In a supply chain, the importance of information elicitation from the supply chain players is vital to design supply chain network. The rationality and self-centredness of these players causes the information asymmetry in the supply chain and thus situation of conflict and non-participation of the players in the network design process. The supply chain players’ non-participation or reluctance to participate in supply chain contract is due to the dynamics of the system evolving with many competitive players in supply chain. In this paper, a game theoretical dynamic pricing model has been proposed to elicit the information from the players. With the objective of maximizing the social utility, efforts have been made to value behavioural issues of supply chain. On the other hand, the reluctance of player due to the information asymmetry is measured in the form of inertia experienced by the players due to anxiety and dynamics in the market. Distinguishing cases based on level of risk and variety of product are considered to show the effect of inertia on social utility and corresponding output for each echelon of supply chain. The paper provides supply chain managers an efficient decision making ability to achieve conflict-free outcome with the maximum utility.