comparison between samples. The same applies to the proportion of renters (versus homeowners). Trust is 0.5 in the treatment group and 0.42 in the control group. Renters are 0.34 in the treatment group and 0.33 in the control group.

Table A.3
Administrative data: Canton of Vaud's socioeconomic characteristics.

| | Cantonal mean |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| Gender (M) | 0.489 |
| Age < 20 | 0.222 |
| Age 20–39 | 0.276 |
| Age 40–64 | 0.340 |
| Age > 65 | 0.162 |
| Switzerland | 0.682 |
| European Union (EU) | 0.230 |
| Rest of the world | 0.088 |
| Adults | 0.776 |
| Children | 0.224 |
| Single-adult households | 0.386 |
| Households without children | 0.247 |
| Households with children | 0.277 |
| Single-member households | 0.063 |
| Household size | 2.2 |
| Compulsory schooling | 0.268 |
| Apprenticeship | 0.300 |
| High school | 0.091 |
| University | 0.321 |
| Jobless | 0.049 |
| Student | 0.080 |
| Homemaker | 0.127 |
| Employee | 0.480 |
| Manager | 0.065 |
| Retired | 0.094 |
| Income < 35,000 CHF | 0.192 |
| Income 35,001–60,000 CHF | 0.220 |
| Income 60,001–80,000 CHF | 0.160 |
| Income 80,001–100,000 CHF | 0.114 |
| Income 100,001–175,000 CHF | 0.207 |
| Income > 175,001 CHF | 0.107 |
| Renters | 0.694 |

Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office and Statistique Vaud.

Note: Cantonal statistics refer to years 2012 or 2013 whenever data are available, to year 2011 otherwise. Cantonal data define as children individuals from age 0 to 19. Educational achievements are given only for population over 30 years. The level of education of 2% of the canton is not known. The share of self-employed workers is not given. Income is measured as yearly gross income in Swiss francs (CHF). The proportion of renters is obtained from the negative of the share of housing assets with owners living in. No measure for trust is available at the cantonal level. The World Values Survey wave of 2007 reports a level of trust of 0.539 for Switzerland. More recent data are available from the European Social Survey, which, however, uses a 10 points scale instead of a binary variable as in our survey.

Table A.4
Household survey: treatment effect on recycling and wrapping, control variables.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Aluminium | Battery | Cans | Carton | Clothes |
| PGB | 0.195** | 0.0288 | 0.0511) | 0.0940) | 0.0335 |
| Year 2013 | –0.00107 | 0.0192 | (0.0373) | (0.0587) | –0.00975 |
| Gender (M) | –0.0174 | 0.0110 | 0.0685* | 0.0176 | 0.0232 |
| Age | 0.00130 | 0.00143 | (0.00145) | (0.00183) | 0.00223 |
| EU | –0.0716 | –0.0823** | (0.0371) | (0.0712) | –0.0850 |
| Rest of the world | 0.109 | –0.0256 | (0.0877) | (0.115) | 0.0643 |
| Adults in households | 0.0186 | –0.0267 | 0.0404 | –0.0140 | –0.0290 |
| Children in households | –0.0293 | –0.00880 | 0.0101 | –0.0279 | –0.0126 |
| Apprenticeship | –0.0120 | 0.00162 | (0.0546) | (0.0963) | –0.00251 |
| High school | –0.0479 | –0.00507 | (0.0560) | (0.0915) | –0.0121 |
| University | 0.0853 | 0.0345 | (0.0543) | –0.00229 | 0.0573 |
| Jobless | 0.330 | –0.232** | (0.0928) | (0.299) | –0.320*** |
| Homemaker | 0.278 | –0.128 | (0.0905) | (0.269) | –0.130 |
| Employee | 0.235 | –0.203*** | (0.0712) | (0.242) | –0.283*** |
| Self-employed | 0.251 | –0.225*** | (0.0835) | (0.253) | –0.322*** |
| Manager | 0.239 | –0.238** | (0.0944) | (0.265) | –0.352** |
| Retiree | 0.222 | –0.240** | (0.0954) | (0.243) | –0.298** |
| Green | 0.0431 | –0.00454 | (0.0421) | (0.0701) | –0.0106 |
| Distance | –0.00205 | 0.0000173 | (0.00316) | (0.0053) | –0.00677* |
| Renter | 0.0245 | 0.00867 | (0.0296) | (0.0521) | –0.0162 |
| Income category 1 | 0.110 | –0.00924 | (0.0730) | (0.136) | 0.0639 |
| Income category 2 | 0.109 | –0.00115 | (0.0619) | (0.0954) | 0.0795 |
| Income category 3 | 0.0884 | 0.0653 | (0.0665) | (0.105) | 0.147* |
| Income category 4 | 0.0101 | 0.0228 | (0.0493) | (0.0764) | 0.0778 |
| Income category 5 | –0.0275 | –0.0222 | (0.0561) | (0.0909) | 0.0103 |
| Income is missing | 0.0315 | –0.0124 | (0.0557) | (0.0789) | 0.0795 |
| Constant | 0.460** | 1.117*** | (0.137) | (0.322) | 1.070*** |
| Within-R ² | 0.101 | 0.059 | 0.130 | 0.088 | 0.069 |
| N | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 368 |

| | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|------------------------|----------|---------------|------------|----------|----------|
| | Glass | Organic waste | Paper | PET | Wrapping |
| PGB | 0.0206 | 0.144* | 0.0361 | 0.00896 | 0.0561 |
| Year 2013 | 0.0281 | 0.0369 | 0.00225 | 0.00447 | 0.0577 |
| Gender (M) | –0.00934 | 0.0818* | –0.0190 | 0.0128 | –0.129* |
| Age | 0.000986 | 0.000857) | 0.00377*** | 0.00182* | 0.00367 |
| EU | –0.0218 | (0.0265) | (0.0664) | (0.0328) | –0.179* |
| Rest of the world | –0.156** | (0.0726) | 0.0440 | –0.0234 | 0.160 |
| Adults in households | –0.0195 | (0.0218) | 0.0235 | –0.0166 | –0.0868* |
| Children in households | 0.00483 | (0.0106) | 0.000532 | 0.0217* | –0.0382 |
| Apprenticeship | 0.0212 | (0.0353) | (0.0525) | –0.00308 | –0.0674 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| High school | 0.00932 | (0.0298) | –0.137* | (0.0784) | 0.0318 | (0.0420) | 0.0453 | (0.0291) | –0.0892 | (0.116) |
| University | 0.0303 | (0.0330) | 0.0162 | (0.0598) | 0.0393 | (0.0394) | 0.00968 | (0.0327) | 0.0428 | (0.0979) |
| Jobless | 0.0649 | (0.111) | –0.0926 | (0.282) | –0.0362 | (0.0465) | –0.0661 | (0.0785) | 0.0870 | (0.248) |
| Homemaker | 0.158 | (0.117) | –0.0111 | (0.316) | –0.0443 | (0.0523) | –0.0621 | (0.0632) | 0.181 | (0.249) |
| Employee | 0.0712 | (0.107) | 0.0892 | (0.261) | –0.120* | (0.0481) | –0.108 | (0.0651) | 0.166 | (0.149) |
| Self-employed | 0.0533 | (0.109) | –0.00952 | (0.265) | –0.126** | (0.0578) | –0.123* | (0.0691) | 0.123 | (0.152) |
| Manager | 0.0574 | (0.109) | 0.106 | (0.271) | –0.114* | (0.0602) | –0.0676 | (0.0746) | 0.410* | (0.225) |
| Retiree | 0.0478 | (0.107) | 0.0118 | (0.262) | –0.143** | (0.0689) | –0.0987 | (0.0727) | 0.213 | (0.160) |
| Green | 0.0149 | (0.0228) | 0.0143 | (0.0674) | 0.0599* | (0.0302) | 0.0381 | (0.0274) | 0.0697 | (0.0988) |
| Distance | –0.00438** | (0.00212) | –0.0208*** | (0.00485) | –0.00642** | (0.00250) | –0.00421* | (0.00250) | –0.00541 | (0.00773) |
| Renter | 0.00813 | (0.0223) | 0.0446 | (0.0456) | 0.00529 | (0.0297) | 0.0303 | (0.0255) | –0.0363 | (0.0753) |
| Income category 1 | 0.0256 | (0.0489) | 0.135 | (0.128) | 0.0850 | (0.0610) | 0.0768 | (0.0829) | 0.487*** | (0.182) |
| Income category 2 | –0.0415 | (0.0616) | 0.0748 | (0.0969) | 0.0550 | (0.0679) | 0.0493 | (0.0781) | 0.205 | (0.152) |
| Income category 3 | 0.00454 | (0.0687) | –0.0716 | (0.123) | 0.0655 | (0.0772) | 0.165** | (0.0760) | 0.201 | (0.130) |
| Income category 4 | 0.0534 | (0.0532) | 0.00856 | (0.106) | 0.0611 | (0.0522) | 0.108 | (0.0688) | 0.625*** | (0.120) |
| Income category 5 | 0.0128 | (0.0511) | –0.159 | (0.125) | –0.00134 | (0.0627) | 0.0657 | (0.0690) | 0.00950 | (0.167) |
| Income is missing | 0.0362 | (0.0516) | –0.00912 | (0.102) | 0.0192 | (0.0596) | 0.111* | (0.0608) | 0.330** | (0.126) |
| Constant | 0.871*** | (0.152) | 0.567 | (0.363) | 0.798*** | (0.106) | 0.886*** | (0.130) | 0.191 | (0.299) |
| Within- R^2 | 0.133 | | 0.166 | | 0.112 | | 0.093 | | 0.222 | |
| N | 368 | | 368 | | 368 | | 368 | | 365 | |

Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5
Household survey: treatment effect on recycling and wrapping, Logit.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Aluminium | Battery | Cans | Carton | Textiles | Glass | Organic waste | Paper | PET | Wrapping |
| <i>OLS</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| PGB | 0.264*** (0.0576) | 0.209*** (0.0493) | 0.293*** (0.0733) | 0.207*** (0.0468) | 0.116 (0.0710) | 0.200*** (0.0653) | 0.232*** (0.0724) | 0.191** (0.0762) | 0.177** (0.0879) | 0.0692* (0.0757) |
| Year 2013 | −0.0683 (0.0736) | −0.0857 (0.0940) | −0.346 (0.0999) | −0.0773 (0.0810) | −0.0812 (0.0689) | −0.0606 (0.0962) | −0.0174 (0.0944) | −0.126 (0.107) | −0.146 (0.113) | 0.0582 (0.110) |
| Pseudo-R ² | 0.119 | 0.079 | 0.131 | 0.096 | 0.056 | 0.096 | 0.097 | 0.064 | 0.072 | 0.084 |
| N | 234 | 120 | 282 | 184 | 250 | 112 | 246 | 144 | 136 | 343 |

Note: Marginal effects are reported for Logit (all discrete changes). Brute force fixed effects.

Individuals bypassed if Y_{ict} always = 0 or always = 1 (fixed effects cannot be computed).

Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6
Municipality survey: non-tax waste management policies undertaken between 2012 and 2013, descriptive statistics.

| | Treatment group | Control group |
|---|-----------------|---------------|
| Variable | Mean | |
| Did the municipality introduce a new kerbside program | 0.074 | 0.034 |
| Did the municipality introduce a new collection centre | 0.064 | 0.043 |
| Did the municipality extend the opening hours of its centres | 0.223 | 0.155 |
| Did the municipality add a new skip for | | |
| Paper | 0.117 | 0.043 |
| Carton | 0.064 | 0.06 |
| PET | 0.17 | 0.043 |
| Textiles | 0.117 | 0.06 |
| Glass | 0.17 | 0.043 |
| Cans | 0.117 | 0.043 |
| Batteries | 0.117 | 0.043 |
| Aluminium | 0.064 | 0.043 |
| Plastic | 0.085 | 0 |
| Wood | 0 | 0.017 |
| Organic waste | 0.117 | 0.138 |
| Overall number of materials covered by the new skips | 1.138 | 0.534 |
| Did the municipality implement any awareness-raising initiative | | |
| Unaddressed mailshot | 0.5 | 0.345 |
| Information session | 0.117 | 0 |
| Street stand | 0.021 | 0 |
| Specific websites | 0 | 0.017 |
| N | 94 | 116 |

