

## **Tax on sugary drinks and trends in daily soda consumption by family affluence: an international repeated cross-sectional survey among European adolescents**

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### *Sources of Support*

HBSC is an international survey carried out under the aegis of the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. Data collection is funded for each HBSC survey at the national level. The work related to this article was possible thanks to the academic support of the Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, and the financial support of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland (UNIL/CHUV mobility fellowship for AC). The funders had no role in the analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

### *Conflicts of interest*

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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### *Short running head*

Soda tax and socioeconomic position in adolescents

## 1 **Abstract**

### 2 *Background*

3 The World Health Organization calls for soda taxes to reduce sugar consumption, but the  
4 effect across socioeconomic groups is unclear.

### 5 *Objective*

6 We assessed 16-year trends in daily soda consumption among adolescents in 4 European  
7 countries with a soda tax and 5 comparison countries, by family affluence.

### 8 *Methods*

9 Five rounds of the international 'Health Behaviour in School-aged Children' (HBSC) school-  
10 based survey were used (school years 2001/02 to 2017/18, repeated cross-sectional  
11 design). Finland, France, Belgium, and Portugal introduced or updated a soda tax during this  
12 period. For comparison, we selected 5 neighboring countries without such a tax. Nationally-  
13 representative samples of adolescents aged 13 and 15 years (n=165,521; 51.2% girls)  
14 completed a standardized questionnaire, including a question on soda consumption  
15 frequency. Using the Family Affluence Scale (FAS), we categorized adolescents into lower-,  
16 middle- or higher-affluent groups. Changes in daily soda consumption were assessed in  
17 each country independently.

### 18 *Results*

19 Before taxation, daily soda consumption was more likely among lower-affluent adolescents in  
20 France and Belgium ( $P < 0.001$ , socioeconomic inequalities) and was similar across FAS  
21 groups in Finland and Portugal (no inequalities). After the tax, daily soda consumption was  
22 reduced across all FAS groups in Finland, Belgium, and Portugal ( $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.33$ ). In France,  
23 post-tax decrease was observed only among lower-affluent adolescents ( $OR_{\text{lower}} 0.76$ , 95%CI:  
24 0.60, 0.96, reduced inequalities). During the same periods, socioeconomic patterns remained  
25 stable in 3 comparison countries ( $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.38$ ), and larger reductions in daily soda  
26 consumption were observed among middle- or higher-affluent adolescents compared to  
27 lower-affluent adolescents in the 2 remaining comparison countries ( $P_{\text{interactions}} \leq 0.08$ ,  
28 increased inequalities).

### 29 *Conclusions*

30 Socioeconomic patterns did not change after the tax implementation in 3/4 countries and  
31 socioeconomic inequalities were reduced in France. Taxing sodas might be an effective  
32 measure to attenuate, or at least not exacerbate, socioeconomic inequalities in adolescent  
33 daily soda consumption.

34

### 35 *Keywords*

36 Tax on sugary drinks, soda tax, sugar-sweetened beverages, sodas, adolescents, social  
37 inequalities in diet, Health Behaviour in School-aged Children study

## 38 **Introduction**

39 Adolescents are large consumers of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) (1, 2). Several  
40 types of SSBs exist (2, 3), but sodas (sugary soft drinks) are the most commonly consumed  
41 (2, 4). A socioeconomic gradient in SSB consumption has been reported in several Western  
42 European countries (5-9). Adolescents with a lower socioeconomic position (SEP) are more  
43 likely to consume more, and more often, SSBs (sodas especially) than those with a higher  
44 SEP (6, 8, 9). This may in part contribute to the observed socioeconomic inequalities in  
45 obesity (10, 11).

46  
47 The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends taxing SSBs as a cost-effective measure  
48 to reduce sugar consumption (12). Worldwide, over 45 jurisdictions (country, region, or city)  
49 have introduced such a tax (13, 14). A meta-analysis estimated that a soda tax increasing SSB  
50 price by 10% would cut consumption by 10.0% (95%CI: -14.7%, -5.0%) (15). In Western  
51 Europe, positive findings were also reported (16-20). Most of the evidence came from  
52 econometrics studies relying on sales or purchase data aggregated at the household level,  
53 which prevents assessing the differential effects of taxes across household members,  
54 including adolescents. Recently, we showed that European countries with a soda tax did not  
55 experience larger beneficial changes in post-tax soda consumption among adolescents than  
56 their comparison countries (21). However, this null result at the overall population level might  
57 hide different effects of taxes on soda consumption by SEP.

58  
59 Understanding the effects of soda taxes by SEP is essential to assess whether structural public  
60 health measures, such as taxes, may or may not reduce socioeconomic inequalities in  
61 adolescent soda consumption. So far, evidence has been inconsistent regarding the  
62 differential effects of taxes on SSB consumption by SEP in Western countries (among adults  
63 and children). Some studies reported similar effects across SEP groups (22-29), whereas  
64 others did find larger reductions in SSB consumption among lower SEP groups (30-35) or  
65 among higher SEP groups (36). Most studies using 'real world' data were conducted in the  
66 U.S. (27, 28, 35) and/or relied on sales or purchase data, aggregated at the store (35, 36) or  
67 household (29) levels, which limits the understanding of how the tax might impact European  
68 adolescents.

69  
70 Adolescent consumption of SSBs and sodas has been on the decline since 2000-2010s in  
71 Western Europe (37). Therefore, when comparing pre-tax to post-tax soda consumption,  
72 having a comparison group, namely a population with similar socioeconomic conditions and  
73 living in a near geographical zone but not exposed to the tax, is needed. Thus, we  
74 investigated post-tax changes in daily soda consumption among adolescents by family

75 affluence using 16-year trends in four European countries that have implemented a soda tax,  
76 and five comparison countries (without such a tax).

77

## 78 **Subjects and Methods**

### 79 *Study design and datasets*

80 We used repeated cross-sectional data from the 'Health Behaviour in School-aged Children'  
81 (HBSC) study (38). HBSC is a large international school-based survey  
82 (<http://www.hbsc.org/>). Every four years, adolescents are surveyed in schools regarding their  
83 health behaviors and wellbeing via a standardized self-reported anonymous questionnaire.  
84 Each country uses cluster sampling to select a nationally-representative sample of  
85 adolescents aged 11, 13, and 15 years. The primary sampling unit is the school, with all  
86 adolescents in the selected class(es) being invited to complete the questionnaire (38).  
87 Details regarding the HBSC protocol can be found elsewhere (38).

88

### 89 *Selection of countries with a soda tax*

90 We selected HBSC countries (i) located in Western Europe to have countries with similar  
91 socioeconomic backgrounds; (ii) with data available for school years 2001/02, 2005/06,  
92 2009/10, 2013/14, and 2017/18; and (iii) having introduced or updated a national soda tax  
93 between 2003 and 2017. For the last point, we reviewed literature (13, 14, 16) and had  
94 personal contacts with national experts. Hence, Finland, France, Belgium, and Portugal were  
95 included. Table 1 describes soda taxes by country according to the chronological order of tax  
96 implementation (13, 14, 16). Taxes were introduced or updated at different times depending  
97 on the country (e.g., between 2011 and 2014 in Finland with a 3-step tax increase) and had  
98 two different designs: volumetric-based in France and Belgium, and sugar-content-based in  
99 Finland and Portugal (Table 1). Tax sizes were heterogeneous across countries (€0.07/L in  
100 France to €0.22/L in Finland). In France and Finland, the average price increase due to the  
101 tax was estimated at 7-10% (15) and 20% (16), respectively. Of note, we did not find  
102 literature estimating price increase following the implementation of the Belgian nor the  
103 Portuguese taxes.

104

### 105 *Selection of comparison countries*

106 To compare how socioeconomic patterns evolved in countries without soda taxes, we  
107 selected one or two neighboring countries that (i) did not implement a tax between 2003 and  
108 2017, and (ii) had similar demographic, economic, and nutritional characteristics. Thus,  
109 Sweden served as the comparison country for Finland, Germany and Italy for France, the  
110 Netherlands for Belgium, and Spain for Portugal. Supplementary Table 1 shows a relative  
111 similarity between the pairs of countries, based on 12 indicators (e.g., Gini index measuring

112 equity in income distribution). Survey response rates at the school level (and pupil level for  
 113 2017/18) were also similar, except that it was lower in Germany than in France  
 114 (Supplementary Table 2).

