@article{Balmelli:12057,
      recid = {12057},
      author = {Balmelli, Simone and Moresino, Francesco},
      title = {Coordination of plug-in electric vehicle charging in a  stochastic framework : a decentralized tax/incentive-based  mechanism to reach global optimality},
      journal = {Mathematics},
      address = {2023-02},
      number = {ARTICLE},
      pages = {24 p.},
      abstract = {We address the problem of charging plug-in electric  vehicles (PEVs) in a decentralized way
and under stochastic  dynamics affecting the real-time electricity tariff. The  model is formulated as a Nash equilibrium seeking problem,  where players wish to minimize the costs for charging their  own PEVs. For finite PEVs populations, the Nash equilibrium  does not correspond to the social optimum, i.e., to a  control strategy minimizing the total electricity costs at  the aggregate level. We accordingly introduce some  taxes/incentives on the price of electricity for charging  PEVs and show that it is possible to tune them so that (a)  the social optimum is reached as a Nash equilibrium, (b) in  correspondence with this equilibrium, players do not pay  any net total tax, nor receive any net total incentive.},
      url = {http://arodes.hes-so.ch/record/12057},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/math11040999},
}