Table A.7
Administrative data: treatment effect on solid waste per capita in kilos per year, non-tax waste management policies.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|-----------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| PGB | −86.14*** (12.26) | −84.80*** (16.25) | −82.73*** (19.86) |
| Year 2013 | −11.15** (4.346) | −7.579** (3.407) | −6.619 (7.496) |

| | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Additional skips: number of materials covered | | | –0.110 (2.669) |
| Collection centres: better opening hours | | | –16.00 (13.81) |
| New kerbside program | | | 17.04 (14.27) |
| New collection centre | | | 12.49* (6.282) |
| Awareness-raising campaign: unaddressed mailshot | | | 1.356 (10.01) |
| Constant | 173.6*** (2.380) | 178.7*** (3.012) | 178.7*** (3.062) |
| Within-R ² | 0.715 | 0.724 | 0.737 |
| N | 116 | 68 | 68 |

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.8

Administrative data: treatment effect on solid waste per capita in kilos per year, 2012–2015.

| | Survey | Volume |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| PGB | –90.47*** (8.942) | –80.82*** (4.226) |
| Constant | 173.6*** (2.946) | 186.9*** (1.591) |
| Within-R ² | 0.674** | 0.792* |
| N | 232 | 867 |

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Time dummies for 2013, 2014 and 2015 included in the estimation.

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.9

Household survey: policy perceptions, mean comparison between 2012 and 2013.

| | | 2012 | | 2013 | |
|--|---------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | | Treatment group | Control group | Treatment group | Control group |
| Variable | Short | Mean | Mean | Mean | Mean |
| Perceived effectiveness on own behaviour | Eff. own | 0.419 $N = 86$ | 0.411 $N = 107$ | 0.547 $N = 86$ | 0.383 $N = 107$ |
| Perceived effectiveness | Effectiveness | 0.784 $N = 74$ | 0.839 $N = 93$ | 0.928 $N = 69$ | 0.878 $N = 90$ |
| Perceived effect on the environment | Eff. env. | 0.581 | 0.736 | 0.721 | 0.71 |
| Use of revenues for other purposes | Use rev. | 0.262 | 0.689 | 0.709 | 0.71 |
| Unfair: inequitable | Unfair ineq. | 0.233 | 0.208 | 0.07 | 0.065 |
| Unfair: paying enough taxes | Unfair taxes | 0.547 | 0.302 | 0.349 | 0.262 |
| Unfair: paying even if sorting | Unfair sort | 0.558 $N = 86$ | 0.34 $N = 106$ | 0.349 $N = 86$ | 0.383 $N = 107$ |
| Legitimacy provided social cushioning | Leg. cush. | 0.353 $N = 85$ | 0.286 $N = 105$ | 0.558 $N = 86$ | 0.561 $N = 107$ |

Table A.10
Household survey: policy perceptions, Logit.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Eff. env. | Eff. env. | Use rev. | Use rev. |
| PGB | 0.174* (0.0909) | 0.220** (0.0879) | 0.439*** (0.0696) | 0.499*** (0.0708) |
| Year 2013 | −0.0340 (0.0813) | −0.0358 (0.0862) | 0.0277 (0.0767) | 0.0324 (0.0922) |
| Socio-economic variables | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Pseudo-R ² | 0.089 | 0.193 | 0.186 | 0.293 |
| N | 337 | 324 | 333 | 314 |
| | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | Unfair taxes | Unfair taxes | Unfair sort | Unfair sort |
| PGB | −0.188* (0.102) | −0.286*** (0.0957) | −0.271*** (0.0919) | −0.358*** (0.0917) |
| Year 2013 | −0.0590 (0.0761) | −0.0031 (0.0907) | 0.0576 (0.0763) | 0.132 (0.0904) |
| Socio-economic variables | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Pseudo-R ² | 0.163 | 0.312 | 0.104 | 0.198 |
| N | 326 | 311 | 355 | 342 |
| | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| | Unfair ineq. | Unfair ineq. | Leg. cush. | Leg. cush. |
| PGB | −0.0190 (0.117) | −0.0411 (0.0941) | −0.0961 (0.102) | −0.0269 (0.121) |
| Year 2013 | −0.229*** (0.0675) | −0.166*** (0.0678) | 0.317*** (0.0631) | 0.321*** (0.0734) |
| Socio-economic variables | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Pseudo-R ² | 0.167 | 0.259 | 0.127 | 0.218 |
| N | 249 | 236 | 374 | 356 |

Note: Estimates report marginal effects (all discrete changes). Brute force fixed effects. Individuals bypassed if Y_{ict} always = 0 or always = 1 (fixed effects cannot be computed). Clustered standard errors are in parentheses (cluster per municipality).

* $p < 0.1$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

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