115

#### 116 *Soda consumption*

117 Adolescents completed a validated short food frequency questionnaire (sFFQ) (39, 40). The  
 118 question was: 'How many times a week do you usually eat or drink Coke® or other soft  
 119 drinks that contain sugar?' and possible consumption frequency was (i) 'every day, more  
 120 than once'; (ii) 'once a day, every day'; (iii) '5-6 days a week'; (iv) '2-4 days a week'; (v) 'once  
 121 a week'; (vi) 'less than once a week'; or (vii) 'never' (38). Daily consumers were defined as  
 122 those who ticked the first two answers ( $\geq 1x/day$ ).

123

#### 124 *Family affluence*

125 The Family Affluence Scale (FAS) is a brief assets-based measure of family wealth (41, 42).  
 126 The FAS was based on 4 (survey rounds 2001/02 to 2009/10) to 6 (2013/14-2017/8) items:  
 127 (i) having one's own bedroom; (ii) number of cars; (iii) computers/laptops/tablets in the family;  
 128 (iv) number of vacation trips in the last year; and since 2013/14: (v) number of bathrooms in  
 129 the house; and (vi) having a dishwasher at home. We riddit-transformed total FAS scores  
 130 (2001/02–2009/10: 0–9; 2013/14–2017/18: 0–13) to estimate the relative family affluence of  
 131 adolescents (38, 43). Riddit-based scores are based on cumulative probabilities within each  
 132 country, survey round, sex, and age group. The riddit of the category  $i$  is the sum of the  
 133 proportions ( $\pi$ ) of individuals in each category below the category  $i$  plus half the proportion of  
 134 individuals in the category  $i$  itself (43):  $Ridit_i = \sum_{0 \leq k < i} \pi_k + \frac{\pi_i}{2}$ . The riddit-score was then  
 135 divided into quintiles to obtain three groups: the first 20% (lower affluence), the next 60%  
 136 (middle affluence), and the last 20% (higher affluence). This procedure is recommended by  
 137 the HBSC protocol (38) to better highlight the extremes and disregard cross-national and  
 138 temporal differences in absolute poverty and material standards of living.

139

#### 140 *Covariates*

141 SSBs are more likely to be consumed by male and older adolescents (44), and when the  
 142 outside temperature is warmer (45-47). All HBSC participants included in the international  
 143 database had complete data on sex (females or males) and age. Our analyses included only  
 144 13- and 15-year-olds. Adolescents aged 11 years were excluded (i) to have only secondary  
 145 school students, who are more homogeneous in terms of school food environment as well as  
 146 age-related food choice autonomy and SEP), and (ii) to limit the frequency of missing data  
 147 for FAS (more common among younger adolescents). We recorded the mean monthly

148 temperature during the month participants completed their questionnaire using world climatic  
149 data (<https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/>). We selected the land-based station located close to the  
150 capital city with data available from 2001 to 2018. Supplementary Table 3 details the mean  
151 temperature of the months when data were collected, by survey round. Overall, temperatures  
152 were similar across paired countries.

153

#### 154 *Ethics*

155 Authorizations from the institutional ethics committees or the relevant boards were obtained  
156 at the country level before proceeding with data collection. Supplementary Table 4 details  
157 institutions in charge of ethical approval (or exemption) for each country. The surveyed  
158 schools, adolescents, and their parents or caregivers received detailed information about the  
159 study and were assured of their anonymity and the possibility to withdraw their participation.  
160 Pupils voluntarily filled out the anonymous questionnaire at school. No direct identifiable  
161 information about study participants was collected in the questionnaire.

162

#### 163 *Statistics*

164 For all analyses, we used Stata® version 15 and applied multilevel logistic models with  
165 random intercepts. Level 1 was set for the pupil and level 2 for the class (median cluster size:  
166 15 pupils/class). All analyses were conducted for each country independently, the prevalence  
167 of daily soda consumption being the dependent variable. All models were adjusted for survey  
168 round, sex, age group, and temperature at the time of data collection. Statistical significance  
169 was set at  $P \leq 0.05$ .

170

171 Firstly, we investigated whether the prevalence of daily soda consumption varied across the  
172 three FAS groups (independent variable, reference group = lower-affluent adolescents) at the  
173 last pre-tax and first post-tax survey rounds.

174

175 Secondly, we focused on *short-term* post-tax changes and tested whether there was a  
176 reduction in daily soda consumption between the last survey round before and the first  
177 survey round after the tax was implemented, in the whole sample (population level) and for  
178 each FAS group (stratified models). Data from all survey rounds were included and the pre-  
179 tax survey round was the reference survey round. Then, we determined whether results  
180 differed by socioeconomic groups, adding an interaction term between survey rounds and  
181 FAS groups (interaction models). The difference between groups was tested using a Wald  
182 test. Then, we computed and plotted the prevalence (95% CIs) of daily soda consumption by  
183 FAS for each county.

184

185 Thirdly, we investigated *long-term* post-tax changes in Finland and France, where two survey  
186 rounds were available after the tax implementation. For that, we modeled pre-and post-tax  
187 time trends (slopes) in daily soda consumption overall and by FAS groups (stratified trend  
188 models), applying two-piecewise linear spline multilevel logistic models (48) and setting the  
189 survey round (2001/02 to 2017/18) as a continuous time variable (1–5). We defined one knot  
190 at the survey time 3, creating two periods of analysis: the pre-tax (2001/02–2009/10) and the  
191 post-tax (2009/10–2017/18) trends. To determine whether pre-and post-tax trends in daily  
192 soda consumption differed by FAS, we added two interaction terms: (i) between pre-tax time  
193 and FAS groups, and (ii) between post-tax time and FAS groups (interaction trend models).  
194 Finally, the prevalence (95% CIs) of daily soda consumption was predicted and plotted at  
195 times 1 (2001/02), 3 (2009/10), and 5 (2017/18).

196

## 197 **Results**

### 198 *Study participants*

199 We excluded adolescents with missing data on soda consumption and FAS, respectively  
200 0.6% and 5.1% of the sample (Supplementary Figure 1). Of note, about a third of missing  
201 FAS data came from Spain and the survey round 2013/14, because only a random  
202 subsample was surveyed about FAS that school year (Supplementary Table 4). In total,  
203 165,521 HBSC participants had complete data: 51.2% of girls, and 50.9% aged 13-years old  
204 (Table 2). Samples were similar across paired countries in terms of age and sex.  
205 Supplementary Table 5 presents sample characteristics plus the unadjusted prevalence of  
206 daily soda consumption, by survey round.

207

### 208 *Pre-tax socioeconomic inequalities in soda consumption*

209 Pre-tax prevalence of daily soda consumption was similar among the three FAS groups in  
210 Finland ( $P \geq 0.38$ ) and Portugal ( $P \geq 0.19$ , Supplementary Table 6). By contrast, middle- and  
211 higher-affluent adolescents were less likely to consume sodas daily than lower-affluent  
212 adolescents in France (Supplementary Table 6,  $OR \leq 0.63$ , 95%CI:  $\geq 0.46$ ,  $\leq 0.75$ ,  $P < 0.001$ )  
213 and Belgium ( $OR \leq 0.73$ , 95%CI:  $\geq 0.43$ ,  $\leq 0.84$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ). Thus, France and Belgium  
214 experienced pre-tax socioeconomic inequalities in daily soda consumption with a clear  
215 socioeconomic gradient.

216

### 217 *Short-term changes in daily soda consumption by FAS*

218 Finland (comparison country: Sweden, Figure 1A): Between 2009/10 and 2013/14, Finland  
219 experienced a decline in daily soda consumption, especially among middle-affluent  
220 adolescents (Supplementary Table 7,  $OR 0.54$ ; 95%CI: 0.36, 0.82). However, interaction  
221 models indicated that post-tax reductions among middle- and higher-affluent adolescents

222 were not different than those among lower-affluent pairs (Table 3,  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.44$ ). Thus, no  
223 post-tax change in socioeconomic patterns was observed. Sweden also experienced a  
224 similar decline in daily soda consumption across FAS groups ( $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.38$ ).

225  
226 France (comparison countries: Germany and Italy, Figure 1B): Prevalence of daily soda  
227 consumption was reduced only among lower-affluent adolescents in France between  
228 2009/10 and 2013/14 (Supplementary Table 7, OR 0.76; 95%CI: 0.60, 0.96). Therefore,  
229 socioeconomic inequalities between lower- and middle-affluent adolescents were reduced  
230 after the tax introduction (Table 3,  $P_{\text{interaction middle vs. lower FAS}} = 0.02$ ;  $P_{\text{interaction higher vs. lower FAS}} = 0.20$ ).  
231 As for both comparison countries, between 2009/10 and 2013/14, probabilities of daily soda  
232 consumption were not reduced in any FAS groups (Supplementary Table 7,  $P \geq 0.18$ ) and  
233 differences between FAS groups remained constant (Table 3,  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.63$ ).

234  
235 Belgium (comparison country: Netherlands, Figure 1C): Belgium experienced a reduction in  
236 the prevalence of daily soda consumption among all FAS groups between 2013/14 and  
237 2017/18 (Supplementary Table 7,  $OR \leq 0.75$ , 95%CI:  $\geq 0.54$ ,  $\leq 0.92$ ,  $P \leq 0.01$ ), without any  
238 differences between groups (Table 3,  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.79$ ). Thus, pre-tax socioeconomic  
239 inequalities remained stable after the tax implementation (Supplementary Table 6). On the  
240 contrary, the Netherlands had during the same period a larger decline in daily soda  
241 consumption among higher-affluent than lower-affluent adolescents ( $P_{\text{interaction}} = 0.002$ ). This  
242 led to socioeconomic inequalities in 2017/18, while no differences between FAS groups were  
243 documented in 2013/14 (Supplementary Table 6).

244  
245 Portugal (comparison country: Spain, Figure 1D): Between 2013/14 and 2017/18, daily soda  
246 consumption in Portugal was reduced at the population level, especially among lower-  
247 affluent adolescents (Supplementary Table 7, OR 0.71; 95%CI: 0.52, 0.95). However, the  
248 extent of reduction was not significantly larger than that observed among middle- and higher-  
249 affluent adolescents (Table 3,  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.33$ ). As for Spain, a reduction in daily soda  
250 consumption was observed among higher- and middle-affluent adolescents, but not among  
251 lower-affluent ones (Supplementary Table 7, towards more inequalities, as also shown in  
252 Supplementary Table 6). The reduction tended to be larger in the middle-affluent group than  
253 in the lower-affluent one (Table 3,  $P_{\text{interaction}} = 0.08$ ).

254  
255 *Long-term changes in Finland and France*

256 Between 2009/10 and 2017/18 (post-tax trend), Finland did not experience declines in daily  
257 consumers of sodas in any FAS groups (Supplementary Table 8,  $0.82 \leq OR \leq 1.03$ , 95%CI:  
258  $\geq 0.55$ ,  $\leq 1.61$ ,  $P \geq 0.34$ ), and no difference was observed across FAS groups (Figure 2A,



259  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.75$ ). This indicates no long-term post-tax changes in socioeconomic patterns.  
260 During the same period in Sweden, lower-affluent adolescents tended to reduce their  
261 probability of consuming sodas daily (Supplementary Table 8, OR 0.81; 95%CI: 0.66, 1.00).  
262 This reduction was, however, not larger than those observed among middle- nor higher-  
263 affluent FAS groups (Figure 2A,  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.45$ ), meaning no change in socioeconomic  
264 patterns.

265  
266 In France, daily soda consumption declined among lower- and middle-affluent adolescents  
267 between 2009/10 and 2017/18, respectively (Supplementary Table 8, OR 0.78; 95%CI: 0.70,  
268 0.87; OR 0.89; 95%CI: 0.83, 0.96). The reduction among the lower FAS group was larger  
269 than in the middle and higher FAS groups (Figure 2B,  $P_{\text{interactions}} \leq 0.03$ ), indicating a long-term  
270 reduction in socioeconomic inequalities. As for trends in Italy and Germany, long-term  
271 reductions in daily soda consumption were observed among all FAS groups in both  
272 comparison countries (Supplementary Table 8,  $OR \leq 0.85$ , 95%CI:  $\geq 0.48$ ,  $\leq 0.98$ ,  $P \leq 0.03$ ),  
273 without significant differences between FAS groups (Figure 2B, Germany:  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.38$ ;  
274 Italy:  $P_{\text{interactions}} \geq 0.46$ ).

275

## 276 Discussion

277 Analyses of daily soda consumption according to SEP groups showed two different patterns.  
278 First, in Finland and Portugal (no pre-tax socioeconomic inequalities) as well as in Belgium  
279 (pre-tax inequalities), all SEP groups reduced their probability of consuming soda daily in a  
280 similar way. During the same periods, their three corresponding comparison countries  
281 experienced no change in socioeconomic patterns (Sweden) or increased their  
282 socioeconomic inequalities (Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, Spain). Second, in France,  
283 post-tax reductions were mostly observed among lower-affluent adolescents, also in the long  
284 term (6 years after the tax), whereas no change in socioeconomic patterns was observed in  
285 the two comparison countries over the same period.

286

### 287 *Population-level changes in SSB consumption*

288 This study showed an overall post-tax reduction in daily soda consumption among adolescents  
289 living in Finland, Belgium, and Portugal, but not in France. Although not directly comparable to  
290 our results, econometrics studies also revealed reductions in SSB sales/purchases in Finland  
291 (16, 17), Portugal (18), and also a slight decrease in France (19, 20) (no studies were found  
292 for Belgium). Why France did not experience a post-tax decline in daily soda consumption at  
293 the adolescent population level, as shown by our study, is unclear. This could be explained by  
294 a low tax rate (7-10%) (15), which might be insufficient to discourage soda purchase among

295 adolescents. Previous literature suggested that low tax rates (<5%) were unlikely to affect  
296 childhood SSB consumption at the population level (15, 49).

297

298 Our previous analyses also showed that reductions in daily soda consumption in Finland,  
299 Belgium, and Portugal were not larger than those observed in comparison countries (same  
300 comparison countries as this study) (21). Multiple reasons could explain this phenomenon,  
301 such as: (i) youth might be less sensitive to taxes than adults, as shown in two different U.S.  
302 cities, where tax rates were above 20% (27, 28), (ii) adolescents, who are not the main  
303 household shoppers, do not habitually face a price rise, and (iii) taxes have a limited health  
304 risk 'signaling effect' on adolescents (50). We expanded on these matters (21) and the possible  
305 reasons why there is an overall declining trend in soda consumption in Western Europe (37)  
306 in our previous papers.

307

308 *Differential effects among SEP groups: comparison with other studies*

309 This study shows that socioeconomic patterns in adolescent daily consumption of sodas did  
310 not change after the implementation of the tax, or socioeconomic inequalities were reduced.  
311 Modeling studies in the Western English-speaking countries also simulated that a tax rate of  
312 10-20% would produce equal or greater reductions in SSB consumption among lower-SEP  
313 households compared to higher-SEP households (22-26, 30-34). Unfortunately, these  
314 studies are specific to a context, i.e., the jurisdiction under study, and none of the above  
315 studies were conducted in the jurisdictions we analyzed, hence limiting the comparison with  
316 our findings.

317

318 Beyond simulation modeling, our findings should be compared to those from studies  
319 assessing tax effects under 'real life' circumstances like ours. In Catalonia, a province of  
320 Spain (tax rate: ~15%), the reduction in SSB purchases was larger in stores located in  
321 higher-income regions, without significant changes in middle- and lower-income regions (36).  
322 By contrast, Bleich et al. showed in the U.S. city of Philadelphia that the decrease in SSB  
323 purchases was larger among customers shopping in lower-income neighborhoods and  
324 individuals with less education two years after the tax (tax rate >20%) (35). In the same city,  
325 Crawley et al. found similar reductions in the *purchase* of sodas among adults in poverty than  
326 other adults. However, *consumption* data did not show a reduced intake of sodas among  
327 adults in poverty (28). This may indicate that lower SEP individuals are more prone to cross-  
328 border shopping. This phenomenon was however not accounted for by Bleich and  
329 colleagues (35).

330

331 Comparing our results to those from national taxes, where cross-border is constrained, is of  
332 particular interest. In the U.K., a country with a large two-tiered sugar-content-based tax, total  
333 sugar purchased per household from taxed beverages has declined across all SEP groups  
334 one year post tax (–33% to –39%, five occupational groups based on the main wage earner)  
335 (29). To the best of our knowledge, this is the only Western country with published data on  
336 tax effects by SEP (29). Given those literature gaps, more research is needed to evaluate the  
337 effect of soda taxes by SEP.

338

### 339 *Public health implications*

340 Taxation might be a valuable tool to complement educational programs (e.g., mass-media  
341 campaigns on healthy eating, promotion of water consumption) which tend to increase  
342 socioeconomic inequalities in diet (51). If taxes on SSBs produce equal or greater reductions  
343 in SSB consumption among lower-SEP than higher-SEP groups (22-26, 29-35), they could  
344 be viewed as a progressive tool for reducing socioeconomic inequalities in SSB  
345 consumption, and potentially, in SSB-related diseases, such as obesity. However, soda  
346 taxes are financially regressive, i.e., the economic burden of the tax falls more heavily on  
347 lower-income families, especially those who consume sodas regularly (52). Thus, mitigating  
348 the tax burden on lower-income households is essential (52). This can be done with the  
349 redistribution of a fraction of the tax revenue via subsidies for healthy foods (e.g., fruit and  
350 vegetables) (53) or public health measures for the most disadvantaged communities (e.g.,  
351 free healthy school meals).

352

### 353 *Strengths and limitations*

354 Our study has several strengths. The protocol was standardized across survey rounds and  
355 countries. Our study involved large school-based samples, taken to be nationally  
356 representative. We included four European countries to better understand tax effects where  
357 pre-tax inequalities in daily soda consumption existed or did not.

358

359 The main limitation of this study is that public health measures other than soda taxes and  
360 socioeconomic events impacting soda consumption may have occurred during the periods  
361 under scrutiny, especially while investigating long-term changes. Socioeconomic  
362 characteristics of lower- and higher-affluent adolescents might also have changed over time.  
363 In addition, Finland and Sweden had a low prevalence of daily soda consumption (increased  
364 risk of type II error, low power). However, when we assessed post-tax short-term changes  
365 using a consumption cut-off at  $\geq 5x/\text{week}$  instead of  $\geq 1x/\text{day}$  (raw prevalence presented in  
366 Supplementary Table 5), we also found equal post-tax reductions in all FAS groups (data not  
367 shown). Another limitation is the restricted information collected via the sFFQ (no information

368 on soda sugar contents, nor portion sizes). No data on other types of consumed beverages  
369 were collected either, limiting the analysis of potential substitutions towards other beverages  
370 or the calculation of sugar intake, especially relevant for sugar-content-based taxes (Finland  
371 and Portugal). Underreporting of food intake is common with sFFQ (54). Underreporting of  
372 soda consumption might have increased over time due to rising awareness of their negative  
373 consequences on health. As higher-SEP adolescents tend to be more health-educated, they  
374 could have been more subject to desirability bias over time (leading to increased  
375 inequalities). Furthermore, FAS reflects only one dimension of SEP and may not well  
376 distinguish adolescents from heterogeneous contexts (e.g., urban vs. rural, small vs large  
377 countries). We may suppose that socioeconomic inequalities would have been more  
378 pronounced if we used parental education or occupation (not assessed every survey round)  
379 (5). Finally, FAS score construction also changed between 2010 and 2014 to take societal  
380 changes into account (two additional items), which increased the likelihood of missing values  
381 and might have reduced the consistency in the definition of family affluence.

382

### 383 *Conclusions*

384 Taxing SSBs might be an effective measure to attenuate, or at least not exacerbate,  
385 persisting socioeconomic inequalities in SSB consumption found in several Western  
386 countries (44, 55). More research is needed to evaluate the effect of such taxes, possibly  
387 with and without subsidies for healthy foods, and using complementary SEP indicators. Such  
388 an issue is especially important if public health actors want to promote taxes on SSBs (and  
389 potentially also on other unhealthy foods) to simultaneously reduce consumption and related  
390 socioeconomic inequalities.

391

### 392 **Acknowledgments**

393 HBSC is an international study carried out in collaboration with World Health Organization  
394 Regional Office for Europe. The International Coordinator was Jo Inchley (University of  
395 Glasgow, United Kingdom) for the 2017/18 survey and Candace Currie (Glasgow Caledonian  
396 University, United Kingdom) for the 2001/02 to 2013/14 surveys. The Data Bank Manager  
397 was Oddrun Samdal (University of Bergen, Norway). The survey data included in this study  
398 were collected by the following principal investigators: Flemish Belgium (Maxim Dierckens,  
399 Bart De Clercq, Carine Vereecken, Anne Hublet, and Lea Maes), French-speaking Belgium  
400 (Katia Castetbon, Isabelle Godin and Danielle Piette), Finland (Jorma Tynjälä), France  
401 (Emmanuelle Godeau), Germany (Matthias Richter, Petra Kolip, Ulrike Ravens-Sieberer, and  
402 Klaus Hurrelmann), Italy (Franco Cavallo and Alessio Vieno), the Netherlands (Gonneke  
403 Stevens, Saskia van Dorsselaer, Wilma Vollebergh, and Tom de Bogt), Portugal (Margarida

404 Gaspar de Matos), Spain (Carmen Moreno), and Sweden (Petra Löfstedt, Lilly Augustine,  
405 and Ulla Marklund). For details, see <http://www.hbsc.org>.

406

407 *Authors' Contributions*

408 AC and KC designed the manuscript. AC analyzed the data. AC wrote the manuscript and KC,  
409 MR, CK, ASF, CP, and LD reviewed and edited it. AC and KC had primary responsibility for  
410 final content. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

411

412 *Data sharing*

413 Data described in the manuscript and analytic code will be made available upon request. All  
414 HBSC protocols, questionnaires, and data can be accessed via a request to the HBSC Data  
415 Management Centre ([dmc@hbsc.org](mailto:dmc@hbsc.org)). For further information, see  
416 <http://www.uib.no/en/hbscdata>.

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**Table 1** European countries with a soda tax introduced/updated between 2003 and 2017 and description of the tax during the study period <sup>1</sup> (in chronological order of tax introduction or update).

Countries	Dates of tax introduction or update	Types of tax <sup>2</sup>	Tax sizes (euros <sup>3</sup> per liter)	Tax rates (% price increase)
Finland	Introduction: before 2001/02	Volumetric, excise tax on non-alcoholic drinks with added sugar	Before 2011: €0.05	-
	Update: 1 Jan 2011	Idem	€0.08	Unknown
	Update: 1 Jan 2012	Idem	€0.11	Unknown
	Update: 1 Jan 2014	Sugar content-based, excise tax on non-alcoholic drinks with added sugar	€0.22 (>5g of sugar/100mL) and €0.11 (<5g/100mL)	20% from Dec 2010
France	Introduction: 1 Jan 2012	Volumetric, excise tax on non-alcoholic drinks with added sugar (also with artificial sweeteners)	€0.07	7-10%
Belgium	Introduction: Unknown	Volumetric, excise tax on non-alcoholic drinks with added sugar, other sweeteners, or flavors	Before 2016: €0.03	Unknown
	Update: 1 Jan 2016	Idem	€0.07	Unknown
	Update: 1 Jan 2018	Idem	€0.12	Unknown
Portugal	Introduction: 1 Jan 2017	Sugar content-based, excise tax on non-alcoholic drinks with added sugar, other sweeteners, or flavors	€0.16 (>8g of sugar/100mL) and €0.08 (<8g/100mL)	Unknown

<sup>1</sup> Some taxes (e.g., in France) have been updated after the 2017/18 HBS data collection, i.e., after the period we studied.

<sup>2</sup> An excise tax is a duty levied on a particular product at the point of manufacture (i.e., soda producers), as opposed to a sales tax that is applied to end consumers at the point of purchase.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Euro ≈ 1 US dollar (in 2022).

**Table 2** Description of survey participants (total sample and % of the total sample), by country (in black = country with a tax; in grey = comparison country), Health Behaviour in School-aged Children study, 2001/02–2017/08 (five survey rounds)

	<b>Total sample (n)</b>	<b>Females (%)</b>	<b>Males (%)</b>	<b>13 y/o (%)</b>	<b>15 y/o (%)</b>	<b>Lower FAS (%)</b>	<b>Middle FAS (%)</b>	<b>Higher FAS (%)</b>	<b>2001- 2002 (%)</b>	<b>2005- 2006 (%)</b>	<b>2009- 2010 (%)</b>	<b>2013- 2014 (%)</b>	<b>2017- 2018 (%)</b>
<b>Finland</b>	16 647	51.6	48.4	49.9	50.1	22.0	59.7	18.3	20.3	19.9	24.8	22.4	12.5
<b>Sweden</b>	16 965	51.0	49.0	47.7	52.3	21.1	61.3	17.6	13.9	16.5	24.6	28.1	17.0
<b>France</b>	23 095	51.0	49.0	54.8	45.2	22.6	59.1	18.3	23.2	19.6	16.4	16.0	24.9
<b>Germany</b>	18 386	51.3	48.7	49.1	50.9	22.4	58.8	18.7	18.8	26.5	17.4	21.9	15.5
<b>Italy</b>	13 826	51.4	48.6	53.1	46.9	22.1	59.6	18.3	20.1	19.0	22.8	18.8	19.4
<b>Belgium</b>	27 344	50.2	49.8	48.9	51.1	21.7	60.4	17.9	24.6	19.6	17.1	22.9	15.8
<b>Netherlands</b>	14 201	50.6	49.4	52.2	47.8	22.5	58.1	19.3	19.3	19.8	20.2	18.8	22.0
<b>Portugal</b>	13 681	53.4	46.6	53.8	46.2	21.7	60.5	17.8	12.7	19.1	20.2	22.0	26.0
<b>Spain</b>	21 376	51.6	48.4	50.2	49.8	21.5	60.5	18.0	17.2	27.2	17.1	24.0	14.4
<b>All</b>	165 521	51.2	48.8	50.9	49.1	21.9	59.8	18.2	19.4	21.0	19.6	21.7	18.3

FAS, Family Affluence Scale

**Table 3** Country-level short-term changes (interaction models) in the proportion of daily soda consumption between the last pre-tax survey round (reference) and the first post-tax survey round in countries with a soda tax (in black) and comparison countries (in grey), by family affluence (FAS)

	Middle vs. lower FAS <sup>1</sup>			Higher vs. lower FAS <sup>1</sup>		
	OR	(95% CI)	P-Val.	OR	(95% CI)	P-Val.
<b>Finland</b>	0.79	(0.43, 1.45)	0.44	0.88	(0.42, 1.83)	0.73
<b>Sweden</b>	1.20	(0.79, 1.83)	0.38	1.13	(0.64, 2.00)	0.67
<b>France</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>(1.04, 1.73)</b>	<b>0.02</b>	1.25	(0.89, 1.75)	0.20
<b>Germany</b>	1.01	(0.76, 1.34)	0.95	1.09	(0.75, 1.59)	0.64
<b>Italy</b>	1.01	(0.71, 1.43)	0.97	0.89	(0.56, 1.42)	0.63
<b>Belgium</b>	0.98	(0.79, 1.21)	0.83	0.96	(0.71, 1.29)	0.79
<b>Netherlands</b>	0.89	(0.66, 1.21)	0.46	<b>0.52</b>	<b>(0.35, 0.79)</b>	<b>0.002</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	1.18	(0.85, 1.64)	0.33	1.23	(0.81, 1.89)	0.34
<b>Spain</b>	0.77	(0.57, 1.04)	0.08	0.76	(0.51, 1.14)	0.19

<sup>1</sup> OR > 1 indicates that middle/higher-affluent adolescents reduced their consumption to a lesser extent than lower-affluent adolescents (decreased inequalities); OR < 1 indicates that middle/higher-affluent adolescents reduced their consumption to a larger extent than lower-affluent adolescents (increased inequalities); ORs represent the interaction between FAS (reference = lower FAS) and survey round (reference = pre-tax survey round) and were modeled using multilevel logistic models (dependent variable = daily soda consumption), adjusted for FAS, survey round, sex, age group, and temperature at the time of data collection (P≤0.05 in bold, all survey rounds included, total n=165,521; numbers of participants by country and survey round are detailed in Supplementary Table 5).



## List of figures

**Figure 1.** Prevalence (95% Cis) of daily soda consumption, by survey round in country that introduced/updated a tax (left, A, B, C, and D) and in the comparison country (right, A, B, C, and D). The grey vertical bar represents the date of tax introduction/update (left) or the comparison period (right, in lighter grey). Prevalence is adjusted for sample variations over time in terms of sex, age group, and temperature at the month of data collection; = or ≠ means that post-tax changes among middle- and higher-affluent adolescents were similar or different from changes among lower-affluent adolescents, respectively; (B) France: lower-affluent adolescents reduced their consumption to a larger extent than middle-affluent adolescents (\* $P_{\text{interaction}}=0.02$ , Table 3); (C) Netherlands: lower-affluent adolescents reduced their consumption to a lesser extent than higher-affluent adolescents (\*\* $P_{\text{interaction}}=0.002$ , Table 3). The y-axis scale varies according to paired countries (total  $n=165,521$ ; numbers of participants by country and survey round are detailed in Supplementary Table 5). FAS, Family Affluence Scale.




**Figure 2.** Trends in prevalence (95% CIs) of daily soda consumption between 2001/02 and 2009/10 (pre-tax trend) and between 2009/10 and 2013/14 (post-tax trend) in countries that introduced/updated a tax (left, A and B) and in the comparison country (right, A and B). Trends are adjusted for sample variations over time in terms of sex, age group, and temperature at the month of data collection; = or ≠ means that post-tax changes among middle- and higher-affluent adolescents were similar or different from changes among lower-affluent adolescents, respectively; (B) France: lower-affluent adolescents reduced their consumption to a larger extent than middle-affluent (\*\* $P_{\text{interaction}}=0.01$ ) and higher-affluent adolescents (\* $P_{\text{interaction}}=0.03$ ). The y-axis scale varies according to paired countries (total  $n=88,919$ ; numbers of participants by country and survey round are detailed in Supplementary Table 5). FAS, Family Affluence Scale.

Figure 1



A





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

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


— Lower FAS — Medium FAS — Higher FAS

Figure 2

A



B



—●— Lower FAS   
 —●— Medium FAS   
 —●— Higher FAS



## Online Supplementary Material

### *Tax on sugary drinks and trends in daily soda consumption by family affluence: an international repeated cross-sectional survey among European adolescents – Chatelan et al.*

**Supplementary Table 1.** Key demographic, economic, and nutritional characteristics of studied countries

Countries	Location within Europe <sup>1</sup>	National languages <sup>2</sup>	Total population in 2019 (millions) <sup>3</sup>	Life expectancy at birth in 2018 (years) <sup>4</sup>	Gross national income per capita in 2002 (2017 PPP \$) <sup>5</sup>	Gross national income per capita in 2018 (2017 PPP \$) <sup>5</sup>	Mean FAS (2001/02, min.0, max. 9)	Mean FAS (2017/18, min. 0, max. 13)	Gini index (2003) <sup>6</sup>	Gini index (2018) <sup>6</sup>	Dietary risks in 2019 (death rates/100,000) <sup>7</sup>	Prevalence of adult obesity in 2013 (%) <sup>8</sup>
Finland	Northern	Finnish, Swedish	5.5	81.7	41,604	48,456	5.2	8.9	27.7	27.3	183	23
Sweden	Northern	Swedish	10.0	82.7	42,128	53,442	5.8	9.4	25.3	30.0	138	19
France	Western	French	65.1	82.5	40,939	46,491	5.3	8.6	31.4	32.4	100	18
Germany	Western	German	83.5	81.2	42,836	54,878	5.4	9.4	30.0	31.9 <sup>10</sup>	163	25
Italy	Southern	Italian	60.6	83.4	43,856	42,647	4.8	7.9	34.9	35.9 <sup>11</sup>	144	20
Belgium	Western	Dutch, French, German	11.5	81.5	44,814	51,776	5.1	9.0	28.1	27.2	112	22
Netherlands	Western	Dutch	17.1	82.1	47,981	56,880	5.7	9.0	29.8 <sup>9</sup>	28.1	97	19
Portugal	Southern	Portuguese	10.2	81.9	30,468	33,317	4.7	8.1	38.8	33.5	125	24
Spain	Southern	Spanish	46.7	83.4	36,044	40,515	4.9	8.5	31.8	34.7	93	27

<sup>1</sup> Reference: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Vocabularies. Access to the Thesaurus: <https://op.europa.eu/en/web/eu-vocabularies/concept-scheme/-/resource?uri=http://eurovoc.europa.eu/100277>.

<sup>2</sup> Reference: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (e.g., access for Latvia: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latvia>).

<sup>3</sup> Reference: Human Development Report 2020 from the United Nations Development Programme. Access to Table 7: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/download-data>

<sup>4</sup> Reference: United Nations Development Programme. 2019. Human Development Report 2019. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century. New York. Access to the report: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2019>.

<sup>5</sup> Reference: World Bank. Access to 2002 and 2018 data: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.KD>.

<sup>6</sup> Reference: World Bank. Access to data: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/>.

<sup>7</sup> Reference: Global Burden of Diseases. Access to data: <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/> (selected options: map, risk, any dietary risks, deaths, year 2019, all ages, both sexes, rate, rate of change: off, detail: 2).

<sup>8</sup> Reference: WHO Regional Office for Europe. Country profiles on nutrition, physical activity, and obesity. Access to monitoring and surveillance indicators: <https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/nutrition/country-work> (obesity = BMI≥30, both sexes, >15-25 years).

<sup>9</sup> Data for 2004 (no previous data found).

<sup>10</sup> Data for 2016 (no more recent data found).

<sup>11</sup> Data for 2017 (no more recent data found).

**Supplementary Table 2.** Response rates <sup>1,2</sup> at school and pupil levels (only for 2018), by country, and by survey round

	<b>2001/02</b>	<b>2005/06</b>	<b>2009/10</b>	<b>2013/14</b>	<b>2017/2018</b>	
<b>Countries</b>	<b>School level</b>	<b>School level</b>	<b>School level</b>	<b>School level</b>	<b>School level</b>	<b>Pupil level <sup>3</sup></b>
<b>Finland</b>	NA	89%	74%	67%	47%	60%
<b>Sweden</b>	NA	90%	88%	77%	47%	NA
<b>France</b>	NA	80%	95%	89%	88%	87%
<b>Germany</b>	50%	46%	89%	25%	16%	54%
<b>Italy</b>	NA	95%	NA	93%	89%	96%
<b>Belgium</b>	Flemish: NA French: NA	Flemish: 50% French: NA	Flemish: 33% French: 60%	Flemish: 26% French: 21%	Flemish: 22% French: 25%	Flemish: 71% French: 82%
<b>Netherlands</b>	NA	50%	50%	49%	38%	94%
<b>Portugal</b>	NA	92%	86%	97%	51%	NA
<b>Spain</b>	NA	86%	79%	59%	69%	NA

NA = Not available

<sup>1</sup> Response rates apply to all age categories of HBSC study participants (11-, 13-, and 15-year-olds). Therefore, response rates of the 13- and 15-year-olds included in this study may vary slightly.

<sup>2</sup> Reference: HBSC International Coordinating Centre 2021. Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC). Publications: International Reports. Access to reports: <http://www.hbsc.org/publications/international/>

<sup>3</sup> Pupil response rates are based on (estimated) pupils enrolled at the participating schools.

**Supplementary Table 3.** Data collection months (% interviewed adolescents) and mean temperature during data collection month(s) <sup>1</sup>, by country, and by survey round


Countries	Months of data collection					Mean temperature degree (in °C)				
	2001/02	2005/06	2009/10	2013/14	2017/2018	2001/02	2005/06	2009/10	2013/14	2017/2018
<b>Finland</b>	Mar (40.0%) / Apr (59.1%) / May (0.9%)	Mar (30.7%) / Apr (63.6%) / May (4.5%) / Jun (1.2%)	Mar (98.0%) / Apr (1.6%) / May (0.4%)	Mar (0.4%) / Apr (89.2%) / May (10.5%)	Apr (16.9%) / May (83.1%)	1.3	-0.6	-4.5	4.3	11.9
<b>Sweden</b>	Dec (100.0%)	Nov (100.0%)	Dec (100.0%)	Jan (100.0%)	Oct (0.6%) / Nov (65.1%) / Dec (34.3%)	-3.5	4.1	-1.4	-3.0	4.5
<b>France</b>	Mar (38.0%) / Apr (38.6%) / May (21.8%) / Jun (1.6%)	Mar (8.2%) / Apr (67.5%) / May (19.7%) / Jun (4.5%)	Apr (4.5%) / May (83.7%) / Jun (11.9%)	Apr (26.9%) / May (51.8%) / Jun (21.4%)	Apr (18.3%) / May (72.0%) / Jun (9.8%)	11.1	11.4	13.6	14.3	16.1
<b>Germany</b>	Feb (12.0%) / Mar (2.5%) / Apr (2.7%) / May (61.5%) / Jun (21.3%)	Jan (13.3%) / Feb (23.8%) / Mar (42.5%) / Apr (13.7%) / May (3.6%) / Jun (3.2%)	Feb (3.2%) / Mar (15.2%) / Apr (32.4%) / May (34.1%) / Jun (13.5%) / Jul (1.7%)	Oct (0.2%) / Nov (6.3%) / Dec (1.2%) / Jan (3.3%) / Feb (9.0%) / Mar (19.3%) / Apr (18.4%) / May (16.5%) / Jun (11.3%) / Jul (13.2%) / Aug (1.4%)	Apr (7.2%) / May (8.4%) / Jun (33.5%) / Jul (38.7%) / Aug (2.8%) / Sep (9.4%)	14.6	2.6	10.8	12.1	19.9
<b>Italy</b>	Apr (52.5%) / May (47.5%)	May (100%)	Nov (31.5%) / Dec (64.7%) / Feb (0.9%) / Mar (2.9%)	Apr (10.1%) / May (84.9%) / Jun (5.0%)	May (99.0%) / Jun (1.0%)	15.0	17.9	8.6	16.1	17.6
<b>Belgium</b>	Mar (6.2%) / Apr (27.5%) / May (61.5%) / Jun (4.9%)	Mar (4.3%) / Apr (18.2%) / May (72.4%) / Jun (5.2%)	Mar (29.0%) / Apr (11.5%) / May (55.0%) / Jun (4.5%)	Feb (16.7%) / Mar (15.9%) / Apr (7.3%) / May (60.1%)	Feb (0.1%) / Mar (16.5%) / Apr (20.3%) / May (61.3%) / Jun (1.9%)	12.4	12.3	9.5	11.5	13.9
<b>Netherlands</b>	Sep (1.2%) / Oct (22.0%) / Nov (54.5%) / Dec (14.9%) / Jan (6.7%) / Feb (0.6%)	Oct (31.9%) / Nov (67.8%) / Dec (0.4%)	Oct (30.3%) / Nov (68.2%) / Dec (1.5%)	Oct (37.7%) / Nov (55.7%) / Dec (6.6%)	Oct (35.4%) / Nov (62.7%) / Dec (1.9%)	7.9	8.9	9.8	8.7	9.6
<b>Portugal</b>	Mar (100.0%)	Jan (100.0%)	Nov (64.4%) / Jan (35.6%)	Jan (4.8%) / Feb (91.1%) / Mar (4.2%)	Jan (100.0%)	14.9	10.2	14.3	12.1	12.1
<b>Spain</b>	May (100%)	May (100%)	Mar (6.5%) / Apr (30.9%) / May (59.1%) / Jun (3.5%)	Mar (1.1%) / Apr (8.9%) / May (25.8%) / Jun (21.1%) / Jul (0.1%) / Sep (0.1%) / Oct (10.6%) / Nov (25.1%) / Dec (7.2%)	Feb (33.6%) / Mar (28.8%) / Apr (17.9%) / May (19.8%)	14.8	19.7	14.8	16.2	10.1

<sup>1</sup> Reference: Monthly temperature during the month of data collection was extracted from U.S. National Centers for Environmental Information (former National Climatic Data Center), which published monthly climatic data for the world. One land-based station (if possible, close to the capital city) was selected as follows: Finland: Jyvaskyla, Sweden: Karlstad Flygplats, France: Paris-Orly, Germany: Berlin-Tempelhof, Italy: Pisa, Belgium: Uccle (Brussels), Netherlands: De Bilt, Portugal: Lisboa/Geof, Spain: Madrid/Barajas.

**Supplementary Table 4.** Relevant information regarding ethical issues, by country

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Information regarding ethical issues</b>
<b>Finland</b>	Ethical approval by the Finnish Teachers' Union and the Finnish National Board of Education
<b>Sweden</b>	Ethical clearance not needed (Privacy Act of The Swedish Data Protection Authority)
<b>France</b>	Ethical clearance not needed (French Control of electronic datasets with personal information)
<b>Germany</b>	Ethical approvals by the Committee of the General Medical Council Hamburg and the Federal State Ministries of Culture and Education
<b>Italy</b>	Ethical approvals by the Committee of the 'Istituto Superiore di Sanità' and the University of Torino
<b>Belgium</b>	Flemish: Ethical approval by the Committee of the University Hospital Ghent French: Ethical approval by the Committee of the Faculty of Psychology of the 'Université libre de Bruxelles'
<b>Netherlands</b>	Ethical approval by the Committee of the University of Utrecht
<b>Portugal</b>	Ethical approval by the Committee of the São João University Hospital and the National Commission for Individual Data Protection
<b>Spain</b>	Ethical approval by the Committee of the University of Seville

IMPORTANT NOTE: Information regarding ethical issues is often related to the most recent survey rounds. Information for older survey rounds may not be similar but this information is often absent in the international HBSC database. Of note, all data were collected with anonymous questionnaires.



**Supplementary Figure 1.** Flowchart showing causes of participants' exclusion for analyses, by survey round (HBSC, Health Behaviour School-aged Children).

**Supplementary Table 5.** Percentage of the sample excluded due to missing FAS<sup>1</sup> data, sample size (with complete data) and description, by country, and by survey round

Countries	2001/02						2005/06						2009/10					
	FAS <sup>1</sup> missing (%)	n	Females (%)	Mean age	Daily consumers (%)	Regular consumers (>5x/week) (%)	FAS <sup>1</sup> missing (%)	n	Females (%)	Mean age	Daily consumers (%)	Regular consumers (>5x/week) (%)	FAS <sup>1</sup> missing (%)	n	Females (%)	Mean age	Daily consumers (%)	Regular consumers (>5x/week) (%)
Finland	2.2	3 386	49.8	14.8	8.6	18.2	2.7	3 310	52.8	14.8	6.0	13.7	3.0	4 135	52.4	14.7	4.6	12.3
Sweden	1.9	2 355	49.6	14.5	14.8	27.4	1.7	2 794	51.4	14.6	7.7	15.6	3.4	4 170	50.8	14.4	7.6	16.5
France	1.5	5 353	50.8	14.1	29.5		2.2	4 516	51.3	14.6	28.8		3.8	3 796	51.0	14.4	29.4	
Germany	2.3	3 451	51.8	14.6	31.6		1.8	4 873	50.0	14.4	22.0		2.2	3 190	52.9	14.4	22.4	
Italy	1.5	2 774	53.4	14.7	24.8		1.5	2 626	50.6	14.8	28.9		2.0	3 154	50.5	14.4	20.5	
Belgium	4.1	6 720	52.8	14.5	41.4		10.9	5 356	48.9	14.5	38.3		13.2	4 669	50.4	14.4	33.0	
Netherlands	1.5	2 736	49.4	14.4	47.0		2.1	2 806	50.0	14.4	40.6		5.3	2 862	50.4	14.4	35.3	
Portugal	2.5	1 739	53.0	14.8	33.0		3.2	2 608	54.1	14.6	25.9		2.4	2 763	54.7	14.6	23.6	
Spain	1.1	3 670	51.6	14.5	31.7		1.1	5 823	50.1	14.5	25.5		2.9	3 665	51.7	14.5	23.6	

Countries	2013/14						2017/18					
	FAS <sup>1</sup> missing (%)	n	Females (%)	Mean age	Daily consumers (%)	Regular consumers (>5x/week) (%)	FAS <sup>1</sup> missing (%)	n	Females (%)	Mean age	Daily consumers (%)	Regular consumers (>5x/week) (%)
Finland	2.9	3 731	51.4	14.8	2.8	9.8	4.7	2 085	51.1	14.8	4.6	10.2
Sweden	4.7	4 770	51.1	14.7	5.4	12.6	3.0	2 876	51.7	14.5	5.6	11.8
France	5.2	3 687	50.6	14.4	28.2		3.3	5 743	51.2	14.2	24.4	
Germany	3.1	4 018	49.1	14.4	21.4		1.5	2 854	54.1	14.4	15.0	
Italy	2.6	2 596	49.8	14.6	15.6		2.4	2 676	52.8	14.6	12.2	
Belgium	7.7	6 266	48.5	14.6	35.4		2.3	4 333	50.1	14.5	28.3	
Netherlands	7.0	2 672	51.6	14.4	30.1		2.5	3 125	51.6	14.4	20.3	
Portugal	8.6	3 016	51.8	14.4	18.4		0.0	3 555	53.4	14.3	15.7	
Spain	35.5 <sup>2</sup>	5 130	53.0	14.4	21.7		1.2	3 088	51.8	14.4	14.3	

<sup>1</sup> FAS, Family Affluence Scale.

<sup>2</sup> Only a random subsample of the 2013/2014 Spanish sample was asked the questions on family affluence, which explains the large proportion of missing data that survey round.

**Supplementary Table 6.** Odds ratios (95% CI) of the cross-sectional association between daily soda consumption and Family Affluence Scale (FAS) category (reference group = lower-affluent adolescents) at the last pre-tax survey round and at the first post-tax survey round, by country

Countries	Pre-tax survey round						Post-tax survey round					
	Middle FAS			Higher FAS			Middle FAS			Higher FAS		
	OR <sup>1</sup>	(95% CI)	P-value	OR <sup>1</sup>	(95% CI)	P-value	OR <sup>1</sup>	(95% CI)	P-value	OR <sup>1</sup>	(95% CI)	P-value
Finland	0.86	(0.60, 1.25)	0.47	1.23	(0.77, 1.94)	0.38	0.63	(0.38, 1.04)	0.07	0.96	(0.53, 1.74)	0.90
Sweden	0.64	(0.48, 0.85)	<b>0.002</b>	0.76	(0.51, 1.12)	0.16	0.76	(0.56, 1.04)	0.09	0.83	(0.55, 1.26)	0.38
France	0.63	(0.53, 0.75)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	0.58	(0.46, 0.73)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	0.84	(0.70, 1.01)	0.07	0.72	(0.56, 0.92)	<b>0.01</b>
Germany	0.87	(0.70, 1.08)	0.20	0.68	(0.51, 0.90)	<b>0.007</b>	0.86	(0.71, 1.05)	0.14	0.75	(0.58, 0.97)	<b>0.03</b>
Italy	0.83	(0.66, 1.04)	0.10	0.90	(0.67, 1.20)	0.46	0.84	(0.64, 1.11)	0.22	0.80	(0.56, 1.16)	0.25
Belgium	0.73	(0.64, 0.84)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	0.51	(0.43, 0.62)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	<b>0.73</b>	(0.61, 0.86)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	0.50	(0.39, 0.63)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>
Netherlands	0.95	(0.77, 1.19)	0.67	0.99	(0.75, 1.31)	0.95	0.84	(0.68, 1.03)	0.09	0.51	(0.37, 0.69)	<b>&lt;0.001</b>
Portugal	0.85	(0.68, 1.08)	0.19	0.88	(0.65, 1.18)	0.40	1.00	(0.79, 1.27)	0.99	1.09	(0.81, 1.48)	0.57
Spain	0.84	(0.71, 0.99)	<b>0.05</b>	0.78	(0.62, 0.98)	<b>0.03</b>	0.67	(0.53, 0.87)	<b>0.002</b>	0.58	(0.42, 0.82)	<b>0.002</b>

<sup>1</sup> Difference between FAS groups estimated by multilevel logistic models (dependent variable: daily soda consumption) adjusted for sex, age groups and mean temperature at month of data collection, FAS categories (odds ratios for FAS categories). OR<1 and P<0.05 (in bold) indicate that lower-affluent adolescents are more likely to consume sodas daily than middle- and high-affluent ones (conversely for OR>1: larger daily soda consumers = middle- and high-affluent adolescents). The numbers of participants by country and survey round are detailed in Supplementary Table 5.

**Supplementary Table 7.** Country-level short-term changes (OR (95% CI)) in the proportion of daily soda consumption between the last pre-tax survey round (reference) and the first post-tax survey round in countries with a soda tax (in black) and comparison countries (in grey), overall and by family affluence (FAS, stratified models)

	Population-level			Stratified models								
	All <sup>1</sup>			Lower FAS <sup>1,2</sup>			Middle FAS <sup>1,2</sup>			Higher FAS <sup>1,2</sup>		
	OR	(95% CI)	P-Val.	OR	(95% CI)	P-Val.	OR	(95% CI)	P-Val.	OR	(95% CI)	P-Val.
<b>Finland</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>(0.43, 0.80)</b>	<b>0.001</b>	0.63	(0.34, 1.17)	0.15	<b>0.54</b>	<b>(0.36, 0.82)</b>	<b>0.003</b>	0.71	(0.37, 1.37)	0.31
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>0.70</b>	<b>(0.55, 0.90)</b>	<b>0.005</b>	0.72	(0.49, 1.07)	0.10	<b>0.72</b>	<b>(0.53, 0.97)</b>	<b>0.03</b>	0.70	(0.41, 1.21)	0.20
<b>France</b>	0.93	(0.82, 1.07)	0.32	<b>0.76</b>	<b>(0.60, 0.96)</b>	<b>0.02</b>	1.01	(0.86, 1.18)	0.92	0.94	(0.71, 1.24)	0.65
<b>Germany</b>	0.95	(0.83, 1.10)	0.51	0.91	(0.72, 1.16)	0.45	0.94	(0.80, 1.12)	0.51	1.03	(0.74, 1.42)	0.88
<b>Italy</b>	0.79	(0.57, 1.09)	0.15	0.74	(0.43, 1.27)	0.28	0.82	(0.56, 1.21)	0.32	0.65	(0.34, 1.23)	0.18
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>(0.64, 0.79)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>(0.62, 0.90)</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>0.68</b>	<b>(0.60, 0.78)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>(0.54, 0.92)</b>	<b>0.01</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>(0.50, 0.66)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	<b>0.67</b>	<b>(0.53, 0.86)</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>0.61</b>	<b>(0.51, 0.72)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	<b>0.33</b>	<b>(0.23, 0.47)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>(0.71, 0.97)</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>(0.52, 0.95)</b>	<b>0.02</b>	0.87	(0.72, 1.06)	0.16	0.89	(0.65, 1.21)	0.45
<b>Spain</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>(0.49, 0.72)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	0.80	(0.57, 1.11)	0.18	<b>0.55</b>	<b>(0.43, 0.69)</b>	<b>&lt;0.001</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>(0.38, 0.80)</b>	<b>0.002</b>

<sup>1</sup> OR < 1 indicates a post-tax reduction in daily consumption; OR > 1 indicates a post-tax increase in daily consumption. ORs were modeled using multilevel logistic models (dependent variable = daily soda consumption), adjusted for all survey rounds (reference = pre-tax survey round), sex, age group, and temperature at the time of data collection (P≤0.05 in bold). The numbers of participants by country and survey round are detailed in Supplementary Table 5.

<sup>2</sup> Models were stratified by FAS.



**Supplementary Table 8.** Country-level long-term trends (OR (95% CI) in the proportion of daily soda consumption in the pre-tax period (between 2001/02 and 2009/10) and the post-tax period between 2009/10 and 2017/18 in countries with a soda tax (in black) and comparison countries (in grey), overall and by family affluence (FAS, stratified models)

		Pre-tax trend (2001/02–2009/10)		Post-tax trend (2009/10–2017/18)	
		OR <sup>1</sup>	(95% CI)	OR <sup>1,2</sup>	(95% CI)
<b>Finland</b>	All	0.67	(0.60, 0.76) ***	0.94	(0.76, 1.16)
	Lower FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.69	(0.56, 0.86) ***	0.82	(0.55, 1.23)
	Middle FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.69	(0.56, 0.76) ***	0.97	(0.73, 1.28)
	Higher FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.71	(0.55, 0.91) **	1.03	(0.66, 1.61)
<b>Sweden</b>	All	0.67	(0.60, 0.75) ***	0.86	(0.75, 0.98) *
	Lower FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.71	(0.60, 0.85) ***	0.81	(0.66, 1.00) *
	Middle FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.69	(0.59, 0.79) ***	0.91	(0.77, 1.07)
	Higher FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.60	(0.47, 0.75) ***	0.81	(0.60, 1.07)
<b>France</b>	All	1.01	(0.95, 1.08)	0.86	(0.81, 0.92) ***
	Lower FAS	1.06	(0.95, 1.18)	0.78	(0.70, 0.87) ***
	Middle FAS	0.98	(0.91, 1.06)	0.89	(0.83, 0.96) **
	Higher FAS	1.03	(0.91, 1.18)	0.88	(0.78, 1.00)
<b>Germany</b>	All	0.81	(0.76, 0.87) ***	0.84	(0.77, 0.91) ***
	Lower FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.79	(0.70, 0.88) ***	0.81	(0.69, 0.94) **
	Middle FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.83	(0.77, 0.91) ***	0.85	(0.76, 0.95) **
	Higher FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.81	(0.69, 0.95) **	0.79	(0.64, 0.98) *
<b>Italy</b>	All	0.94	(0.85, 1.04)	0.62	(0.55, 0.69) ***
	Lower FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.95	(0.81, 1.11)	0.64	(0.53, 0.78) ***
	Middle FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.96	(0.85, 1.08)	0.57	(0.50, 0.66) ***
	Higher FAS <sup>2</sup>	0.97	(0.79, 1.20)	0.61	(0.48, 0.78) ***

<sup>1</sup> OR < 1 indicates a decreasing trend in daily soda consumption; OR > 1 indicates an increasing trend in daily soda consumption. ORs were modeled using multilevel two-piecewise linear spline logistic models (dependent variable: daily soda consumption), adjusted for sex, age group, and temperature at the time of data collection (\*P≤0.05, \*\*P≤0.01, \*\*\*P≤0.001). The numbers of participants by country and survey round are detailed in Supplementary Table 5.

<sup>2</sup> Models were stratified by FAS.